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"DE-LEVERAGING" THE LEVERAGED BUYOUTS OF
THE 1980s: A PRISONER'S DILEMMA FOR
UNSECURED CORPORATE BONDHOLDERS
IN THE 1990s
ANN E. CONAWAY STILSON*
The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented burgeoning of merger and
acquisition (M&A) transactions in American corporations.' One trans-
action in particular, the leveraged buyout (LBO), 2 increased in number
from 99 in 1981 to 316 in 1988. 3 The M&A growth resulted from sev-
eral factors, not the least of which was the development by Drexel, Bum-
ham & Lambert (Drexel) in 1977 of high-yield debt securities (junk
bonds). 4 During the 1980s, corporations also began incurring record
levels of debt. 5 This increase in both M&A activity and corporate lever-
aging now threatens the restructuring of newly-merged firms because
interest obligations often exceed corporate revenues, leaving pre- and
post-merger unsecured bonds teetering on default.
This article explores the "prisoner's dilemma" created for pre-
merger unsecured bondholders by failed or failing buyouts of the 1980s.
Section I outlines the dilemma. Section II discusses the nature of bonds
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. The author
would like to express thanks to her husband, Daniel J. Anker, Esquire, and her brother,
David H. Conaway, Esquire, for their insightful comments during the drafting of this
Article.
1. See Top 25 Transactions, 24 MERGERS & AcQUISrrIONS, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 124, for a
listing by name and value of the transaction in millions of dollars of the largest acquisitions
in the fourth quarter of 1989. See also Top 25 Transactions, 24 MERGERS & AcqussrnONS,
July-Aug. 1989, at 81 (twenty-five largest acquisitions in the first quarter of 1989); The Top
100, 23 MERGERS & AcquisrnoNs, May-June 1989, at 47 (one hundred largest acquisitions
in 1988); The Top 100, 22 MERGERS & AcQuisrnONS, May-June 1988, at 39 (one hundred
largest acquisitions of 1987); The Top 100, 21 MERGERS & AcQUISMrONS, May-June 1987, at
47 (one hundred largest acquisitions in 1986); The Top 100, 20 MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS,
May-June 1986, at 33 (one hundred largest acquisitions in 1985).
2. An "LBO" refers to any highly leveraged transaction. Leveraged takeovers fall
into two primary categories: (1) buyouts by a company's management in which key execu-
tives acquire the firm through borrowed funds and subsequently become the sole or pri-
mary equity owners of the company or (2) buyouts by third-party acquirors who purchase
target securities through borrowed funds and subsequently become the company's pri-
mary equity owners or who participate in equity ownership of the firm with target manage-
ment who consented to and cooperated in the firm's acquisition. Leveraged transactions
may also be a corporate recapitalization in which a firm borrows cash to distribute to eq-
uity holders. The result of leveraged recapitalizations is that high levels of debt replace
outstanding equity creating a capital structure which resembles that of an LBO.
Recapitalizations, unlike traditional LBOs, do not effect a change in corporate man-
agement and, therefore, firm directors often use them as a defensive maneuver.
3. The aggregate value of LBOs alone swelled from $3.1 billion in 1981 to over $42
billion in 1988. See Quarterly Profile, 23 MERGERS & AcquosrrioNs, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 74.
4. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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and bond financing. Section III examines the conflict inherent in corpo-
rate bond financing between stockholders and bondholders. Section IV
discusses the consequences of bankruptcy upon pre-merger unsecured
bondholders as well as workout and insolvency plans of reorganization.
Section V suggests a solution to the dilemma by examining various state
and federal remedies.
I. OUTLINING THE DILEMMA
M&As increased at a phenomenal rate during the 1980s. This was
due to several factors: (1) Drexel's development of a primary market in
junk bond financing for acquisitions;6 (2) the acceptance of commercial
lending on the basis of anticipated cash flow and asset dispositions; (3)
tender offers for large conglomerate corporations based upon the com-
pany's "break-up" value; (4) the practice by institutional investors, pen-
sion funds, and savings and loans of acquiring risky investments to
generate fees and to maintain performance levels on their customers'
behalf; (5) the control of commerce in United States' securities by a few
industry professionals and institutional investors; (6) the use of tax in-
centives for debt financing purposes; and (7) the emergence of special-
ized takeover firms which located target firms and raiders, assisted in
structuring buyouts, provided bridge financing for acquisitions, and
often became owners of the acquired entity.
7
During the 1980s, American businesses also began incurring record
levels of debt. In 1989, the New York Times reported that from 1984 to
1987 corporate equity decreased by $313 billion, while new corporate
debt increased by almost twice that amount.8 This unprecedented
growth in corporate leverage has several consequences. First, new
leveraging imposes a substantial strain upon the cash flow of a firm's
ability to service interest commitments. For example, interest, as a per-
centage of cash flow, increased from approximately 17% in 1977-78 to
approximately 25% in 1988.9 Consequently, larger portions of a firm's
6. Junk bonds were issued in transactions involving the following companies: RJR
Holdings ($14.9 billion), Long Island Lighting ($3.8 billion), Owens-Illinois ($2.9 billion),
Quantum Chemical ($2.1 billion), Southland ($1.7 billion), SCI Holdings ($1.7 billion),
Wickes ($1.6 billion), Safeway Stores ($1.6 billion), Fort Howard ($1.6 billion), Union Car-
bide ($1.6 billion), Harcourt BraceJovanovich ($1.6 billion), E.II Holdings ($1.5 billion),
R.H. Macy ($1.5 billion), USG ($1.5 billion), Federated Dept. Stores ($1.4 billion), Allied
Stores ($1.4 billion), National Gypsum ($1.0 billion), Burlington Holdings ($1.0 billion),
American Standard ($1.0 billion), and Interco ($0.8 billion). See Kuhn,Junk: The Weak and
the Strong, FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 1989, at 17.
7. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. is one of the first, and best known, firms devel-
oped for the purpose of locating buyers and assisting in mergers and acquisitions activity,
particularly LBOs.
8. See Reuters, Buyout Curbs Draw Concern, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 20, 1989, at D6, col. 5. See
also Dowd, Washington's War Against LBO Debt, FORTUNE, Feb. 13, 1989, at 91 (corporate
equity incurred a net loss of $442 billion whereas debt experienced an $800 billion
increase).
9. See Dowd, supra, note 8, at 92. If companies issuing non-investment grade debt
expect cash flow problems following placement of the securities, payment-in-kind (PIK)
notes or zero-coupon bonds may be used instead of traditional junk bonds. Zero-coupon
bonds provide relief to struggling firms through interest deferrals. PIK notes, on the
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cash flow are being directed to debt obligations. Second, the increase in
interest payments led Standard & Poor's to downgrade 386 debt issues
valued at over $170 billion.' 0 For the most part, these debt issues were
investment grade when issued and carried low risk of loss to security
holders. I Finally, since most LBO transactions allowed no leeway for
an economic downturn, the effects of a recession on target firms, LBO
participants, pre-LBO bond owners, and trade suppliers were largely
ignored. 12
The expansion in volume and aggregate dollar amount of M&As,
coupled with the increase in corporate debt, threaten a systematic re-
structuring of newly-merged firms. Defaults will occur on both pre-
merger unsecured corporate bonds, which have suffered material reduc-
tions in bond ratings,' 3 and junk bonds. 14 A 1989 study reported that
other hand, pay interest with other debt securities and, therefore, require no cash outlays
for extended intervals. PIK notes and zero-coupon bonds allow LBO firms to avoid inter-
est payments at the outset, thus deferring the possibility of default until a later date.
10. Reuters, Record Debt Downgrading, N.Y. TiMEs,Jan. 16, 1989, at D6, col. 2 (ratings
were cut in part because of the impact of huge LBOs and acquisitions).
11. See id.
12. See Corporate Finance, "Leveraged to the Hilt" Will History Repeat Itsef?., WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 25, 1988, at A26, col. 3.
13. In 1988, Standard & Poor's reported that downgrades of corporate debt securities
outranked upgrades by more than 2 to 1, with an adverse effect on $46 billion worth of
corporate debt. See Committee on Developments in Business Financing, Sixth Annual Re-
view of Developments in Business Financing, 45 Bus. LAw. 441, 451 (1989). As a result of this
attack on the bond market, bondholders from major corporations have united to form the
Institutional Bondholders' Rights Association. The purpose of the Association is, in large
part, to aid debt owners during merger and acquisition transactions. Id. at 453. See also
Winkler, Sore Junk Bond Holders Form Rights Group But Say They Aren't Looking for Free Ride,
WALL ST.J.,June 30, 1988, at 61, col. 2. The triggering event for the Association's forma-
tion was the fall 1988 LBO of RJR Nabisco which resulted in a fifteen percent drop in RJR
bond value. Laderman, How Megadebt Shakes Up Banks and Bonds, Bus. WK., Nov. 14, 1988,
at 132, 136.
14.
ISSUER JUNK BONDS ESTIMATED RECENT CHANGE
DEFAULT RISK* PRICE
in billions 2 yrs. 5 yrs. percent 8/31-9/27
of face
value
RJR Holdings $14.9 2 4 103.0 -4.5
Long Island Lighting 3.8 1 3 103.0 -0.5
Owens-Illinois 2.9 1 4 96.0 -4.5
Quantum Chemical 2.1 2 5 96.0 -4.0
Southland 1.7 3 6 52.0 -22.0
SCI Holdings 1.7 2 4 109.0 -1.5
Wickes 1.6 3 6 69.0 +3.0
Safeway Stores 1.6 2 4 101.5 -1.5
Fort Howard 1.6 2 5 99.5 -3.0
Union Carbide 1.6 1 2 86.0 -2.0
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1.6 2 5 102.0 -2.0
E.II Holdings 1.5 4 6 67.0 -3.0
R. H. Macy 1.5 2 4 102.5 -1.5
USG 1.5 3 5 66.0 -12.0
Federated Dept. Stores 1A 6 7 62.0 -21.0
Allied Stores 1.4 6 7 40.0 -11.0
National Gypsum 1.0 3 5 70.0 -4.0
Burlington Holdings 1.0 2 5 104.0 -2.5
American Standard 1.0 2 5 102.0 -2.0
Interco 0.8 5 6 57.0 -4.0
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the junk bond default rate averaged 1.5 percent over the period from
1978 to 1986.15 Another study indicated that junk bonds issued be-
tween 1977 and 1978 incurred a default rate in excess of thirty-four per-
cent; those issued between 1979 and 1983 had a default rate from
nineteen to twenty-six percent; and those issued between 1984 and 1986
showed a default rate of approximately nine percent. 16 The latter study
reflects the concept of bond aging which recognizes minimum default
percentages immediately after issue that then rise over the life of the
bond and ultimately become diluted by new bond placement accre-
tion. 17 If bond aging proves to be an accurate default progression indi-
cator, the number of bankruptcies or voluntary reorganizations will
increase as more junk bonds approach maturity.
Despite the modest default ratios on straight corporate debt and
junk bonds in relation to the billions of dollars of outstanding bonds,
the 1990s will gauge whether corporate cash flow is sufficient to sustain
the 1980s buyout debt. Already two large LBOs have failed because of
junk bond commitment defaults: Campeau Corporation (which filed for
Chapter I I bankruptcy protection in January 1990)18 and Revco R.S.
Inc. (which filed under Chapter 11 in July 1988). 19 Market analysts cur-
rently are following the Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.'s 1989 LBO of
RJR Nabisco (RJR) which, at approximately $25 billion in cash and se-
curities, is the largest acquisition in history.20 At last report, RJR gener-
ated sufficient cash to cover its interest costs at the end of 1989. RJR
management, however, faces the prospect of adjusting interest rates on
two securities at a cost of approximately $7 billion by April 1991.21
One significant result of the frenzied 1980s debt financing for
M&As is that companies now need greater revenues to service debt obli-
gations. To avoid default, firms must create cash. If further junk bond
financing is unavailable and corporate assets cannot be sold for reason-
able amounts, target firms will be forced either into liquidation or insol-
vency reorganizations. Assuming that most firms will initially attempt to
continue business operations, reorganization provides the best alterna-
tive to forced disposal of firm assets. The probable goal of rehabilitative
restructuring in or outside of bankruptcy is the de-leveraging of the
* A default risk of one is considered safe; a default risk of seven represents a 75 percent
chance of default. Kuhn, supra note 6, at 17.
15. SpioTro, HIGH-YIELD BONDS, LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND TROUBLED DEBT FINANC-
ING, at 76 (1989). See also Winkler,Junk Bonds Are Taking Their Lumps, WALL ST.J., Apr. 14,
1989, at Cl, col. 3 (the default rate between 1970 and 1985 on junk bonds never exceeded
2.1 percent).
16. See Winkler, Junk Bonds Are Taking Their Lumps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1989, at CI,
col. 3.
17. See SpioTro, supra note 15, at 76.
18. Barmash, Campeau Invokes Bankruptcy Code for its Big Stores, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1990, at Al, col. 6.
19. Holusha, Revco Drugstore Chain in Bankruptcy Filing, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 1988, at
DI, col. 3.
20. Norris, Can RJR Nabisco Keep Its Promise?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at D10, col. 3.
21. Id. Although the securities do not pay interest in cash until 1995, as the interest
accrues and compounds it becomes an obligation of the company.
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debtor corporation. The query for the 1990s is how the restructuring
will be effected and who will bear its costs.
The capital structure of a typical LBO consists of three general
levels: (1) approximately ten percent equity, or common stock; (2) fifty
to sixty percent senior secured debt; and (3) mezzanine financing of the
difference between the cost of the LBO company and the equity and
senior debt available. 2 2 When a LBO company is restructured or de-
leveraged, management often retires, replaces, or amends outstanding
debt interests. To do this, management repurchases existing debt se-
curities at a fraction of their face value, exchanges new securities (either
debt or equity) for pre-existing bonds, or modifies indenture covenants
to extend or reduce material terms to outstanding bond contracts. Pres-
ently, LBO companies are pursuing reorganizations in which equity and
debt interests are realigned pursuant to exchanges of securities. For ex-
ample, assume an LBO firm is unable to meet all of its debt commit-
ments. A common alternative to default or foreclosure is to offer debt
owners an equity position in the company. In September 1990, the
Trump Organization varied this tactic by offering equity in the Trump
Taj Mahal Casino Resort to its bondholders in exchange for delaying a
$47.3 million interest payment.
23
The more common inversion of debt and equity positions is negoti-
ated either on a long-term or permanent basis to effectuate a successful
restructuring of the LBO firm. In the latter instance, holders of equity,
senior debt, and mezzanine financing compete for priority consideration
in the debtor's de-leveraging process. For example, assume that senior
debt holders reject a substitution of securities due to the inequality of
the exchange (speculative equity for low-risk secured debt). Instead, se-
nior lenders offer to advance additional credit to the LBO company in
return for a security interest in unencumbered assets. By this maneuver,
secured creditors provide necessary cash to the distressed company, ex-
act collateral as security for the loan, and preserve their status as priority
creditors.
Unsecured creditors-including pre-merger bondholders, trade
claimants, and junk bond owners-are in a less favorable bargaining po-
sition. For the most part, these creditors must compete for cash pay-
ments or equity. Trade creditors, comprising a relatively small
percentage of the outstanding unsecured debt claims, will negotiate for
22. Mezzanine financing is most often in the form of junk bonds or preferred stock
which, together with pre-existing unsecured corporate debt and trade claims, comprise all
interests not classified as equity or senior debt. Equity investors in an LBO may include:
(I) LBO firm's management; (2) shareholders who sold all but a small portion of their
former equity position; (3) venture capitalists or firms that specialize in LBO financing;
and (4) owners of senior debt or mezzanine financing who receive an equity "kicker" as
part of a financing "package" or "strip." Senior debt owners often consist of banks and
insurance companies who require full collateralization of the LBO company's assets for
their investment. Mezzanine financing includes third-party financiers, insurance compa-
nies, and senior debt holders (as included in their secured loan package).
23. See Hylton, Trump Now Reported Near Bond-Sways Offer, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 11, 1990,
at D2, col. 5.
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cash payments to be made out of ongoing business operations over a
twelve-month period. Management will be inclined to permit these pay-
ments in order to maintain the flow of goods and services to the dis-
tressed firm. Junk bondholders, on the other hand, have no alternative
except to accept equity securities since the sheer volume of their claims
forecloses possible cash settlements.
Unsecured pre-LBO bondholders' interests lie in an abyss some-
where between those of trade creditors and junk bondholders. As with
trade creditors, pre-existing bondholder claims are diminutive in rela-
tion to the percentage of LBO debt outstanding and, thus, arguably
could be paid in cash. Like junk bondholders, pre-merger debt owners
do not provide essential supplies or services to the LBO firm. The LBO
firm management, therefore, neither owes nor is encouraged to develop
an allegiance to the pre-merger debt owners. Equity investors in the
LBO company oppose any stock offering to debt holders which dilutes
their ownership posture. From a practical perspective, however, these
equity owners must endorse a common stock offering since the alterna-
tive is bankruptcy liquidation where they rank last among the debtor's
other creditors.
Secured and unsecured creditors who are not willing to wait for par-
tial compensation under a plan of reorganization may assign their rights
against the debtor. The assignment of creditor claims arguably will be
initiated by insiders to the buyout. These insiders include members of
creditors' committee and former LBO participants who have access to
the merged entity's proprietary financial information and who hold mil-
lions of dollars of the debtor's unsecured bonds or preferred stock. De-
leveraging an LBO company, by substituting equity for unsecured debt
interests, has the immediate effect of auctioning away corporate control
in bankruptcy. As a practical matter, insiders control the auction pro-
cess. To allow corporate control to be manipulated in a bankruptcy fo-
rum effectively circumvents the jurisdiction of the federal securities and
state corporate courts-the traditional sentinels of fairness in corporate
control transactions.
Currently, the costs and risks of restructuring M&As in bankruptcy
are borne by pre-merger unsecured bondholders whose post-LBO inter-
ests align neither with trade creditors nor high-yield debt owners. As
unsecured creditors, these bondholders rank only above equity investors
in priority of payment by a bankrupt debtor and are considered pari
passu with both junk bond owners and trade creditors. In practical
terms, however, these debt holders are hard pressed to secure a cash
settlement and are instead compelled to consent to an equity offering by
the reorganized entity. If the restructured firm fails to become profita-
ble, the substituted stock becomes worthless. In effect, pre-LBO bond-
holders must either sell their devalued securities at a substantial loss or
await compensation in the form of equity. The question raised by these
bondholders is what remedy, if any, is available to protect their debt
stake that was solicited years earlier by a financially sound issuer.
336 [Vol. 68:3
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To date, corporate bondholders who have pursued impairment of
investment claims against management or acquirors in state corporate
or federal securities actions have lacked standing to sue.24 State courts
in particular are unwilling to extend corporate fiduciary principles to
pre-LBO bondholders, ostensibly in recognition of the inviolable pre-
cept of corporate law that management must maximize shareholder wel-
fare over bondholder gain.2 5 State contract actions which seek relief
based upon modifications of outstanding debt securities have fared no
better.26 The contractual actions, unlike their fiduciary duty counter-
parts, implicate questions of coercion, good faith, fair dealing, and in-
formed consent.2 7 Sincejunk bonds issued in the 1980s will continue to
mature and press troubled companies to the verge of bankruptcy, the
quandry of spiraling devaluation confronting unsecured corporate
bondholders in the 1990s apparently will be addressed in bankruptcy
proceedings, a forum ill-suited to adjudicate issues of corporate control
in publicly-held corporations. The only other alternative for unsecured
corporate debt holders is to set aside certain claims by buyout partici-
pants under fraudulent transfer provisions of the bankruptcy code or
analogous state fraudulent conveyance statutes.
II. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BONDS
AND BOND FINANCING
The financial structure of a corporation is primarily composed of
two common investment devices: common stock (equity) and bonds or
debentures (debt).28 Straight corporate debt involves a creditor (the
bondholder) lending money to a corporate entity in return for the cor-
24. See infra notes 193-220 and accompanying text.
25. See id.
26. See Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); Kass v. Eastern Air Lines,
C.A. No. 8700, 8701, 8711 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986). See also Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d
785 (Del. Ch. 1987).
27. See infra notes 193-220 and accompanying text.
28. The fundamental characteristics of common stock include: (1) the right to vote
for the election of directors and on other extraordinary corporate matters; (2) the right to
receive dividends; (3) free transferability; (4) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (5)
the ability to increase in value; and (6) the right to share in the net assets of the corpora-
tion upon liquidation. See United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (ad-
dressing the issue of whether "a share of stock" that entitled the holder to lease an
apartment in a housing cooperative was a "security"). Common stock holders are also
entitled to inspect books and records, REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 16.02
(1984), to sue derivatively on behalf of the corporation, Id. § 7.40, and to receive financial
information concerning the corporation, Id. § 16.20.
Bonds and debentures are evidences of long-term corporate commitment and indebt-
edness. Each involves an unconditional promise to pay a certain sum at the maturity date
plus interest. The distinction between bonds and debentures is technical and often ig-
nored in short-hand finance practice. Debentures are unsecured corporate obligations,
whereas bonds are secured by a lien or mortgage on corporate assets. For purposes of this
article, the term "bond" means both types of debt securities.
Additional characteristics of debt securities are (1) interest payments at fixed intervals
(this interest is deductible to the corporation for income tax purposes); (2) a redemption
feature which allows the corporation to pay off the debt before its maturity date, usually at
a premium over the face value of the security; (3) subordination to other corporate obliga-
tions; (4) a right of conversion into other classes of stock, generally common stock; and (5)
1991]
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poration's unconditional promise to repay the sum at a future fixed date
(the maturity date). 29 The transaction is a debt that must be repaid; it is
a loan of capital by the bondholder to the firm which is the debtor. Cor-
porate bonds are generally issued in $1,000 denominations, represent-
ing the face or par value of the bond. The face or par value must be paid
to the creditor upon maturity. The bond manifests the additional obli-
gation by the debtor to pay a fixed amount of interest at specified inter-
vals, commonly semi-annually. This interest becomes a deductible
expense for the corporation. But, in turn, the firm must generate suffi-
cient cash flow to service the debt obligation.
The three basic attributes of a bond-maturity date, interest, and
face or par value-are set forth in a bond contract, referred to as a "trust
indenture." 3 0 The trust indenture is a standard form contract that con-
tains numerous covenants to protect bondholders from undesirable
management or debtor actions. 3 ' The purpose of these covenants is to
minimize corporate decisions that tend to transfer wealth from bond-
holders to stockholders. Customary bond covenants include restrictions
on future unsecured long-term debt,3 2 limitations on the declaration
and payment of dividends,3 3 and restraints on secured debt (known as a
a right to vote permitted by statute and created by the indenture upon certain, limited
contingencies.
A third common investment device is preferred stock. Preferred shares are "hybrid"
securities, involving features of both classic equity and debt. Typical features of preferred
stock include: (1) priority in dividend payments over holders of common shares; (2) prior-
ity over common stockholders in distributions upon liquidation; (3) the accumulation of
dividends in arrears which must be paid before any new dividends are paid to common
stockholders; (4) the absence of voting rights unless dividends are in arrears for a specified
time; (5) a redemption feature exercisable at the corporation's option; and (6) convertibil-
ity at the holder's option if permitted by the articles of incorporation.
29. Straight debt is not convertible into equity. A convertible bond, on the other
hand, allows the holder to surrender the bond in exchange for issuer's common stock.
Ordinarily, convertible bondholders do not vote for directors since their interest is similar
to that of a creditor of the corporation. Likewise, convertible bondholders enforce their
respective rights via the bond indenture as opposed to the derivative cause of action which
is accorded to equity holders to whom directors owe a fiduciary duty. See Bratton, The
Economics and Junsprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667.
30. The trust indenture is a contract between the corporate bond issuer and a trustee
for the benefit of the bondholders. The contract sets forth the rights and obligations of
the issuer and the bondholders. See A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS
173-74 (5th ed. 1953).
31. Committee on Developments in Business Financing, ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, Model Simplified Indentures, 38 Bus. LAw. 741-43 (1983).
32. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 369-70 (1971) [here-
inafter COMMENTARIES]. See also B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 98
(2d ed. 1981).
Issuance of additional debt generates proceeds which correspondingly increase the
value of the corporate issuer. The additional debt, however, simultaneously increases the
leverage of the firm. With the addition of new debt, the total amount of outstanding eq-
uity declines in relation to the total debt issued, thereby raising the risk of insolvency by
the issuing corporation. Restrictions on additional debt may include absolute prohibitions
or covenants providing for the subordination to existing debt of subsequent bond
financing.
33. COMMENTARIES, supra note 32, at 402. The declaration and payment of dividends
involve judgments within the sound discretion of a board of directors and may be over-
turned only upon a showing of bad faith and a capital surplus from which the dividends
may be paid. See Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947). Addition-
[Vol. 68:3
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negative pledge cause).3 4 Covenants which are uncommon to indenture
contracts, but which substantially protect bondholder interests, are con-
straints on the sale or disposition of assets3 5 and restrictions on future
investments.
3 6
In 1984, a survey was conducted of indenture covenants for one-
hundred and fifty corporations with outstanding bond issues as reported
in the Moody Industrial Manual for 1956-1975.3 7 The survey found that
ninety percent of the corporate indentures directly restricted dividend
payments while the remaining ten percent imposed indirect dividend
constraints.
3 8
In 1979, Smith and Warner published findings from a random sam-
pling of eighty-seven indenture contracts filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1974 and 1975.39 According to
this study, standardized contract covenants as set forth in The Commen-
taries on Indentures by the American Bar Foundation (Commentaries)
were used frequently.40 In addition, ninety-one percent of the bond
contracts restricted additional debt, thirty-six percent limited disposi-
tion of assets, and twenty-three percent curtailed payment of
dividends.
4 1
In a similar survey of America's one hundred largest industrial cor-
porations, as listed in Fortune in 1984, eighty-four companies reported
senior public debt issues. 4 2 Of those corporations, eighty-two disclosed
indenture covenants which contained a restriction on secured debt-the
negative pledge clause. Ninety-two of the one hundred companies re-
ported one or more outstanding senior debt issues, one or more
subordinated debt issues, or both. Approximately twenty-eight percent
of the ninety-two reporting companies revealed indenture restrictions
on unsecured long-term debt while thirty-five percent identified restric-
tions on dividends. Of the twenty-eight percent, twenty-two percent re-
stricted unsecured long-term debt of the parent company alone and the
ally, under state corporate law, payment of dividends is not permitted when the effect is to
impair the corporation's capital account or to otherwise render the corporation insolvent.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1983); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr, § 6.40
(1984). The term "dividend" includes other corporate transactions which effect a transfer
of corporate property from the corporation to its shareholders. The most common exam-
ple of such a transaction is an issuer's repurchase of its common stock.
34. COMMENTARIES, supra note 32, at 350. A negative pledge clause typically limits a
company's ability to incur additional mortgage debt. This pledge by the firm promises its
unsecured bondholders that no mortgage debt will be created that would obtain priority
over the pre-existing unsecured debt. The negative pledge clause, however, relates only
to the firm's fixed assets.
35. Id. at 423.
36. Id. at 458.
37. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAw. 413, 425 (1986).
38. Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10J. FIN. EcoN. 211,
214-16 (1982).
39. Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 117 (1979).
40. Id. at 122-23.
41. Id.
42. The survey was based on information in Moody's 1984 Industrial Manual.
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remaining six percent restricted such debt of only the subsidiary corpo-
ration. None of the ninety-two corporations surveyed disclosed an in-
denture covenant which curtailed the transfer of assets.
These statistics, however, do not reflect representative covenants
for new bond issues. For example, of the twenty-six companies with re-
straints on unsecured debt, eleven dropped the restrictions for new issu-
ances. Consequently, with regards to new offerings alone, only eleven
of ninety-two major industrial corporations protected their bondholders
against subsequent unsecured debt. Similarly, fourteen of the thirty-two
firms which restricted dividends omitted that limitation from initial is-
sues. Again from the perspective of subsequent bond offerings, there-
fore, only twenty percent of the ninety-two companies surveyed granted
bondholder protection from dividend payments.
In view of these statistics, America's largest industrial corporations
are not contracting in favor of their bondholders. Evidence instead indi-
cates that indenture covenants concerning unsecured debt and divi-
dends are occurring less frequently, thereby representing the position of
a minority of publicly-held American corporations. The plight of un-
secured bondholders may be greater than these statistics indicate since
small businesses, for which no data is available, often pattern their trans-
actions on Fortune 100 companies. If, therefore, only negative pledge
clauses remain inviolate, 4 3 a threshold question is raised: Are un-
secured bondholders of American corporations essentially contract
unprotected?
Another preliminary issue concerns the role of long-term un-
secured debt in financing corporate America. First, issuance of some
debt to third parties is generally warranted due to the concept of lever-
age. Leverage occurs when the use of borrowed funds generates more
revenue than the cost of the borrowing. Second, raising capital through
the placement of bonds, as opposed to common stock or other forms of
equity, avoids a potential transfer of control of the firm through voting
securities or the dilution of existing common stockholder interests.
Third, debt financing provides tax advantages to the firm since interest
payments on debt are deductible by the borrower whereas dividend pay-
ments are double-taxed, once by the corporation and again by the equity
holder. Finally, repayment of principal is a non-taxable return of capital
unlike a purchase or redemption of stock by an issuer which is a taxable
dividend to the investor. In sum, the issuance of unsecured debt with
43. Negative pledge clauses represent a simple business decision by firm management
that soliciting public funds for unsecured bonds and then selling mortgage bonds soon
thereafter guarantees antagonism by the existing bondholders who become junior debt
holders. Negative pledge clauses thus protect a company's reputation as a debtor. In
addition, major corporations rarely mortgage their plants to raise additional capital inas-
much as mortgage bonds inflict high administrative costs and limit management's ability to
use its fixed assets.
Negative pledge clauses, on the other hand, take from debtors of the firm the option
of avoiding insolvency or bankruptcy by mortgaging fixed assets. This threat may not be
perceived as great since junior unsecured creditors likely will agree to the creation of new
senior debt where the only remaining choice is bankruptcy.
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appropriate indenture protections infuses start-up or working capital to
the issuer without requiring recourse to banks, existing stockholders, or
the pledge of fixed assets, while providing all of the tax advantages of
debt financing. Long-term unsecured debt is, therefore, a desirable and
necessary aspect of the capitalization and ongoing financial structure of
the corporate enterprise.
In order to effect debt financing, firms often issue bonds to the
"public.' '4 4 Public debt issuance requires the issuing corporation to
register with the SEC.4 5 The registration statement contains all material
terms of the bond placement, including financial disclosures pertinent
to the issuer and the bonds to be sold.4 6 Before the registration state-
ment is filed, however, the issuer will likely negotiate the sale of the en-
tire bond offering to an investment banker who, in turn, underwrites or
sells portions of the placement to participating brokers and dealers.
4 7
The impact of underwriting the offering is that basic terms of the debt,
such as the maturity date, interest rate, and redemption feature, will be
negotiated by the issuer and investment banker. Other terms, such as
the manner in which the call feature is exercised, the duties of the
trustee under the indenture, and the method for calculating dividend
restrictions will tend to follow standardized indenture contracts. Spe-
cialized provisions which reflect specific needs of sophisticated creditors
will be costly, if not impossible, to draft into indenture contracts.
Where unusual circumstances demand the adoption of non-standard-
ized terms, the issuer may propose a private placement, that is, the sale
of bonds to a single creditor or small group of creditors. The advan-
tages of a private securities placement are twofold. First, the borrower
avoids the cost of an SEC registration since the offering is private in
nature. Second, the borrower and lender may freely negotiate contract
terms which are beneficial to both and which more accurately reflect the
allocation of risks for the bonds as market circumstances change.
Although private placements are advantageous to issuers, the benefits
are illusory when debt holders in a private offering soon thereafter sell
some or all of the obligations to a number of other investors. In the
situation of immediate resales, the initial lenders themselves become un-
derwriters to the offering and the placement becomes public. 48
A second category of corporate bond is the "junk bond." The term
"junk bond" refers to all debt instruments issued by any of the 22,000
American corporations whose bonds are not rated "investment
grade." 49 "Non-investment grade" bonds are defined as those debt in-
44. In this context, "public" means a discernible number of individuals, mutual funds,
savings and loans, pension funds and insurance companies who require material informa-
tion regarding the offering for their investment of funds.
45. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77e (1988). Where bonds are sold to the
public, the terms of the indenture contract must comply with the requirements of the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988).
46. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (1988).
47. See generally JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION (1982).
48. See id.
49. See DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT, INC., 1989 ANNUAL HIGH YIELD MARKET REPORT 6
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struments rated below Baa by Moody's, below BBB by Standard and
Poor's, or unrated. To assign ratings for new bond issuances, these
agencies consider the issuer's financial status to determine the issuing
company's ability to pay interest when due and to repay principal upon
maturity. Bond ratings are also reflective of the issuing firm's future
business plans, objectives, strategies, and policies.
Prior to 1977, junk bonds comprised a small market of "fallen an-
gels" (companies whose bonds carried low risk when issued but which
had been downgraded to high-risk and high-yield because the issuer ex-
perienced financial hardship).50 In 1977, Lehman Brothers (Lehman)
marketed high yield bonds to raise new capital for companies that other-
wise could not qualify for investment grade securities. 5 1 Lehman aban-
doned this line of financing shortly thereafter.5 2 Drexel entered the
market upon Lehman's withdrawal and began to expand immediately
and underwrite original-issue, high-yield bonds in both public and pri-
vate placements.
53
In the early years of use, the Drexel high-yield securities provided
alternative capital for newer and smaller businesses unable to secure in-
vestment grade debt placements due to an absence of historical financial
performance. With the advent of Drexel's junk bonds, these emerging
companies were able to substitute their prior source of funding-bank
loans and loans from insurance companies (which imposed onerous loan
covenants and accelerated repayment schedules)-with a more flexible,
high-yield financing source which typically required a longer ten to
twenty year repayment feature. 54 In effect, Drexel created alternative
"securitized commercial loans" for emerging small businesses. 5 5 Addi-
tional uses for the original Drexel high-yield bonds included negotiated
mergers and takeovers, LBOs, and bank loan payoffs.
In 1984, the junk bond market careened into the hostile takeover
arena with Drexel's agreement to arrange funding for the attempted
takeover of Gulf Oil by T. Boone Pickens. This entry into hostile M&A
activity witnessed the increase in volume of new issue junk bonds from
$900 million in 1977 to $14.3 billion in 1984.56 By the close of 1989,
[hereinafter DREXEL REPORT]. As of 1989, approximately 800 American corporations had
bonds outstanding which were "investment grade."
50. McGough, Reaching for Yield, FORBES, Sept. 16, 1985, at 91.
51. In the 1920s and 1930s, original-issue high-yield bonds were marketed by a vari-
ety of United States corporations including General Motors and IBM. This market dried
up after a high rate of default on the bonds occurred in the 1930s. See Loeys, Low-Grade
Bonds: 4 Growing Source of Corporate Funding, FED. RES. BANK OF PHIL., Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1986, at 3-4 (citing W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR Ex-
PERIENCE 153 (1958)).
52. Loeys, Low-Grade Bonds: A Growing Source of Corporate Funding, FED. RES. BANK OF
PHIL., Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 3, 4 (citing W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND
QUALITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE, at 153 (1958)).
53. Id. at 10-12.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. SamuelsonJunk Campaign Against Junk Bonds, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1985, at 5, col.
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original issue bonds comprised at least twenty-five percent of the total
bond market.
57
Notwithstanding their relative proportion to the outstanding bond
market, use of junk bonds for hostile tender offer financing has gener-
ated considerable debate and concern by both market professionals and
Congress. 58 Of primary concern to junk bond critics is the use of origi-
nal-issue, high-yield securities to place large, well-managed companies
"in play" for purposes of short-term speculation. These critics argue
that the resulting profit-taking and inside trading harm target security
holders and create confusion in the public securities market. Junk bond
proponents emphasize the high rates of return associated with the secur-
ities and their eradication of size as an impediment to a successful take-
over of inefficient firms.
III. THE BONDHOLDER-STOCKHOLDER CONFLICT
Bondholders are creditors of the firm. They neither vote for the
board of directors nor share an equity interest in the corporation.59
Contract law and traditional bond covenants protect bondholder inter-
ests.6 0 Conversely, shareholders own and indirectly manage the firm
through equity securities of common stock.6 1 Corporate law protects
stockholders by imposing upon directors fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty in the management of the firm.62 The question is whether these
concepts of simple debt and equity accurately reflect the rights, inter-
ests, or claims of the financial participants of publicly-held corporations
which are targeted for an LBO.
A. The Bondholder-Stockholder Dichotomy in Corporate Finance
Corporate management may take actions that maximize shareholder
interests at the bondholders' expense. The three most obvious exam-
ples of such shareholder maximization are dividend payments, invest-
ment choices, and surplus capital investment. 6 3 In each of these
circumstances, issuers face unavoidable potential conflicts of interest be-
tween equity investors and debt holders.
(1) Dividend Payments
The classic conflict between debt and equity relates to dividend pay-
57. See DREXEL REPORT supra note 49, at 6.
58. See Congressional Research Service Report, Report for the House Subcommittee
on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, The Roe of High Yield Bonds
(Junk Bonds) in Capital Markets and Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications (Dec. 1985);
H. SHERMAN & R. SCHRAGER, JUNK BONDS AND TENDER OFFER FINANCING (1987).
59. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIPS, 321-22 (1990).
60. L. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 11.07 (1990).
61. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 188 (1983).
62. Id. §§ 234-235.
63. See Malitz, On Financial Contracting: The Determinants of Bond Covenants, FIN. MGMT.,
Summer 1986, at 18.
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ments. For example, the greater the distribution of stock dividends, the
smaller the value of the issuer's assets, the greater the likelihood of de-
fault on bonds and the decrease in value of debt securities. Retention of
earnings and capital conversely results in increased assets, an increase in
the firm's equity cushion, a decrease in the risk of default on the debt,
and a rise in the value of bonds. If management is able to pay a substan-
tial dividend and is governed by shareholder maximization decisions,
asset distributions will be effected and other potential investments lost.
The result is a transfer of assets to shareholders at the expense of reduc-
ing the current value of outstanding bonds. The wealth of the firm is
thus shifted from the bondholders to the equity investors.
(2) Choice of Investments
Another way in which the firm's value may be transferred from
bondholders to common stockholders is for management to supplant
risky assets for existing ones. For example, assume a firm has additional
capital for investment. Further assume that the firm has two choices.
Option A bears slight volatility of risk and a moderate monetary return.
Option B represents a less conservative investment strategy but
promises substantial potential yield. From the bondholder's perspec-
tive, Option B transfers the benefit of increased monetary yield to com-
mon stockholders because of the higher probability of default on
existing debt and the resulting lower return rate on outstanding bonds.
To bondholders, any management decision which substitutes invest-
ments in a manner that increases default risk shifts firm wealth from
bondholders to stockholders. The likelihood of this wealth transfer is
increased when common stockholders exercise control over the enter-
prise and act in a way to serve their interests at the bondholders'
expense.
(3) Investment of Surplus Capital
The firm directors' decision to invest additional capital presents an-
other shareholder-bondholder conflict. Consider the following balance
sheet of a firm which has been in operation for five years:
Balance Sheet A
Assets Liabilities
Book Mkt. Book Mkt.
Investments $1,000 $500 Debt $800 $400
Equity
Capital $200 $100
Corporate management receives an opportunity to invest in a new
enterprise for a cost of $500 and a present value of $750. Assume the
project is a certain winner and that the cost must be funded with new
equity. Further assume that all management decisions must benefit
shareholder interests. If corporate directors pursue a new stock
issuance with preemptive rights to existing stockholders (and all
stockholders are forced to contribute for fear of losing wealth), the book
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value of the firm's investments increase by $500 and the market value of
the assets increase by the $750 value of the project. The market value of
the debt increases by $400 due to the absence of any risk of default
resulting from the total value added by the new opportunity. The
parallel increase in shareholder equity, however, is only $350. Balance
Sheet B reflects the post-offering results:
Balance Sheet B
Assets Liabilities
Book Mkt. Book Mkt.
Investments $1,500 $1,250 Debt $800 $800
Equity
Capital $700 $450
The total value of the new corporate enterprise is $250, the
difference between the acquisition cost of the opportunity ($500) and
the present value to the firm ($750). The project will be rejected,
however, because pursuit of the opportunity decreases shareholder
wealth by $150 (the post-opportunity value of the common stock ($450)
minus the cost of acquisition to equity holders ($500) and the pre-
opportunity value of the common shares ($100)). As a practical matter,
the project increases firm value by $250, but the additional contribution
of equity by existing stockholders transfers $400 of firm wealth to the
bondholders. Thus, directors governed exclusively by shareholder
maximization are forced to abandon the opportunity to the detriment of
bondholders.
It may be suggested that, as to dividend payments, choice of
investments, and investment of surplus capital, appropriate bond
covenants would enable firm management to choose those options
which maximize firm value and which neither focus exclusively on
stockholders nor bondholders. Due in part to the continuing adherence
to a bright line creditor-owner rule, however, particularized drafting is
not feasible because it tends to be costly, subjective, and otherwise non-
responsive to unforeseen circumstances.
(4) The Option-Pricing Model
In order to value risky bonds in relationship to stockholder equity,
financial experts developed an "option-pricing model." 64 Consider a
firm with common stock and long-term bonds outstanding. According
to the concept of option-pricing, issuance of both types of securities cre-
ates an option in common shareholders relative to bondholder interests.
For example, stockholder liability in the event of a corporate liquidation
is limited to the amount of each shareholder's investment in the firm.
Consequently, shareholders have the option to default on outstanding
bonds, which is equivalent to a put of the firm's assets to the bondhold-
ers. The value of the put is the present value of the obligations due to
64. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 294, 429, 432,
436-38, 480-84 (2d ed. 1984).
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the corporate debt owners. If the value of this option is $100 and pres-
ent firm value is $50, shareholders will exercise the put. As a result,
shareholders are relieved of their commitment to pay on the bonds.
From another perspective, bondholders in effect own the firm's as-
sets while stockholders own only an option to repurchase the assets by
buying out the bondholders' interests. Such an option is equivalent to a
call upon corporate assets. The exercise price of the call feature is the
present value of commitments due to the bondholders. Thus, if the
value of the call is $100 and firm value is $150, shareholders will exer-
cise the call and become sole owners of the firm.
Recent financial research indicates that the value of a call increases
according to fluctuations in the potential value of the assets subject to
the option. Consequently, potential gains to common stockholders are
unlimited by volatility in the value of underlying assets. Losses, on the
other hand, cannot exceed a shareholder's equity investment-the price
paid for the option. The relationship of these puts and calls thus bear
directly on the bond value by way of shareholder decisions which pursue
corporate investments or uses of surplus capital that reduce or other-
wise place at risk present firm value.
B. Bondholders and Stockholders and Leveraged Tender Offers
Since the 1960s, corporations have announced "tender offers" for
other corporations' common stock by soliciting target security holders
to "tender" their shares to the bidding entity.65 These bids were highly
successful in wrestling shares from common stockholders since the of-
fering price typically reflected a sizeable premium (often fifty percent or
more) over current or historic stock market value. From the standpoint
of the bidder, tender offers provided a fast and efficient vehicle for se-
curing control of the target company because (1) the "offer" was to the
"market"-that is, the decision of whether or not to sell control of the
subject company remained with each individual stockholder rather than
management (who often tend to resist changes in control) or controlling
shareholders (who often align with management in decisions affecting
corporate policy and control); (2) the offer commenced upon the adver-
tisement or public announcement of the bid thereby guaranteeing a
"surprise attack" on the target firm; (3) the terms of the offer were fixed
rather than negotiable; and (4) the offer remained open for a limited
period of time.6 6 The motivation for early takeover bids was primarily
65. In 1968, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide a
statutory construct for the regulation of cash tender offers. This framework, commonly
known as the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m-78n (1988)) is embodied in five sections: § 13(d), § 13(e), § 14(d), § 14(e), and
§ 14(0.
66. The term "tender offer" is not defined in the Williams Act. In Wellman v. Dickin-
son, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983), the court proposed an "eight-factor test" for determin-
ing the existence of a tender offer. The eight factors are:




either to increase the bidder's market power through a "horizontal
merger" or to achieve gains through a "synergistic" blending of the
combined firms. This latter motivation was often effectuated through a
"vertical" combination of the bidder and a supplier in order to assure
the acquiror a supply source and to reduce the cost of competitive
behavior.
In the 1980s, takeover activity changed its hue. Although target
companies of the 1960s and 1970s were unwieldy conglomerates with
entrenched management, targets of the 1980s were often well-known,
well-managed firms worth millions and, sometimes, billions of dollars.
The explanation for the up-scaling of acquisition targets rests, in large
part, with the development by Drexel of the new original issue market
for high-yield junk bonds.6 7 With the advent of the Drexel junk bond,
bidders were able to announce cash tender offers that were financed
with borrowings of ninety percent or more. Until this time, takeovers
were funded almost exclusively with bank borrowings and equity contri-
butions by the bidder corporation. The availability of subordinated
high-yield bonds served to eliminate size as a barrier to a takeover bid
and created a new offeror-the corporate "raider."
The 1980s raider was commonly cast as a predator that targeted
companies for liquidation or restructuring by reducing acquisition debt
and paying a large, one-time cash dividend to stockholders. These raid-
ers were motivated by a perceived disparity between the present value of
a firm, as evidenced in stock prices, and the firm's breakup value if vari-
ous assets could be sold. "Corporate control" thus became an asset that
was subject to short-term speculation as unlimited debt financing be-
came available. Changes of control for assimilation and management
purposes were left for smaller businesses.
Leveraged tender offers of the 1980s presented yet another conflict
of interest for stockholders and bondholders of the constituent corpora-
tions to a successful takeover. For example, consider X, a corporate
raider who desires to initiate an any and all cash tender offer to corpora-
tion T's common stockholders. X forms corporation A solely for the
purpose of making the bid for and purchasing shares. X incorporates A
in Delaware as a shell corporation with minimum capitalization. The
offering price for T's stock is $20 per share. The market value for T's
shares at the time of the announcement of the bid is $12. T has out-
standing long-term unsecured bonds with a face value of $1,000 and a
(2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock;
(3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price;
(4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
(5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a
fixed maximum number to be purchased;
(6) offer open only a limited period of time;
(7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell the stock;
(8) public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target com-
pany preceding or accompanying rapid accumulation of large amounts of the
target company's securities.
Id. at 823-24.
67. DREXEL REPORT, supra note 49.
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current market value of $1,150. Interest on the bonds is six percent,
payable annually.
In order to pursue its bid, X, on A's behalf, negotiates commercial
bank financing for fifty percent of the total acquisition cost. X is unable
to secure further bank commitments due to federal margin regulations.
To raise the remaining capital necessary to complete the acquisition, X
contacts I, an investment banking firm. I issues A a letter stating that I is
"highly confident" that funds may be raised at a future time by I's place-
ment of subordinated, high-yield, high-risk bonds of A. Based upon its
bank financing, its "highly confidential" letter, and an approximately
one percent equity contribution, A proceeds with its offer.
Upon receipt of the bid, target management announces to T's
stockholders their opinion concerning the inadequacy of A's offer. T's
directors cite their long-range plan for recapitalizing T, A's lack of fund-
ing for forty-nine percent of the offer, and X's reputation as a takeover
artist and greenmailer. Despite management perceptions, eighty-five
percent of T's stockholders tender to A. Management thereafter effec-
tuates a financial restructuring.
Pursuant to its restructuring, T borrows substantial sums from L to
be used to repurchase T's common stock. The intended effect of the
restructuring is to increase current share value by the reduction of eq-
uity. The immediate effect, however, is T's excessive debt-to-equity ra-
tio. Upon announcement of the defensive restructuring, T's unsecured
long-term bonds are downgraded to non-investment grade by both
Standard & Poor's and Moody's.
Notwithstanding T's management efforts, A closes its tender offer
and successfully purchases voting control of T by utilizing its fifty per-
cent bank funding as well as its one percent equity contribution. Imme-
diately thereafter, A's management proposes a merger with T wherein
T's remaining minority shareholders are to be cashed out for the $20
per share tender offer price. The merger cost is financed by funds
raised from I's sale ofjunk bonds of A company which is now the owner
of T company. Junk bond purchasers include pension funds, savings
and loans, institutional investors, mutual funds, and insurance
companies.
Upon completion of the follow-up merger, A begins to sell T's as-
sets in order to pay acquisition costs and expenses and to service pre-
merger debt and post-merger junk bond obligations. When the cost of
carrying all outstanding debt exceeds the cash generated from the re-
maining assets, newly-merged A is forced to declare bankruptcy.
The question becomes: What is the status of A's and T's stockhold-
ers and bondholders? All of T's former equity investors have sold or
been cashed out for at least $20 per share (an $8 per share premium
over pre-tender offer stock value). X, A's stockholder, is the owner of
the merged entity as well as the beneficiary of all profits derived from
T's systematic breakup. Since the present value of payments due to all
bondholders exceeds the present value of the merged firm, X, operating
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through A, exercises its option to put the firm's remaining assets to T's
and A's bondholders. The consequence of this default is the disposition
in bankruptcy of pre-merger corporate bondholder interests.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT IN BANKRUPTCY
A. The Bankruptcy Code
If a firm's value is less than the present value of all obligations due
on outstanding debt, stockholders likely will exercise their option to put
the firm's assets to the bondholders. By pursuing this option, stockhold-
ers default on existing bonds and concurrently violate non-default pro-
visions of the trust indenture. If the debt is secured by a mortgage or
lien on corporate assets, the trustee may seek to enforce the bond-
holder's security interest; that is, he may enforce the lien. Execution on
the lien involves the sale of the subject asset with the proceeds to be
used to pay down the bondholders' claims.
Bondholder rights and remedies, as set forth in the indenture con-
tract, are limited by the rules and procedures of federal bankruptcy law.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197868 offers two basic approaches for
debtors suffering severe financial hardship: "straight" bankruptcy,
commonly known as "liquidation" in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, and in-
solvency reorganization, commonly called "rehabilitation" or "reorgani-
zation." In a liquidation proceeding, a trustee for the debtor sells
appropriate assets and distributes the proceeds to various creditors.
69
Once the liquidation procedure is completed, the debtor is discharged
and further claims on outstanding debts are terminated.
70
In the context of the stockholders and bondholders of a debtor cor-
poration, the cash-fund generated by the sale of corporate property is
distributed in accordance with a schedule of priorities among claim-
ants.7 1 The order of priorities is (1) secured creditors, (2) certain prior-
ity creditors, (3) unsecured creditors, and (4) equity investors.
7 2
Secured creditors include bondholders whose interests are protected by
mortgages or liens on specific corporate property. The amount of a se-
cured creditor's claim is the face amount of the debt plus accrued inter-
est and attorney's fees if the value of the collateral exceeds the value of
the debt.
7"
After secured creditors are priority creditors. These claimants at-
68. 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1984. See
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-249,
§ l(a), 98 Stat. 116 (1984)); Pub. L. No. 98-271, § l(a), 98 Stat. 163 (1984); Pub. L. No.
98-299, § 1(a), 98 Stat. 214 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-325, § 1(a), 98 Stat. 268 (1984); Pub. L.
No. 98-353, §§ 113, 121(a), 98 Stat. 343, 345 (1984); and Pub. L. No. 98-454, § 1001, 98
Stat. 1745 (1984).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1988) (defining the role and capacity of a trustee in bankruptcy);
11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) (defining the property of the debtor's estate).
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988) (describing the effect of discharge in bankruptcy).
71. B. MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL 162-63 (1981).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988); G. TREISTER,J. TRosT, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, § 6.03 at 277 (1988) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS].
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tack assets that are not subject to mortgages and liens and include attor-
neys and other persons who provide services to the debtor firm,
individuals with wage claims, and the Internal Revenue Service.74 As-
suming the cash-fund produced by the liquidation sale is sufficient to
satisfy these priority claimants, any excess amount passes to unsecured
creditors who share pro rata according to the debt owed.
Unsecured creditors include long-term bondholders and junk bond
owners whose claim is for the face value of their security plus accrued
interest. Other such claimants are trade creditors who have supplied
goods and services to the debtor but who remain unpaid when the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed. After the unsecured creditors are paid, the re-
maining funds are shared among preferred stockholders according to
provisions in the firm's articles of incorporation. Common stockholders
then divide the remaining proceeds in accordance with their equity
interest.
If the debtor instead proceeds with a plan of reorganization, the
rules and procedures become more complex. In an insolvency reorgani-
zation, the debtor desires to maintain the corporate enterprise and at-
tempts, through an agreement with its creditors, to meet its financial
obligations. As a result, secured creditors are restrained from executing
upon their security interests through seizure and forced sale of assets.
In the absence of fraud, firm management remains in the hands of the
board of directors. 7 5 State corporate law regulates the day-to-day affairs
of the firm pursuing reorganization and imposes upon directors fiduci-
ary duties of care and loyalty.
In most circumstances, management subject to an insolvency reor-
ganization seeks to issue a new set of securities to distribute to claimants
in some relation to their priorities. As top priority claimants, secured
creditors will not accept a speculative equity position in the debtor nor
substitute an inferior note for an existing secured interest. Secured
creditors may instead negotiate the extension of additional post-petition
credit to the debtor in exchange for a security interest in unencumbered
assets. Unsecured creditors, who lack the bargaining position of a se-
nior secured lender, may be compelled to accept a substitute note in
order to forestall liquidation of the debtor's assets.
Debt substitution is generally accomplished through an exchange
offer. Under the Trust Indenture Act,7 6 modification of material terms
to publicly issued debt can only be made with the consent of the holders
affected by the alteration. As a practical matter, an exchange offer al-
ways alters the core terms of existing debt (the maturity date, rate of
interest, and face value) in favor of a lower principal amount, a lower
interest rate, and a longer period for repayment. To be effective, ap-
proximately ninety-five percent of the unsecured bondholders must sub-
scribe to the exchange offer. Since amendments are binding only to the
74. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988).
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extent debt holders consent to accept new bonds, ninety-five percent of
pre-offer bondholders must tender into the offer. If bondholders refuse
to substitute notes, the issuer will file for a Chapter 7 liquidation and the
value of bonds likely will decrease to an amount below the face value of
the debt securities offered in the exchange.
Bond investors thus face a "prisoner's dilemma." Assuming that
most bondholders refuse to accept the proposed exchange, bankruptcy
follows and all parties lose. Ironically, under bankruptcy law, these
"holdouts" place the debtor corporation in a position to negotiate a re-
duced debt claim. As a practical matter, once bankruptcy ensues, the
debtor is encouraged to negotiate and compromise prior claims. A ma-
jority vote of debt holders binds all others. In the event of a privately
placed debt issue, the bond indenture must grant to bondholders the
legal power to force all interests under the indenture to accept a substi-
tute security.
B. Unsecured Bondholders in Bankruptcy
(1) Creditors' Committees in Chapter 11 Reorganizations
Bondholders confronting a debtor reorganization are granted pro-
cedural representation in bankruptcy proceedings. Representation is ef-
fected through the formation and operation of creditors' committees
which serve as conduits for bondholder interests.
Creditors' committees lessen the administrative burden on bank-
ruptcy courts. These committees are granted broad ranging powers and
duties. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code grants standing to creditors
who wish to appear and be heard on issues involved in the bankruptcy
action.
In Chapter 11 reorganizations 77 the United States trustee 78 ap-
points a committee of unsecured creditors. 79 These creditors generally
hold the seven largest unsecured claims.80 The trustee may appoint ad-
ditional committees of creditors or equity security holders as deemed
appropriate or if necessary to assure adequate claimants' representation
of other unsecured creditors. In the alternative, the United States
trustee may appoint a creditors' committee consisting of pre-petition
committee members if those members were fairly selected and are rep-
resentative of the different claimants.81
77. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
78. The United States trustee is empowered to raise, appear and be heard on any
issue in any case or proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act but may not file a plan pursuant
to § 1121(c). 11 U.S.C. § 307 (1988).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l) (1988).
80. Id. § 1102(b)(1).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1988). Bankruptcy Rule 2007(b) sets forth the criteria for
determining the representative nature of a pre-petition committee:
(1) it was selected by a majority in number and amount of claims of unsecured
creditors who may vote under § 702(a) of the [Bankruptcy] Code and were
present in person or represented at a meeting of which all creditors having
claims of over $1,000 or the 100 unsecured creditors having the largest
claims had at least five days notice in writing, and of which meeting written
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The Code empowers the committees to consult with the trustee or
debtor-in-possession concerning administration of the case; to investi-
gate the debtor's business and financial condition; to participate in the
formulation, acceptance, and rejection of a plan; to request the appoint-
ment of a trustee or examiner; and to perform other services in the un-
secured creditors' interest.8 2 The committee may also select and
employ attorneys, accountants or other agents.8 3  The trustee or
debtor-in-possession must meet with the committee as soon as practica-
ble after the committee is appointed to transact all necessary and proper
business.8 4 In conducting business, members of the committee are sub-
ject to a fiduciary duty to represent all interests of their class. 8 5
If the debtor and its creditors attempt an out-of-court workout, the
debtor may appoint creditors with relatively small claims to the credi-
tors' committees. Like their Chapter 11 counterparts, workout commit-
tees include hostile creditors. Dissident claimants are vital to a
bankruptcy workout because out-of-court workout plans are binding on
these claimants only to the extent these claimants accept a plan's
terms.8 6 Individual workout committees may be selected to represent
secured creditors, banks, senior and junior bondholders, general un-
secured creditors, and equity investors.
Although workout committees operate in a manner substantially
similar to the Chapter 11 committees, considerable differences exist.
First, no specific rules regulate the operation of workout committees.
8 7
As a consequence, no guidelines delineate the scope of the members'
duties and powers. This lack of regulation raises questions such as
whether committee participants owe fiduciary duties to those whom they
represent. In addition, unlike in a Chapter 11 proceeding, there are no
established procedures protecting creditors who allege discrimination
or acts of self-interest by committee members. Further, workout com-
mittee members are subject to federal securities laws-including
prohibitions on insider trading 8 8 -yet no specific forum is empowered
to impose sanctions on committee members in the event of insider trad-
minutes reporting the names of the creditors present or represented and vot-
ing and the amounts of their claims were kept and are available for
inspection;
(2) all proxies voted at the meeting for the elected committee were solicited pur-
suant to [Bankruptcy] Rule 2006 and the lists and statements required by
subdivision (e) thereof have been filed with the court; and
(3) the organization of the committee was in all other respects fair and proper.
11 U.S.C. § 702(a) (1988).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(l)-(5) (1988).
83. Id. § 1103(a). In addition, persons employed to represent a committee may not,
during their agency, represent any other entity having an adverse interest in connection
with the reorganization. Id. § 1103(b).
84. Id. § 1103(d).
85. See In re First Republic Bank Corp., 95 Bankr. 58 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 919, 925 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
86. CAMPBELL, LYNN & YOUNGERMAN, CREDITOR'S RIGHTS HANDBOOK, § 902, at 250j
(1990) [hereinafter CREDITOR'S RIGHTS].
87. Id. § 902, at 253.
88. Id. § 905, at 261.
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ing or other breaches of implied fiduciary duties. Finally, no "cram
down" provision is applicable in an out-of-court workout;89 creditors
who do not accept the workout plan are not bound by its contract
terms.90 Notwithstanding these differences, debtors who are able to
work out their financial obligations with creditors avoid substantial ad-
ministrative costs associated with bankruptcy. Workout committees,
therefore, allow savings for creditors as well as debtors-in-possession.
(2) Purchase and Sale of Claims in Bankruptcy
A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a "proof of claim"
against the debtor's estate.91 The claim is deemed allowed unless ob-
jected to by a party in interest.92 Creditors holding unsecured claims
may be appointed to a creditors' committee by the trustee or the debtor
pursuing a workout plan.93 Members of the creditors' committees are
empowered to negotiate with the debtor over a plan of reorganization or
may seek liquidation of the estate or a trustee's appointment. 94
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure recognize the practice of
purchase and sale of creditors' claims. Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) gov-
erns the transfer of claims other than those based on a bond or deben-
ture. The rule is organized into four operative parts: (1) unconditional
transfer before the filing of a proof of claim; (2) unconditional transfer
after the filing of a proof of claim; (3) transfer of a claim for security
prior to a proof of claim being filed; and (4) transfer of a claim for secur-
ity after a proof of claim is filed.95
Rule 3001(e)(1) provides that if a claim, other than one based on a
bond or debenture, is unconditionally transferred before a proof of
claim is filed, only the transferee may file a proof of claim.9 6 If the claim
is transferred subsequent to the filing date, the proof of claim must be
supported by a statement of the transferor acknowledging the transfer
and stating the consideration therefor or setting forth the consideration
for the transfer and the reason the transferee is unable to obtain the
statement from a transferor.
9 7
Rule 3001(e)(2) governs claims unconditionally transferred after
the proof of claim has been filed. Evidence of the transfer terms must be
filed by the transferee.98 The clerk of court gives immediate notification
89. Section 1 129(b)(1) allows the court, on request of the proponent to the plan, to
"cram down" the plan on dissident creditors; that is, to confirm the plan notwithstanding
opposition by these creditors if the plan "does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has
not accepted, the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
90. CREDITOR'S RiGHrs, supra note 90, § 902, at 251.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
92. Id. at § 502.
93. Id. at § 1102.
94. Id. at § 1103.
95. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) (1988).
96. Id. at 3001(e)(1).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3001(e)(2).
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to the original claimant of the evidence of transfer filing. 99 The claim-
ant must file an objection to the transfer generally within twenty days.10 0
If the court finds that the claim has been unconditionally transferred,
the transferee is substituted for the original claimant.' 0 1
Rule 3001(e)(3) provides that if a claim, other than one based on a
bond or debenture, is filed for security before a proof of claim is filed
and if either the transferor or the transferee files a proof of claim, the
clerk must immediately notify the other of the right to join in the filed
interest. 10 2 If the transferor and transferee each file a proof upon the
same claim, the proofs are consolidated.' 0 3 The court then determines
the allowance and voting of the claim, payment of dividends thereon,
and appropriate participation in the administration of the estate.'
0 4
Proposed bankruptcy rule amendments include an extensive revi-
sion of Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) which would limit the court's role in
connection with the transfer of claims to the adjudication of disputes
arising in connection with transfers.' 0 5 Authors of the proposed
amendments indicate that revised rule 3001(e) is not intended to en-
courage or discourage post-petition transfers of claims. 10 6 The revi-
sions also are not intended to affect any remedies otherwise available to
the parties under nonbankruptcy law.
10 7
It is suggested that the proposed revision to rule 3001 (e) recognizes
the emergence of an auction market for bankruptcy claims and treats the
purchase and sale of transferred interests in a manner analogous to ex-
isting rules governing bonds and debentures. The apparent intent of
the revision is to limit the power of bankruptcy judges to curtail the
transferability of bankruptcy claims. The Advisory Committee on Bank-
ruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Rules
Committee), therefore, supports a free market in trade claims whereby
passive creditors may liquidate their position in a bankruptcy case rather
than await distribution under liquidation or a plan of reorganization.
The question raised by an auction market in bankruptcy claims is
the legality and potential conflicts of interest inherent in the trading of
securities by members of the creditors' committee in large insolvency
reorganization cases. In general, committee members are fiduciaries to
the class of creditors represented.' 0 8 Pre-Bankruptcy Code cases lim-




102. Id. at 3001(e)(3).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules 76-80
(Aug. 1989).
106. Id. at 80-81.
107. Id.
108. CREDITOR'S RIGHTS, supra note 90, § 905, at 259.
109. In re Moulded Products, 474 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940
(1973); In re Franklin Bldg. Co., 178 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 978
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Section 328(c) of the Bankruptcy Code denies compensation to "profes-
sional persons" if they are post-petition investors. 11 0 The section, how-
ever, does not reach indenture trustees, creditors' committee members,
or the debtor's officers and directors. "' Yet Bankruptcy Rule 2019 au-
thorizes the court to examine any claim or interest acquired by an entity
or committee in the course of a case under the Code and to grant appro-
priate relief. 1 2 The court's Rule 2019 power is not applicable, how-
ever, to committees under section 1102.113 In light of these gaps in
statutory application to committee members and indenture trustees, the
issue of whether the bankruptcy court has the power to curtail or other-
wise limit the enforceability of claims purchased by insiders after bank-
ruptcy remains to be decided. Presently, committee members are being
requested to adopt a confidentiality agreement which addresses issues of
use of inside information and trading activities. Execution of such an
agreement is discretionary by committee members and indenture trust-
ees and binds only those with notice or who otherwise accept its terms.
C. Impact of the Securities Laws on Workouts and Insolvency Reorganizations
(1) The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)' "4 requires that inves-
tors be provided material information concerning new issues of securi-
ties offered for sale to the public. The Securities Act prohibits
fraudulent or deceptive practices in primary and secondary distribu-
tions. Its objectives are primarily satisfied through three code provi-
sions: section 5-which prohibits any person from offering or selling
securities without an effective registration statement or an exemption" 15
and sections 17 and 12(2)-which prohibit fraud or misrepresentation in
interstate sales of securities."
16
Registration requires that an issuing corporation file a registration
statement with the SEC. 1 7 Information contained in the statement in-
cludes financial data concerning the issuer and the securities to be
sold.' " 8 Sales effected pursuant to a public distribution must be accom-
panied or preceded by a registration statement or the prospectus con-
tained therein. 1 19 Failure to comply with registration and delivery
requirements results in substantial potential liability for issuers, under-
(1950); In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945); In re Philadelphia and Western Ry. Co., 64 F. Supp. 738 (E.D.
Pa. 1946); In re Indiana Central Telephone, 24 F. Supp. 342 (D. Del. 1938).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1988).
111. Id.
112. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019 (1988).
113. Id.
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o-77aa (1988).
115. Id. at § 77e.
116. Id. at §§ 77q, 77L(2).
117. Id. at § 77e(c).
118. Id. at § 77aa.
119. Id. at § 77h.
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writers, and other participants to the distribution. 120
The Securities Act also sets forth transaction and securities exemp-
tions from registration guidelines. 12 1 Securities which are exempt may
be freely resold without registration. 12 2 Securities issued under a trans-
action exemption are "restricted" and may not be resold without regis-
tration or an independent exemption.
123
(2) Issuance of Securities Under a Plan of Reorganization
The Bankruptcy Code significantly alters the application of the Se-
curities Act. In particular, under specified circumstances, securities may
be issued under a plan of reorganization without registration. Section
1145 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the governing rules for exemp-
tion from state and federal registration requirements. 124 Despite poor
drafting, 125 section 1145(a)(1) 12 6 permits a debtor, its affiliates, 12 7 and
successors 128 to issue securities without registration if the plan allows
for such a distribution and the securities are issued principally in ex-
change for a claim or interest against the debtor. 129 The section does
120. Id. at §§ 77k, 77L(I), (2).
121. Id. at §§ 77c, 77d.
122. Id. at § 77c.
123. Id. at § 77d. The five securities transaction exemptions under the Securities Act
of 1933 most likely to be used in a workout or Chapter 11 reorganization are section 4(1)
(15 U.S.C. § 77d(I) (1988)) (exempts from registration "transactions by any person other
than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer"); section 4(2) (15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988)) and Reg-
ulation D (17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1990)) (exempts from registration "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering," and Rule 506 of Regulation D provides a safe
harbor for compliance); section 3(a)(9) (15 U.S.C. § 77c(9) (1988)) (provides: "[e]xcept
with respect to a security exchanged in a case under title 11 of the United States Code, any
security exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no
commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such
exchange"); Rule 144 (17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1990)) (sets forth circumstances under which
resale of restricted securities or securities held by control persons will not be deemed to
be transactions by an underwriter); and section 4(1 1/2) (provides an exemption from
registration for private resales of restricted or controlled securities).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988) (exemption from securities laws). Section 1145 permits
issuance of securities without registration under applicable state blue sky laws as well as
section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.
125. See In re Frontier Airlines, Inc., 93 Bankr. 1014, 1018 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (law-
yers at confirmation hearing cannot provide "cogent and logical explanation for the seem-
ingly incomprehensible statutory provisions").
126. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(1) (1988).
127. "Affiliate" is defined as an:
(A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with the power to
vote, twenty percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor
(B) corporation twenty percent or more of whose outstanding securities are di-
rectly or indirectly owned, controlled or held by the debtor or by an entity that
controls twenty percent or more of the voting securities of the debtor...
(D) entity that operates the business or substantially all the property of the
debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988).
128. "Successor" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. In general, however, a suc-
cessor is any entity that assumes the rights and liabilities of another corporation. See In re
Stanley Hotel, Inc., 13 Bankr. 926, 933 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981). See also In re Amarex, Inc.,
53 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (parent corporation of acquiring subsidiary may be
deemed "successor" to debtor).
129. Securities are issued principally in exchange for a claim or interest against a
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not contemplate a sale of securities by the debtor corporation to raise
new capital. The rationale underlying section 1145(a)(1) is that registra-
tion affords no additional protection to creditors due to the bankruptcy
requirement of court approval for a plan of reorganization and a disclo-
sure statement attendant to the distribution of new securities.
Section 1145(a)(2) exempts from registration the offer and sale of a
security through a warrant, option, right to subscribe, or conversion
privilege that was sold in a manner specified in section 1145(a)(1).130
Convertible securities usually are exchanged without registration. Such
convertible securities do not require registration upon conversion since
no investment decision is implicated. Section 1145(a)(2) also permits
the exercise of warrants, options, and conversion privileges for cash
without registration.
Debt securities also may be issued under a plan of reorganization
without registration. In general, the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee
to incur unsecured debt as an administrative expense in the ordinary
course of business.' 3 ' Subject to court approval, debt issued outside
the debtor's ordinary business is permitted.13 2 Section 364(f) exempts
from registration the issuance of debt securities by the trustee pursuant
to sections 364(a) to (d).1 3 3 Although it is possible to use sections 364
and 1145 together for the placement of non-equity securities, the SEC
objects to this practice after a plan of reorganization is confirmed.
13 4
The issue of resales of securities under a plan of reorganization is
also addressed in section 1145.135 For example, assume a person or
entity purchases certain securities with the intent to resell them immedi-
ately or soon thereafter. Conduct which implicates immediate resales
raises the question of underwriter status under the Securities Act and
subjects the issuer and selling security holders to potential federal secur-
ities violations. Section 1145(b) of the Bankruptcy Code attempts to de-
limit the securities definition of "underwriter" for insolvency
reorganizations. 136
Section 1145(b) sets forth four instances in which entities may be
considered underwriters pursuant to the Securities Act:
137
(1) persons that purchase a claim against or interest in the
debtor if such purchase is with a view to distribution of any
debtor where the value of the claim or interest exceeds the value of the consideration
transferred with the claim or interest in exchange for the securities.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(2) (1988).
131. Id. at § 364(a). The Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988), re-
quires that an offering of debt securities in excess of $5 million be issued pursuant to a
qualified indenture.
132. Id. at § 364(d).
133. Id. at § 364(f).
134. See In re Cordyne Corp., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 369 (Dec. 7,
1987); In re Custom Laboratories, SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 367 (July
13, 1987).
135. 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988).
136. Id.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1988).
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security received or to be received in exchange for such a claim
or interest;
(2) persons that offer to sell securities offered or sold under
the plan for the holders of such securities;
(3) persons that offer to buy securities offered or sold under a
plan from the holders of such securities if such offer to buy is
made with a view to distribution of such securities and under an
agreement made in connection with the plan, with the consum-
mation of the plan or with the offer or sale of securities under
the plan; or
(4) issuers, as used in section 2(11) of the Securities Act, with
respect to such securities.
15 8
If the persons who receive securities in a Chapter 11 reorganization
are not underwriters as defined in section 1145(b), the securities are not
subject to the usual resale restrictions. Persons who come within the
underwriter definition in categories (1) through (3) may avoid under-
writer status and, therefore, they resell in ordinary trading
transactions. 139
(3) Civil and Criminal Liability for Fraudulent Securities
Distributions in Reorganizations
The Securities Act prohibits fraud and misrepresentation in inter-
state sale of securities. The primary sections proscribing fraudulent
sales are section 12(2), which provides civil sanctions for securities fraud
or misrepresentation, 140 and section 17, which imposes criminal sanc-
tions for illegal transactions and grants to the SEC a basis for discipli-
nary proceedings or injunction. 14 1 The Securities Act also allows civil
liability for offers or sales that violate section 5 (section 12(1))142 and
civil penalties for issuers, directors, officers, underwriters, and certain
other parties who sign the registration statement (section 11).14
3
Notwithstanding these provisions, section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) imposes a further prohibition on
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.
144
Section 1145 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a registration ex-
emption to the Securities Act. The exemption creates a safe harbor
from civil and criminal penalties imposed when an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer fails to satisfy registration and prospectus delivery guidelines.
Section 1125(e) of the Bankruptcy Code reflects this intent by holding
138. 11 U.S.C. § 1145b(1)(A)-(D) (1988).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1) (1988). The "ordinary trading transaction" exemption is not
available to affiliates who must register resales under the Securities Act, resell pursuant to
Rule 144, or find an independent exemption from the federal securities registration
requirements.
140. Id. § 77L(2).
141. Id. § 77t. It remains an open question whether a private cause of action will be
implied under § 17(a). SeeJENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 890-92 (6th ed.
1987).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77L(l) (1988).
143. Id. § 77k.
144. Id. § 78j(b).
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unaccountable persons who comply with applicable Chapter 11 provi-
sions. In particular, section 1125(e) states that a person who, in good
faith and in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, offers, issues, sells or purchases a security offered or sold under a
plan of the debtor, its affiliates or successors, is not liable for violation
"of any applicable law" governing the offer, issuance, sale or purchase
of securities. 14 5 In order to lose the safe harbor protection of section
1125(e), a person must act with scienter1 46 or otherwise engage n activ-
ities which extend beyond those enumerated in the section.147
Despite the apparent blanket application of section 1125(e), certain
questions remain. For example, is section 1125(e) only applicable to
offers and sales effected pursuant to section 1145(a)? Does section
1125(e) apply to trades or tipping of inside information by committee
members or indenture trustees? If a debtor pursues a private placement
of debt securities in connection with a plan of reorganization, does sec-
tion 1125(e) exempt all participants from the liability provisions of the
Securities Act? Did Congress in 1978 intend that recent auctions of
creditors' claims by insiders fall outside the parameters of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act?
(4) Fraudulent Conveyances and Insolvency Reorganizations
Individual debtors facing severe financial hardship frequently con-
veyed property to family or friends to avoid losing the assets to credi-
tors. It was often understood between the parties to the conveyance that
the debtor would continue to use the property and would obtain its re-
turn after the creditor threat passed. This problem of secreting assets
was addressed in the sixteenth century in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth
(Statute of Elizabeth).1 48 The Statute of Elizabeth allowed a transferor's
creditor to reach the transferred assets upon proof of an "intent to de-
lay, hinder or defraud" 14 9 a creditor. To satisfy the requirement of sci-
enter, the creditor could set forth the circumstances and timing of the
conveyance and thereby permit the inference to be drawn of the requi-
site mental state.' 50
145. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (1988).
146. In enacting section 1125(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress intended the stan-
dard of culpability to be that announced by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 229-31
(1977).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (1988).
148. Statute of 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
149. Id.
150. An early case, Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601), addressed
the circumstances evidencing an intent to defraud. In Twyne's, a creditor who was owed
four hundred pounds had his debtor convey to him all the debtor's property, which was
worth three hundred pounds. The creditor allowed the debtor to retain possession of the
property. At the time of the conveyance, the debtor had been sued by another creditor for
a claim of two hundred pounds. The transfer to the first creditor was found to be fraudu-
lent based on certain indications of fraud. The signs of fraud included:
(1) the gift included all the debtor's property;
(2) the debtor remained in possession of the goods and therefore deceived
others who traded with him;
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In 1918 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (ULC) proposed the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA) to promote "uniformity in the law of fraudulent conveyances"
and to eliminate the "existing confusion in the law."' 15 1 The UFCA
Prefatory Note indicated the ULC's concern regarding uncertainty in the
existing law. 15 2 The first concern was the attempt under the common
law of fraudulent conveyances to make the Statute of Elizabeth embrace
all conveyances which harmed creditors even though an actual intent to
defraud was not present. The ULC noted that many conveyances were
avoided by judicial presumptions of law as to intent and in equity by
presumptions as to fact.153 The rulings of these cases were fair, but for
unsound reasons. As a result, the ULC undertook to draft a uniform act
in which all presumptions of law as to intent were avoided. 154 The
product of the ULC was the UFCA which condemns all conveyances
made with an intent to defraud, with the express statement that the in-
tent must be "actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed as a
matter of law."'
55
Today, three statutory schemes may govern an allegedly fraudulent
conveyance: section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,156 the UFCA, 15 7 and
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). 15 8 With minor variations
in language and interpretative case law, each statute allows a person to
disavow two general categories of fraudulent transfers: (1) transactions
undertaken with an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the trans-
feror's creditors and (2) constructively fraudulent transfers that are un-
dertaken in exchange for inadequate consideration and occur when a
(3) the transfer was secret;
(4) the transfer was made pending an outstanding claim against the debtor;
(5) trust was created and intended between the parties to the transfer; and
(6) the deed of conveyance stated that the transfer was made honestly and in
good faith.
Id. at 812-14.
151. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Aar, Historical and Prefatory Notes, 7A
U.L.A. 427-29 (1985).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 428.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
157. As of March 1990, the UFCA remained in effect in Arizona, Delaware, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, the Virgin
Islands, and Wyoming. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 107 (Supp.
1990).
158. The UFTA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1984 and has replaced the UFCA in many jurisdictions. See UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACr, Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985). As of March 1990, the
UFTA had been adopted in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia and Wisconsin. UFTA, 7A U.L.A. 120 (Supp. 1990).
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code reflects in large part the elements of a fraudulent
conveyance under the UFCA. Cases decided under one statute generally have preceden-
tial value under the other. The UFTA likewise is patterned after the UFCA and section
548 of the Bankruptcy Code. See UFTA, Prefatory Notes, 7A U.L.A. 639-42 (1985).
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company is insolvent, is rendered insolvent, or otherwise too thinly capi-
talized to continue in business.
The basic elements of fraudulent transfers are substantially similar
under the Bankruptcy Code, the UFCA, and the UFTA. For example,
each statute allows the avoidance of transfers or obligations made or
entered into with an "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" credi-
tors of the transferor. 159 Further, culpability does not rest exclusively
upon direct evidence of "actual intent"; objective evidence of circum-
stances surrounding the conveyance is admissible to prove state of
mind.160
The UFTA enumerates eleven factors which may be considered by
courts in determining the actual intent by a transferor.1 6 1 These
"badges of fraud" include: (1) whether the conveyance was of substan-
tially all of the debtor's assets; (2) whether the conveyance occurred
shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred; (3) whether the
consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the property transferred; and (4) whether the debtor became
insolvent at the time or shortly after the transfer was made. 16 2 In large
part, the objective "badges of fraud" factors reflect "constructive fraud"
analysis under the Bankruptcy Code and the UFCA. Consequently,
fraudulent conveyance claims may arise and be upheld more frequently
in jurisdictions adopting the UFTA.
Asset transfers may also be avoided under traditional constructive
fraud theories. The test for constructive fraud is twofold: (1) whether
the debtor receives "fair consideration"1 63 or "reasonably equivalent
value"' 64 for the transferred asset or obligation and (2) whether the
debtor is either rendered insolvent at the time or shortly after the trans-
fer or engaged in business and as a result of the conveyance has "unrea-
sonably small capital" to maintain its business.
16 5
The requirement of "fair consideration" or "reasonably equivalent
value" likely is not satisfied by a third-party benefit. For example, as-
sume a firm is in the throes of a hostile takeover bid. Target manage-
ment obtains loan proceeds which are secured by the firm's assets. The
proceeds are used to repurchase the target stockholders' equity securi-
ties. The result of the transaction is a one-time cash payment to com-
159. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988).
160. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 (3d Cir. 1986)
(actual intent may be inferred from surrounding circumstances); In re Roco Corp., 701
F.2d 978, 984 (1st Cir. 1983) (circumstantial evidence permitted to prove actual intent).
161. UFTA § 4(b)(1)-(1 1), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
162. UFTA § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
163. UFCA § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988); UFTA §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 652-53 (1985). The
"reasonably equivalent value" test in section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code is a re-statement
of the "fair consideration" test embodied in the UFCA. Apparently no substantive change
was intended upon the drafting of the Bankruptcy Code. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 89 (1978) and H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977), repnnted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5963.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988); UFCA §§ 4, 5, 6, 7A U.L.A. 474, 504, 507 (1985);
UFTA § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652-53, 657 (1985).
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mon shareholders, an increase in the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm,
and an increase in the probability of default on pre- and post-obligation
debt. Claims seeking to avoid the cash transfer to target stockholders
emphasize the absence of fair consideration (the loan proceeds) to the
debtor firm. Consideration received by the target shareholders is a
third-party benefit and not, therefore, "fair consideration" received by
the debtor. Courts applying constructive fraud provisions generally fo-
cus only upon the consideration received by the transferor, not the value
transferred by the lender or selling shareholder.' 6 6 Although this inter-
pretation is not mandated by the language of the fraudulent conveyance
statutes, a broad application frequently protects creditors.'
6 7
In addition to proving "fair consideration" or "reasonably
equivalent value," a claimant for avoidance of fraudulent transfers must
show either that the transferor was insolvent at the time or as a result of
the conveyance or obligation incurred, or, as a consequence of the trans-
fer, the firm possessed too little capital to continue business. "Insol-
vency" under the UFCA occurs when the "present fair saleable value" of
a company's assets is less than the amount required to be paid on "prob-
able liability on existing debts as they become absolute and ma-
tured."' 68 Insolvency also may be determined under an "equity" (cash-
flow) test 169 or a "balance-sheet" test.17
0
The Bankruptcy Code defines insolvency to mean that the sum of
the debtor's liabilities is greater than the debtor's property "at a fair
valuation," excluding property transferred, concealed or removed with
the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors as well as certain prop-
erty that is exempt from the debtor's estate.' 7 1 Although the Bank-
ruptcy Code definition appears to adopt a "balance-sheet" test of
insolvency, courts have not always interpreted the Code language so
narrowly. '
72
The UFTA, on the other hand, defines insolvency to include a bal-
166. See In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir. 1983) (In addressing a stock
repurchase under § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court found that "the value to
be considered is that received by the debtor and not that forfeited by the transferee."); In
re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc., 100 Bankr. 127, 136 (Bankr. Mass. 1989) (In applying the
"reasonably equivalent value" test of § 548(a)(2), the court stated, "The debtor must re-
ceive the required value, not some third party."); In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 70 Bankr.
920, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (Focus of constructive fraud is "what the [d]ebtor sur-
rendered and what the [d]ebtor received, irrespective of what any third party may have
gained or lost.").
167. Cases approving indirect benefits as fair consideration have involved "considera-
tion with definite value" rather than benefits which were "merely conjectural and indeter-
minate." See Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1491, 1501 (1987). See also Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 182
(C.D. Cal. 1986) ("As a matter of law, management services do not constitute fair consid-
eration when they have no identifiable monetary value.").
168. UFCA § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985).
169. See Cellar Lumber Co. v. Holley, 9 Ohio App. 2d 288, 290, 224 N.E.2d 360, 363
(1967).
170. Id.
171. I1 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1988).
172. See In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 91 Bankr. 430, 439 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (The
Bankruptcy Code test for insolvency may include the "equity" or cash flow standard.).
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ance-sheet as well as equity or cash-flow standard. 173 Section 2 (a) of the
UFTA states that a debtor is insolvent if "the sum of the debtor's debts
is greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation." 1 74 A pre-
sumption of insolvency is raised if the debtor "is generally not paying
his debts as they come due." 175 Although the definitional language of
insolvency varies among the Bankruptcy Code, UFCA, and UFTA, each
statute demands a "balancing of present aslets against present and fu-
ture liability of existing debts."1 76 The value of a firm's assets, for pur-
poses of an insolvency determination, includes all relevant financial data
and is not limited to the book value of present assets.
177
Each of the three fraudulent conveyance statutes contains a "sav-
ings clause" that protects bona fide initial transferees if they give value
to the debtor. ' 7 8 Subsequent transferees are also exempt where value is
given in good faith and without the transferor's knowledge of a voidable
conveyance. 179 Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code is a typical sav-
ings clause:
[A] transferee or obligee ... that takes for value and in good
faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may
enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the ex-
tent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in
exchange for such transfer or obligation.
1 80
"Good faith" by the transferee requires a showing of no actual knowl-
edge of the insolvency or inadequate capitalization of the transferor and
a lack of constructive knowledge that the debtor is failing financially.' 8 '
V. COMMENTARY
To examine fully the repercussions of M&As which are funded in
large part by non-investment grade corporate debt, consider the follow-
ing scenario. I, a large investment banking firm, forms a $1 billion
"Leveraged Buyout Bridge Fund" to provide short-term funding for
corporate acquisitions. I approaches the management of A corporation
with a plan for the acquisition of B company. A's directors meet with I's
senior executives to consider the possibility of a takeover bid for B. In
the discussion, I's representatives procure non-proprietary information
regarding A's financial condition, including income statements and pro-
jected cash flow reports. After unsuccessful negotiations (due to the re-
luctance of A's directors to incur inordinate amounts of debt), I seeks an
investor elsewhere. Several weeks later, I contacts B's directors with a
173. UFTA §§ 2(a)-(b), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985).
174. Id. § 2(a).
175. Id. § 2(b).
176. See Heiman, Fraudulent Conveyances, 2 ASSET-BASED FINANCING (MB) § 21.03[21[a]
at 21-15 (1987).
177. Id.
178. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(c), 550(b) (1988); UFCA § 9, 7A U.L.A. 577-78 (1985); UFTA
§ 8, 7A U.L.A. 662-63 (1985).
179. Id.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988).
181. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 548.07 at 548-70-71 (King ed. 1988).
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proposition: the acquisition of A with partial funding to be supplied by
I. Negotiations with B are successful and a cash tender offer for A's
common stock is planned.
To implement its bid, B organizes a shell corporation, S, in Dela-
ware for the sole purpose of acquiring A's shares. Thereafter, B initiates
its tender offer at a price of $60 per share. The total purchase price of A
is approximately $23 billion. Funding for the acquisition includes a fifty
percent secured bank commitment from a syndicate of approximately
two hundred banks, a one percent equity contribution by B (which rep-
resents the approximate cost of filing the offer), and a forty-nine percent
bridge loan to be advanced by I on a short-term basis and supplemented
by the sale by I of S's subordinated, high yield bonds. I is to receive for
its services over $386 million in fees as well as a six percent ownership
interest in A. 182 The syndicate of banks providing the senior debt
shares a $325 million fee. 183 B, as owner of S, anticipates an investment
return of almost $3 billion in five years.
At the announcement of the offer, A's common stock is trading at
$50 per share. A also has outstanding senior secured debt which in-
cludes bank loans and long-term notes, long-term unsecured bonds
(which were investment grade when issued eight years earlier), pre-
ferred stock, and convertible bonds. In addition, A has accounts with
twenty large trade creditors which have supplied goods and services to A
since its incorporation in 1954. A's board of directors is composed of
five inside and six outside directors, all of whom enjoy lucrative stock
option plans and severance contracts. A employs 100,000 workers at
sites located throughout the southeast. A's balance sheet reflects a con-
servative, but prudent, management: sixty-five percent equity to thirty-
five percent debt. Of the thirty-five percent debt outstanding, only ten
percent represents secured obligations. Consequently, A's assets are
relatively unencumbered. A also possesses a $400 million cash reserve
which management anticipates using for additional investments. At the
time of the offer, A has no acquisition plans.
A's directors, believing A to be better served by remaining in-
dependent, announce to A's shareholders their opinion concerning the
inadequacy of S's bid. Immediately thereafter, A's management an-
nounces the repurchase of eighty-five percent of A's common stock. To
complete the purchase, A must obtain bank loans, liquidate its $400 mil-
lion cash reserve, and issue new subordinated debt. Announcement of
the repurchase program results in the placement of A's unsecured
bonds on Standard & Poor's Credit Watch list. As a result, A's outstand-
ing unsecured bonds plunge almost fifteen percent in price.
Fearing the impact of a defensive restructuring, eighty percent of
A's stockholders tender to S. At the close of the bid, S takes down ten-
182. These figures are based upon the LBO of RJR by KKR in 1989, White, KKR Sells
Its Partners RJR as a Bargain But Gives Them Few Numbers to Prove It, WALL ST.J., Dec. 5, 1988,




dered securities and pursues its announced cash-out merger in which
the remaining stockholders of A will receive $60 per share in cash. The
proposed merger is successfully completed within several months. At
the end of this time, newly-merged A has senior debt to the extent of the
fair market value of all the company's assets, approximately ten to fif-
teen percent equity (including common stock, warrants, and preferred
stock), and unsecured debt equivalent to the difference between the cost
of acquiring A and the amount of equity and senior debt available. The
$400 million cash reserve has been depleted by S in order to remit ac-
quisition and financing fees to banks, underwriters, and attorneys. Pre-
merger corporate bonds are trading at sixty percent of their face value.
S's management enters negotiations for the purchase and sale of non-
crucial assets, and terminates or lays off approximately 50,000
employees.
Notwithstanding these post-merger cost-cutting decisions, eighteen
months later, B, as owner of the post-merger A entity, is unable to pay
obligations on the new secured and unsecured debt. B's alternatives are
to file for a Chapter 11 reorganization in an attempt to restructure debt
commitments or to file for a Chapter 7 liquidation. Secured creditors of
post-merger A are reluctant to negotiate any restructuring terms which
would result in a reduction of their debt interests. Extensions of pay-
ment periods or adjustments in interest rates are, however, negotiable
terms to these lenders. A's unsecured bondholders are in a less
favorable position. If these creditors "holdout" against a restructuring,
bankruptcy relief will be pursued and their interests will suffer greater
depreciation due to the costs and delays inherent in bankruptcy liquida-
tion proceedings. If these unsecured creditors agree to a restructuring,
their debt interests will certainly experience a substantial dilution in
value. A "game of chicken" now exists between besieged management
and bondholders. The choice is whether to pursue a negotiated reor-
ganization (in which all parties compromise their claims) or liquidation
in bankruptcy (in which all parties suffer a substantial dilution in the
value of their investments). In either of these options, the parties who
bear the direct financial impact of the LBO are the unsecured pre-
merger corporate bondholders.
A brief explanation reveals their dilemma. The keystone of a lever-
aged acquisition is the transfer of wealth from the target company's
bondholders to the firm's common stockholders. For instance, at the
close of the leveraged tender offer for A, A's shareholders have received
a $10 premium for their common stock. The cash paid to A's stockhold-
ers originated from bank loans provided to B as well as bridge loans
from I and the sale of S's subordinated, high yield debt. Since the cash
payments were generated almost exclusively from borrowed funds, B,
through S, is obligated to repay the loans, plus accrued interest. The
bank loans are to be repaid over a period of years and the bridge loans
from I must be paid down within a few months of the buyout and then
replaced by the sale of subordinated debt. In order to satisfy interest
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obligations and to remit fees to I and other participants to the transac-
tion, B must gain immediate access to cash or other assets. The primary
asset available to B is the $400 million cash fund which presumably will
be used to reimburse fees. Next, B will attempt to sell A's severable
divisions. The remaining assets will be used to generate cash to service
all outstanding debt.
The result of these maneuvers is that A's cash fund has, in effect,
bought out the equity interest of A's common stockholders. Further,
A's assets, which were previously unencumbered, have furnished the lev-
erage with which B secured buyout financing. From the perspective of
common stockholders, the resulting leverage of A is of no moment since
they received a one-time cash payment for their equity and, therefore,
retain no economic interest in the newly-merged A. From the stand-
point of secured bondholders, their security interest remains (albeit fur-
ther encumbered by subsequent debt financing)-they are priority
creditors with a right to execute upon assets in the event of default.
Unsecured bondholders, on the other hand, are in a precarious po-
sition. First, pre-merger bonds suffered a substantial loss of value upon
the announcement of the leveraged tender offer and defensive restruc-
turing. This decrease in value (the "event risk" of the bond) reflected
the concern by market analysts that the credit quality of A's outstanding
debt could not survive a takeover or LBO. Upon the cuts in the value of
bonds, pre-merger bondholders face an immediate dilemma: sell into a
falling market after the bonds are downgraded or "wait and see" what
subsequent developments occur. Assuming that pre-merger bondhold-
ers will not sell into the market, a second dilemma is presented: whether
remaining assets are adequate to create the revenues necessary to carry
all outstanding debt. Added to the bondholder's second dilemma is the
question of their rank in priority if bankruptcy ensues. In other words, if
bankruptcy is the result of the leveraged acquisition, pre-merger bond-
holders can either be paid in cash like trade creditors or can be equated
to owners of "junk" bonds and, therefore, be entitled only to a rank
above that of equity investors who, for the most part, have been cashed
out.
At this point, pre-existing debt holders may attempt to negotiate
with S's management. The bondholders' probability of success is se-
verely limited, if not prohibited, by the fiduciary duties owed by manage-
ment to stockholders and by indenture provisions which curtail
amendments absent bondholder consent. If the indenture terms permit
and the bondholders acquiesce to an amendment forcing acceleration of
debt payments, firm directors probably will file for Chapter 11 protec-
tion. Consequently, pre-merger bondholders must address the ultimate
prisoner's choice: hold out against a management attempt to restruc-
ture debt on terms less favorable than existing debt (thereby risking the
bankruptcy of the target firm) or accept an out-of-court restructuring
plan which dilutes their debt interests, but which provides more com-
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pensation than in bankruptcy because of the fees, expenses, and delay
associated with an in-court reorganization.
In sum, the outcome of the LBO is the shifting of A's former wealth
from legitimate unsecured bondholders to A's common stockholders.
A's assets likewise were transferred to B, as owner of A, and B's invest-
ment advisors and attorneys. Since straight unsecured corporate debt is
a bona fide and necessary aspect of corporate financing, safeguards must
be available to long-term unsecured bondholders of firms subject to suc-
cessful buyouts.
VI. PROPOSING A SOLUTION
A. Remedies Pursuant to Trust Indenture Covenants
It may first be suggested that indenture covenants provide appro-
priate bondholder protection. For example, indentures may contain
prohibitions or limitations upon mergers with the intended goal of cur-
tailing subsequent leveraging and its adverse effect on pre-existing debt.
Corporations adopting merger prohibitions or limitations must, in order
to pursue a business combination, redeem outstanding debt according
to the terms of the bond's call feature (generally at a premium). In the
alternative, indenture contracts may allow a merger to proceed only if
the surviving corporation assumes all prior liabilities, and on terms satis-
factory to the indenture trustee and which impose no financial hardship
upon existing bondholders.
Another contract-protective alternative is for management to draft a
bondholders' right to put the bonds to the target corporation in the
event of a merger or the downgrading of the debt subsequent to a
merger or other change of control. These "poison puts" safeguard
against the effects of further leverage.
Poison puts, however, often serve to prevent acquisitions, entrench
incumbent management, and otherwise raise the specter of favorable
bondholder treatment at the expense of equity owners. In addition, in-
denture covenants which restrict mergers are difficult to value, costly to
draft, and burdensome to management decision-making. Consequently,
creditor protection in the form of enforcement of existing indenture
terms is not an optimal alternative for bondholders.
Bondholders are increasingly pursuing contractual remedies for
management-proposed modifications of outstanding debt securities. In
particular, solicitation of indenture amendments comprise modifications
to debt and capital expenditure limitations and often include induce-
ments to bondholders to consent to proposed changes. Consent solici-
tations implicate certain contractual issues including coercion, fair
dealing, good faith, and informed consent. These issues are particularly
relevant where inducements are available only to consenting bond own-
ers and thus, are perceived by non-consenting bondholders as a means
of vote-purchasing.
These issues were presented to, and rejected by, the Delaware
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Court of Chancery in Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc. 18 4 Most recently, this
type of claim was raised by RJR Nabisco's bondholders in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco Inc. 18 5 who charged that management
misappropriated the value of their bonds to help finance the LBO of the
company.18 6 Although the court in Metropolitan Life rejected the debt
owners' claim that management's misappropriation constituted a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,' 8 7 such suits in-
vite an expanded use of good faith terminology to cloud the distinction
between corporate fiduciary duties owed to stockholders and duties of
good faith in the performance of indenture covenants.
B. State Corporate Remedies
Another option for unsecured bondholders is to pursue relief under
state corporate law. Currently two choices are available to these debt
holders. First, bondholders may rely upon a bondholder protection ar-
gument premised on a contractual duty of good faith in the performance
and execution of indenture contracts. This remedy proceeds from the
black-letter rule that bondholders are creditors of the firm and therefore
must provide their own creditor self-protection remedies. If indenture
terms are silent or otherwise prohibit a bondholder-protective construc-
tion, debt holders may raise contract avoidance doctrines to set aside
indenture language that results in unfairness or oppression.
The second option seeks to impose upon issuers and controlling
shareholders a fiduciary duty to bondholders when debt holder interests
conflict with stockholder interests. 188 This approach abandons the
traditional characteristic of bonds as being wholly debt and conse-
quently being governed exclusively by express contractual language.' 8 9
For instance, convertible bonds combine features of both equity and
debt.190 The issue is raised whether convertibles and other hybrid se-
184. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Gh. 1986).
185. 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
186. Id. at 1506.
187. Id. at 1519.
188. Bondholder suits under state corporate law may receive additional support from
stakeholder constituency statutes recently adopted in twenty-four jurisdictions. See gener-
ally Hart & Degener, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 12, 1990, at 1, col.
2. These statutes generally allow directors to consider interests of employees, suppliers,
creditors, consumers, and the local economy in making business decisions for the firm.
The statutes vary according to mandatory consideration of non-stockholder interests, see
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e) (1989); permissive consideration of other constituencies, see
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-35-1(d), (), (g) (Burns. Supp. 1990); and opt-in charter provi-
sions for debt holder approval of takeovers or replacement of specified percentages of
directors, see Wvo. STAT. § 17-18-201 (1990). How these statutes will be interpreted in
light of directors' traditional duties owed to stockholders is unknown. It may be suggested
that such stakeholder legislation increases confusion concerning director accountability
and should, therefore, not provide the primary impetus for bondholder suits in the ab-
sence of searching legislative examination of the impact of such anti-takeover statutes on





curities require departure from a conclusory "equity" or "debt" analysis
for bond interests when they conflict with stockholder interests.
Recently, state courts have revisited the black-letter demarcation of
equity and debt and the doctrinal regimes of corporate and contract law
as applied to securities.1 9 1 Once again, judicial response to the imposi-
tion of a corporate fiduciary duty to bondholders has been a resounding
negative. 19 2 Justification for this lack of intervention by state courts
rests upon the unresolvable conflict between the financial interests of
stockholders and bondholders. 193 On the contract side, requests for
bondholder protection have met with no greater success.
194
Consider the alternatives of a pre-merger unsecured bondholder of
A corporation who seeks relief in Delaware's Court of Chancery. The
issue is whether the debt holder has a cause of action to enjoin the de-
fensive restructuring which caused an immediate downgrading of the
holder's security. If the bondholder casts her claim in the form of a
derivative cause of action alleging breaches of fiduciary duties by A's
management, the short answer is clearly no. In Wolfensohn v. Madison
Fund, Inc.,195 plaintiffs sought to enjoin an exchange offer by a holding
company for ninety-seven percent of the target company's stock. Ac-
cording to plaintiffs, the exchange offer effected a reorganization which
transferred corporate income from bondholders to stockholders in the
event of a liquidation and otherwise placed plaintiff bondholders in an
inferior position. 19 6 Plaintiffs were denied relief because debt holders
were deemed creditors of the corporation to whom no fiduciary duty was
owed and the exchange offer impaired no contractual rights owed to the
plaintiff bondholders.1
9 7
A similar result was obtained in Harffv. Kerkorian.19 8 In Har, plain-
tiffs brought a combined derivative and class action suit challenging the
declaration and payment of a dividend for the controlling shareholder's
benefit.' 9 9 Plaintiffs were the holders of five percent convertible deben-
tures due in 1993.200 They alleged the classic conflict of interest be-
tween stockholders and bondholders in the declaration of a cash
dividend that impairs the value of conversion features and causes a de-
cline in the market value of the underlying bonds. 20 1 The Delaware
Court of Chancery dismissed the derivative cause of action for lack of
standing.20 2 Citing the Wolfensohn decision, the court found that con-
vertible bondholders do not gain stockholder status until exercise of the




195. 253 A.2d 72 (Del. 1969).
196. Id. at 75.
197. Id.
198. 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974).
199. Id. at 215.
200. Id. at 217.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 215.
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option.20 3 As to the class action, plaintiffs claimed that defendant direc-
tors breached the indenture agreement by violating fiduciary duties to
refrain from acting in their own self interest.20 4 The court dismissed the
class action for failure to show any fiduciary duty existing between the
defendants and bondholders.
20 5
A second alternative for A corporation's unsecured bondholders is
to bring a class action charging a breach of contract. For example, as-
sume that management, at the time of drafting the indenture contract,
included a condition which prevented future corporate borrowings with-
out the bondholders' consent. Assume further that a restrictive cove-
nant was adopted which would require consent by a bondholder
majority to amend the indenture. If management thereafter proposed
an exchange offer wherein existing bondholders would tender their de-
bentures for a combination of notes, common stock, and warrants and
the offer was contingent upon an amendment to the indenture and thus
to the consent of the bondholders, what decision would the debt holders
make? If the company is in sound financial condition, the situation likely
will not arise. If a bondholder seeks relief at this juncture, her claim is
breach of contract by "coercive" actions of management-that is, a coer-
cive restructuring effected for the stockholders' benefit (reduction of in-
come obligations by the issuer) at the bondholders' expense (forced
consent to exchange existing debt instrument at an unfair price).
In Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.,206 Chancellor Allen addressed an
analogous situation. The plaintiff in Katz was the owner of long-term
debt securities issued by Oak Industries, Inc. (Oak).20 7 Oak announced
an exchange offer and consent solicitation that would effect a reorgani-
zation of the firm. 20 8 The plaintiffs asserted that the offer was coercive
and forced bondholders to tender and consent. 20 9 They argued that by
conditioning the offer on consent, management breached their contrac-
tual obligation to act in good faith.
210
Chancellor Allen denied plaintiffs' application for a preliminary in-
junction on two grounds-one direct and one indirect.2 1' As to the lat-
ter, he found plaintiffs to have presented no issue of a fiduciary duty
owed by corporate management to the holders of debt securities and
therefore "[n]o cognizable legal wrong" by directorial action that
203. Id. at 219.
204. Id. at 221.
205. Id. at 221-22. Chancellor Quillen also found that plaintiffs failed to raise the ex-
ception that creditors can maintain an action against management upon proof of fraud,
insolvency, or a violation of an independent statute. Id. On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the derivative claim and reversed on the dismissal
of the class action. The court found error in the Chancellor's ruling that plaintiffs alleged
no fraud in their complaint. The case was then remanded for trial on the fraud issue. Id.
at 220-22.
206. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
207. Id. at 875.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 878.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 878-82.
[Vol. 68:3
"DE-LEVERAGING" LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
benefitted shareholder interests at the bondholders' expense. 2 12 The
Chancellor's conclusion was based upon existing Delaware law-and the
law generally-which defines the relationship between a corporation
and its bondholders (including owners of convertible debentures) to be
contractual in nature. The Chancellor further explained a bondholder's
rights and interests:
Arrangements among a corporation, the underwriters of its
debt, trustees under its indentures and sometimes ultimate in-
vestors are typically thoroughly negotiated and massively docu-
mented. The rights and obligations of the various parties are
or should be spelled out in that documentation. The terms of
the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts such
as fairness define the corporation's obligation to its
bondholders.
2 13
Notwithstanding the existing Delaware law, Chancellor Allen ac-
knowledged the impact of the proposed restructuring-that is, the trans-
fer of risk of economic loss to bondholders and thus, in effect, a removal
of wealth from owners of debt to equity investors. 2 14 The court de-
clined to intervene, however, in the absence of either legislative direc-
tives safeguarding bondholder interests or indenture terms granting
creditor self-protection.
2 15
Troubling to this writer is the court's apparent suggestion that
lenders do negotiate and adequately document bondholder-protective
provisions when recent statistics indicate a lack of negotiated terms in
indenture contracts. Is it reasonable to assume, therefore, that corpo-
rate management will draft pro-bondholder terms in light of their cor-
porate fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder interests? Arguably, by
relegating debt owners to relief on their contracts, the Chancellor con-
ceded the inviolable conflict between bondholder and stockholder inter-
ests. Although each is a "stakeholder" in the firm, decisions which
advantage one, disadvantage the other. Corporate directors, therefore,
cannot simultaneously fulfill fiduciary obligations to both parties since
each has conflicting economic concerns.
On the contract side, Chancellor Allen outlined the modern con-
tract principle that a party to an indenture owes a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in the performance and execution of a contract. 21 6 The
Chancellor found the contract obligation not to be synonymous with the
duty of loyalty required by a director in the exercise of his duties to the
corporation and its shareholders. 2 17 The Chancellor stated the legal
212. Id. at 879.
213. Id. at 879 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Chancellor Allen noted, however,
the application of concepts of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing as a matter
of contract law. Further noted by the court was the impact of the challenged transaction-
that is, the transfer of wealth from stockholders to bondholders.
214. Id. at 876.
215. Id. at 879.
216. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 878 (Del. Ch. 1986).
217. Id. at 878 n.7.
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test in Delaware for a breach of contract based upon a claim of "coer-
cion" in the structure of a corporate transaction:
[I]s it clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who
negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed to
proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith-had they thought to negotiate with re-
spect to that matter. If the answer to this question is yes, then,
in my opinion, a court is justified in concluding that such act
constitutes a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. 218
Two questions arise from the Chancellor's formulation of "coer-
cion" as a matter of contract law. First, is the concept of coercion differ-
ent in a contract, as opposed to a corporate, regime? If not, is the
appropriate legal test then one of "fairness" as effectuated through the
equitable powers of the court of chancery? If so, then do not the same
equitable principles require fair treatment to all who seek relief in a
court of chancery? Second, if the test of contractual good faith is what
the parties "would have agreed to," what bondholder protections will
ever be implied when to do so is to breach a corporate duty owed by
directors to their shareholders? In other words, the duty of good faith
in contract law does not attach to the negotiation process which is the
precise juncture at which stockholder and bondholder interests will un-
alterably diverge and leave a debt owner's contract unprotected. If the
covenant of good faith does not reach the bargaining process, therefore,
how will a bondholder sustain proof of a breach of good faith in the
performance of the indenture?
Where, then, is the bondholder of A who sought relief in the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery? First, the bondholder is without a remedy if
the claim is one for a breach of a corporate fiduciary duty. This result is
both necessary and reasonable. Directors cannot simultaneously serve
two masters who seek opposite results concerning the use and retention
of capital assets. In addition, if a court should grant equity status to a
bondholder by imposing such a duty on corporate directors, that bond-
holder likely will be deemed a "stockholder" and thus placed in the low-
est priority rank in the event of bankruptcy. Consequently, a derivative
cause of action poses a remedy for unsecured bondholders only in a pre-
merger, non-bankruptcy circumstance. If the claim is one for breach of
contract based upon coercion by management or the acquiror, it is ques-
tionable whether the claim is co-extensive with a charge of a breach of
fiduciary duty and therefore likely to suffer the same outcome as the
latter allegation.
C. Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws
Corporate bondholders in tender offer transactions may pursue a
private action for damages against an issuing or acquiring corporation
for violations of sections 10(b) 2 19 and 14(e)2 20 of the Exchange Act.
218. Id. at 880.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
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Both section 10(b) and section 14(e) proscribe fraud or other deceptive
acts or practices made in regards to a "security." 2 2' A "security" is de-
fined in the Exchange Act to include any "bond" or "debenture. ' 22 2 To
secure standing under these provisions, however, a corporate bond-
holder must first establish the elements of a cause of action for securities
fraud.
To date, corporate bondholders have largely rejected the federal
avenue of relief in favor of unsuccessful state law remedies.223 The pau-
city of bondholder protection in the federal arena rests in large part
upon judicial characterization of bonds as "debt" and, therefore, secur-
ity holders to whom no duty is owed by an issuing or acquiring corpora-
tion. Stated another way, bondholders, as creditors, lack standing under
federal antifraud provisions. Shareholders, on the other hand, are per-
mitted access to federal securities remedies. 224 This distinction be-
tween stockholders and bondholders in the context of federal securities
laws ignores the economic realities of debt transactions and investments
and appears to rely instead upon subtle state corporate concepts of
"duty" and the nature of the instrument held.
To understand the application of federal securities remedies, as-
sume that a pre-merger bondholder of A company initiates a federal suit
against S and A corporations alleging violations of sections 10(b) and
14(e). The claim by A's bondholders is that debt instruments were
220. Id. § 78n(e).
221. Id. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e).
222. Id. § 78c(a)(10).
223. In articles appearing in The Wall StreetJournal at the close of 1988, it was noted
that federal suits were pending against RJR Nabisco by two RJR noteholders in which
bondholders alleged violations of the securities laws and sought rescission of their debt
instruments. See White, ITT Sues RJR, Saying Buy-Out Devalues Bonds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17,
1988, at CI, col. 3; Heylar, KKR Hiring Firm to Fund an RJR Chief, Though Purchase is Far
From Complete, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1988, at A5, col. 1. See also Winkler, Sore Junk Bond
Holders Form Rights Group but Say They Aren't Looking for a Free Ride, WALL ST. J., June 30,
1988, at 61, col. 2; Piontek, Met Sued RJR to Protect Its Bondholdings, NAT'L UNDERWRrrER,
Nov. 28, 1988, at 1; Franklin, Metlife Looks for Help, N.Y.LJ., May 11, 1989, at 5, col. 2. For
state law actions see Simones v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
In addition, debt holders increasingly are demanding disclosure obligations to debt
owners at least as extensive as those provided to equity investors. In a recent renewal of
this charge, bondholders are "banding together in the most concerted effort yet to change
Securities and Exchange Commission policy" by amending the 300 Rule. Schultz, Bond-
holders Mobilizing to Change 300 Rule: Financial Information More Difficult to Get Post-LBO, IN-
VESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., July 30, 1990. The 300 Rule, as enacted under section 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, allows companies with less than 300 security holders
to forego all disclosure of financial information relevant to the issuer.
224. See Metropolitan Securities v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 705 F. Supp. 134, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Plessey Co. PLC v. General Electric Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 488 (D.
Del. 1986); Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 66, 80 (N.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 492 F.2d 750 (5th
Cir. 1974). Cf. McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1990) (In public offering of debentures, issuer disclosed right of holders to tender the
debentures to the issuer in the event of a merger, consolidation or other triggering event,
unless such event was approved by a majority of independent directors; court held that
jury could find such disclosure misleading under § 10(b) because the independent direc-
tors were required by state law to protect the shareholders' interests above those of debt
owners.).
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purchased by the plaintiffs many years earlier based upon representa-
tions by the issuer and other public information concerning the issuer's
credit worthiness. Plaintiffs will contend that, when purchased, the
bonds were investment grade and carried little or no chance of default.
Further, indenture covenants to the bond contract represented the mar-
ket circumstances of the debt transaction, including the company's con-
servative debt-to-equity ratio and its $400 million cash reserve.
Plaintiffs will allege that upon the announcement of S's leveraged tender
offer and A's defensive restructuring, A's bondholders suffered a sub-
stantial loss in the value of bonds as well as a downgrading of their debt
instrument. A's bondholders will then seek damages and/or rescission
of their debt investments based upon the fraudulent and deceptive prac-
tices of A's and S's management in the initiation and defense of the
LBO.
Each antifraud provision implicated in the bondholders' complaint
prohibits the commission of fraud during the course of a tender offer.
2 25
Under the federal securities laws, fraud includes misrepresentations or
omissions of material facts and the use of deceptive, fraudulent, or ma-
nipulative devices. 2 26 To determine whether a plaintiff has established a
cause of action for securities fraud, the courts have considered five fac-
tors: misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, scienter, reliance,
causation, and damages. Bondholder suits are preempted by the follow-
ing elements: a "duty" to speak (where a claim is one of omission of
fact) and reliance.
1. The Duty Requirement
In Chiarella v. United States,22 7 the Supreme Court held that a failure
to disclose material information constitutes fraud under section 10(b)
225. Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connec-
tion with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation
of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invi-
tation. The Commission shall, for purposes of this subsection, by rules and regu-
lations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and
practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988). Rule lOb-5 (as promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1990).
226. Id.
227. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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and rule lOb-5 when the person who remained silent had a "duty" to
speak. The petitioner was a printer employed as a "mark-up man" on
various documents concerning announcements of corporate takeover
bids. 228 Petitioner used these documents to determine the name of the
target firm in order to purchase target securities before the tender offer
announcement. 2 29 After initiation of the bid, petitioner sold the securi-
ties to the acquiring corporation at a substantial profit.
230
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a person who
learns material information from the confidential documents of a would-
be acquiror violates section 10(b) if he fails to disclose the information
(the impending takeover bid) before trading in the target company's se-
curities.23 1 The Court framed the issue in terms of whether the printer
had a "duty" to speak to the selling shareholders. Absent such a duty,
the Court reasoned, there could be no violation, and therefore no liabil-
ity, under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 23 2 In finding no duty in
Chiarella, the Court stated "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure ... [t]here can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We
hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information." 23 3 To establish a duty,
the Court reasoned, there must exist a fiduciary relationship between
the parties or a similar relation of trust or confidence.
23 4
For the purpose of standing for the bondholders of A corporation,
the question is whether a target or acquiring company owes a duty to A
bondholders under the antifraud provisions and, if so, what information
satisfies the obligation to speak. In terms of the target corporation, it
seems fair and consistent with the federal securities laws to impose a
duty to disclose in light of the trust and confidence the bondholders
placed in the firm which solicited their investment in the issuer's debt
securities. On the other hand, if the test of "duty" is a fiduciary relation-
ship imposed by state corporate law, target management owes no such
obligation to the creditors of the firm-that is, its bondholders. An im-
mediate conflict arises, therefore, concerning the substantive test for
"duty" under the federal antifraud provisions.
In a recent decision, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York reaffirmed the distinction between stockholders and bond-
holders, holding that an issuer owed no duty to convertible debenture
owners to disclose the effect of a third-party tender offer on the bond-
holders' contractual rights.235 In Metropolitan Securities v. Occidental Petro-




232. IL at 230.
233. Id. at 235.
234. 445 U.S. at 228.
235. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
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leum Corp. ,236 a holder of convertible debentures claimed that target
management violated federal securities laws by failing to disclose the
impact of a premium provision in the indenture contract on an outstand-
ing third-party tender offer. According to the debt holder, had manage-
ment disclosed the effect of the offer on relevant premium provisions,
the debt holder would not have exercised its conversion privilege and,
thus, realized a greater gain from the takeover bid. The court rejected
plaintiff's argument, holding that the tender offer was directed to the
issuer's stockholders and that the issuer, therefore, owed no disclosure
duty to owners of its other classes of securities. 23 7
As to the acquiring entity, an argument can be made that a duty
should be implied under federal law. Consider the impact of a success-
ful leveraged tender offer on a pre-merger corporate bondholder. First,
pre-existing bonds will suffer reductions in bond ratings and severe de-
valuation in face value at the announcement of a takeover bid. Second,
if the bondholders choose not to sell in a weak bond market, upon the
successful completion of the offer, the acquiror will systematically dis-
mantle the target firm's capital structure in order to service the junk
bond debt and other acquisition costs. Once the assets have been
stripped to finance the takeover, the value of the once-investment grade
bonds will decrease further. If an out-of-court work-out is effected, pre-
merger bondholders will receive substitute notes, cash, and/or equity in
the reorganized firm which represent only a fraction of the face value of
the prior bonds. If the acquiror pursues a Chapter I 1 reorganization,
the bondholders must battle for partial payment with priority secured
creditors, trade creditors, other unsecured debt holders, and junk bond
owners. Whether and in what form A's bondholders ever receive com-
pensation is unknown. The economic realities of the tender offer trans-
action therefore compel the acquiring corporation to acknowledge a
duty to target bondholders-an outcome which reflects a broad reme-
dial construction of the federal securities laws. 238 Unfortunately, adher-
ence to state corporate principles-which recognize no fiduciary duty or
relation of trust and confidence between an acquiror and target security
holders-prevents this extension of the antifraud provisions to takeover
bidders by bondholders.
2. The Reliance Requirement
Under the antifraud provisions, a plaintiff may recover only if she
can demonstrate that deception caused the injury. Proof of reliance pro-
vides the causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plain-
236. 705 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Hartford Fire Ins., 723 F. Supp. 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
237. Metropolitan Securities v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 705 F. Supp. 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
238. For authorities advocating the existence of a duty under the securities laws based
upon principles of trust and fairness, see Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983); S.E.C. v.




tiff's injury. In List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,2 3 9 the Second Circuit stated that
proof of reliance was necessary to prevent rule 1Ob-5 from becoming an
insurance policy for the investor:
Resistance to "investor's insurance" may be analytically re-
stated as a refusal to transfer certain economic risk from inves-
tors to those who must make disclosures under the securities
laws. There are, of course, legitimate risks inherent in a firm's
enterprise that investors bear in exchange for the opportunity
to profit.
2 40
The court in List held, however, that "actual" reliance was unnecessary
and instead articulated the test as "whether the plaintiff would have
been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had
disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."
24 1
This relaxed standard for proof of reliance is commonly known as
the "fraud on the market" theory.24 2 Acceptance of the fraud on the
market theory requires the assumption that market prices respond to
information available in the marketplace regarding the securities being
traded. This theory treats reliance on market price as identical to reli-
ance upon representations made directly to an individual investor:
[T]he market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ide-
ally, transmits information to the investor in the processed
form of a market price. Thus, the market is performing a sub-
stantial part of the devaluation process performed by the inves-
tor in the face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the
unpaid agent of the investor .... 243
An investor, therefore, can rely upon the integrity and efficiency of
the market. He is also entitled to recover where injury results from the
defrauder's action or inaction.
In the context of A's bondholders, adoption of a fraud on the mar-
ket theory enhances an argument for an emendatory construction of fed-
eral antifraud language. The target firm's bondholders are investors
who rely upon the integrity of the market to decide the investment qual-
ity of their debt instrument.2 44 If the relaxed standard of reliance ap-
plies throughout the life of the bond, bondholders, like stockholders,
can establish the element of reliance under antifraud provisions. If,
however, reliance occurs only at the time the bond was purchased,
bondholders will not have standing for allegation of fraud.
3. The "In Connection with the Purchase or Sale" Requirement
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 require that the fraud be committed
239. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
240. Id. at 463.
241. Id.
242. See 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 8.6 (1981).
243. In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
244. For cases, referring to the Williams Act, supra note 77, and applying the "fraud on
the market" theory, see Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich.
1978); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166 (D.R.I. 1976).
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"in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."'2 45 This is the
final bondholder obstacle in tender offer transaction suits.
Consider a pre-merger bondholder who wishes to pursue a federal
antifraud claim. As a pre-existing debt owner, the bondholder is unable
to show a purchase or sale of a security at the time of the alleged wrong-
doing-that is, the announcement of an LBO or a defensive recapitaliza-
tion. If the bondholder proceeds on the basis of a purchase or sale by
the defendant, which is a recognized theory for satisfying the "in con-
nection with" element of rule 1Ob-5, 2 4 6 the bondholder has no standing.
For example, a would-be acquiror cannot purchase securities during the
pendency of the offer. Likewise, non-investment grade securities will
not be sold by the offeror until the bid closes or is within days of closing.
These latter sales do not comport with the acts or practices (the an-
nouncement of the offer) which caused the devaluation of the pre-ex-
isting bonds.
Target management will not purchase or sell securities at the time
the leveraged recapitalization is announced and the bond ratings are cut
since directors probably cannot effect a repurchase program until after
the event which caused the decrease in bond value. Consequently, de-
spite the remedial purpose underlying the Exchange Act and the defini-
tion of "security," pre-merger bondholders lack a federal remedy for
harm emanating from leveraged tender offers. 24 7 Ironically, owners of
junk securities who provided the key portion of leverage for the buyout
receive antifraud protection more easily because of the timing of the
bonds' issuance-that is, junk bond owners are purchasers of debt se-
curities when the alleged harm occurs. As a consequence, non-invest-
ment grade debt holders have a greater chance of succeeding on the
merits of a section 10(b) cause of action.
D. Relief Under the Bankruptcy Code
In the event a buyout firm is unable to meet interest obligations and
fails to secure a voluntary restructuring of corporate indebtedness, firm
management may seek protection under the bankruptcy laws. The alter-
natives available to financially beset corporations are liquidation under
Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 reorganization. 248 Most companies initially
245. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 204.lOb-5
(1990); Rule lOb-5, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
246. See Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
247. But see McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that ajury could find misleading certain disclosures by an issuing corpora-
tion of rights of debenture holders to tender debt securities to the issuer upon specified
triggering events unless such events were approved by a majority of directors).
248. Another alternative to a bankruptcy petition is a reorganization under § 1126(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1988). Section 1126(b) allows a debtor to
propose and solicit acceptance of a plan for restructuring outstanding indebtedness prior
to the filing of a petition. Pre-petition reorganizations are uncommon, however, due in
substantial part to the restriction on indenture trustees to negotiate and compromise the
interests of owners of public debt issuances where the outstanding bonds are subject to an
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will pursue reorganization in Chapter 11 in order to continue in busi-
ness and to restructure existing debt. Equity investors and unsecured
debt owners probably will consent to reorganization since a forced liqui-
dation in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 will unlikely bring prices which ap-
proximate the market value of the property if it is sold as an ongoing
business.
If firm management pursues reorganization protection under Chap-
ter 11, the filing of the bankruptcy petition temporarily suspends its ob-
ligations for servicing debt and prevents secured creditors from
foreclosing upon corporate property. In particular, the automatic stay
of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code freezes actions against the debtor
and prevents enforcement of claims against the debtor company. 249
Owners of the firm's outstanding debt may not execute upon the
debtor's property and may not declare the debtor in default due to the
suspension of interest payments. 250
Filing a bankruptcy petition also suspends the debtor firm's obliga-
tion to pay pre-petition claims. In addition, interest charges on un-
secured debt commitments are frozen during the pendency of the
bankruptcy proceeding.251 Interest payments on secured debt during
bankruptcy are dependent upon whether the trustee can provide ade-
quate protection for the secured creditor's interest.
252
Firms subject to a Chapter 11 reorganization likely will seek credit
advances in order to continue business operations. Unsecured credit is
available to struggling companies, without bankruptcy court approval, if
the credit is obtained in the debtor's ordinary course of business.253
Creditors which supply such unsecured credit are provided the priority
of an administrative expense and thus will be paid before pre-petition
suppliers and creditors. 254 Post-petition secured credit or not-in-the-
ordinary-course-of-business unsecured credit is available to debtor firms
indenture and bondholder consents must be obtained. See § 316(b) of the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (1988).
249. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
250. Id. Holders of claims against a debtor corporation may seek relief from the auto-
matic stay of section 362 upon a showing of cause (including the lack of adequate protec-
tion of an interest in the creditor's property) or, with respect to a stay of an act against the
debtor's property, if the debtor does not have equity in the property and the property is
not necessary to the reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). If relief from the stay is
granted, holders of claims against the debtor may pursue their rights in the bankruptcy
proceeding or in a separate proceeding.
251. Post-petition interest on unsecured debt is paid under a Chapter 7 liquidation
after all other claims are paid. I 1 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1988). In a Chapter 11 case, post-
petition interest is not payable where the debtor is insolvent. Id. § 1129(b).
252. Secured creditors are paid accumulation of interest after the petition is filed only
where the value of their collateral exceeds the value of their claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
(1988).
253. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1988).
254. Id. Secured or super-priority credit may be authorized, upon a debtor's request,
after notice and hearing. If the court authorizes such borrowing, the creditor extending
the loan receives either a super-priority over administrative expenses or a security interest
in the debtor's assets. Id. § 364(c). A super-priority position will be granted to the debtor
only if unsecured credit is not available or is insufficient to meet business needs and the
interests of prior secured creditors are not adversely affected. Id.
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only after notice and a bankruptcy court hearing.2 55 Since most post-
petition credit obtains priority over pre-petition claims, pre-existing un-
secured creditors are considered parties in interest entitled to notice of
a debtor's intent to secure super-priority credit.
2 56
Consider the position of a pre-petition bondholder of A corpora-
tion, which pursues a Chapter 11 reorganization. Once a Chapter 11
petition is filed, secured creditors are unable to levy upon the company's
assets. Further, the A/S corporation receives, by virtue of the automatic
stay of section 362, the right to temporarily suspend obligations to ser-
vice debt, to pay pre-petition claims, and to remit interest accumulations
on unsecured debt. With the stay in effect, A/S management will at-
tempt to negotiate with major creditors and members of creditors' com-
mittees for a plan of reorganization. If the proposed plan is confirmed,
consent by a majority of creditors will bind all others so long as all credi-
tors receive at least as much as they would have received in a Chapter 7
liquidation.
One risk to A's bondholders in a Chapter 11 proceeding is that firm
management may be removed and replaced by a trustee.2 57 In addition
to possible removal of management, reorganization in bankruptcy im-
poses the scrutiny of the bankruptcy court and creditors' committees
upon the firm's daily operation. Any negative effect of outside interven-
tion is lessened, however, by the creation in bankruptcy of a fiduciary
relationship between the debtor-in-possession and its creditors; that is,
the petition creates an estate consisting of all assets of the company for
the benefit of its creditors. To a large extent, therefore, bankruptcy es-
tablishes an obligation by representatives of the debtor's estate to maxi-
mize returns to all claimants. One result of this fiduciary duty is that the
estate may be required to pursue lawsuits against former managers (who
may hold equity positions in the LBO company), former shareholders
(who cashed out of an arguably insolvent corporation), and buyout lend-
ers (who provided the critical acquisition leverage which ultimately
caused the insolvency of the firm). 25 8 If bankruptcy management is
under a fiduciary commitment to charge these participants to the
buyout, confirmation of the plan of reorganization may be jeopardized.
Notwithstanding these risks of Chapter 11 filings, A's bondholders
255. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1988).
256. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
257. To the extent that management or former shareholders held secured or un-
secured debt claims, those claims may be subordinated under equitable principles to
claims of other creditors. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (Bankruptcy court
is empowered to subordinate claims of insiders who hold judgment liens in an insolvent
company; the dealings of directors and dominant shareholders "are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation are chal-
lenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the
transaction but also to show its inherent fairness .... ).
258. In a recent development in the Chapter 11 reorganization of Campeau, a commit-
tee representing bondholders of Allied Stores Corp. asked a bankruptcy judge in Ohio for
permission to sue Allied's owners and banks, alleging they fraudulently conveyed money




face the additional uncertainty of the priority they obtain as pre-existing
unsecured creditors. Arguably these claimants should be considered
pari passu with trade suppliers since these persons provided legitimate
working capital at a critical juncture in the debtor's life cycle. Moreover,
like trade creditors, the unsecured bondholders did not intentionally
embark on a risky investment relationship with the issuing corporation.
Indeed, all evidence indicates that trade creditors and unsecured bond-
holders sought investment of capital, services, or goods in return for
guaranteed repayment plus interest or profits. Junk bondholders, on
the other hand, purchased high risk debt securities in an over-leveraged
company with the intent of obtaining interest returns in excess of invest-
ment grade debt. The economic motivation for the latter bondholders,
although representing a claim for unsecured debt of the bankrupt firm,
is altogether different from that of pre-merger bondholders. Conse-
quently, an argument is presented that trade suppliers and "legitimate"
unsecured bondholders should gain priority in bankruptcy over subse-
quent owners of high risk, high yield debt.
This argument is further supported by the fact that junk bond own-
ers increasingly receive an equity position in the reorganized company
as a substitute for their unsecured debt claims. The reversal of debt for
an equity position in the LBO firm is dictated, in large part, by the enor-
mous volume ofjunk bond debt. In light of the magnitude of mezzanine
financing, junk bond owners do not, in most circumstances, have the
cash payment option. The resulting phenomenon of substituting equity
for non-investment grade debt has led some commentators to character-
ize bond financing of highly distressed companies as "equity with a bow-
tie."'25 9 As a consequence, ifjunk bonds are actually stocks in disguise,
these debt securities should be paid in bankruptcy like other equity in-
terests: at the base of the priority scheme.
Debt-equity issues arguably also arise in bankruptcy where a pre-
existing bondholder initially seeks relief in a state corporate breach of
fiduciary duty action due to the hybrid nature of current corporate
bonds. In this circumstance, if the bondholder is successful in imposing
a corporate fiduciary duty and its attendant remedies under state corpo-
rate law, the same bondholder must take that "equity" characterization
into a bankruptcy proceeding if the target firm is forced to restructure or
liquidate in Chapter 11. As a result, it appears that A's bondholders are
prejudiced in a bankruptcy forum if the debt owners attempt to forestall
the over-leveraging of the firm by first seeking an injunction against the
leveraged acquisition in a state corporate court. Likewise, if bankruptcy
follows, prior corporate debt owners may be forced to share in priorities
with holders of junk securities.
In addition to these risks, A's bondholders must await the delays
inherent in bankruptcy proceedings before any compensation is forth-
coming. During this period, holders of claims against the debtor may
259. Are Junk Bonds Really Stocks in Disguise?, WALL ST. J., Cl, col. 4, June 4, 1990.
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assign their interests to other parties pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
3001 (e).2 60 While this process allows creditors to liquidate their claims
rather than await a bankruptcy determination, A's bondholders are pe-
nalized once again by the ability of indenture trustees and members of
creditors' committees to trade their interests on the basis of information
garnered in their capacity as LBO participants. As previously noted,
claims assigned by these insiders are apparently outside the power of
bankruptcy and federal securities courts to regulate. Unless A's bond-
holders are considered pari passu with trade creditors, these unsecured
bondholders are substantially handicapped in the event of a Chapter 11
proceeding.
E. Remedies Under Fraudulent Conveyance Statutes
Increasingly, the best alternative for pre-merger bondholders is to
seek avoidance of pre- and post-LBO conveyances which resulted in the
insolvency of the LBO firm. Avoidance of these transactions or security
interests creates a larger asset pool from which unsecured bond claims
may be paid. The obvious targets of fraudulent conveyance actions are
former shareholders, professional advisors, secured lenders, and new
subordinated creditors. Actions based upon fraudulent transfers are
not, however, without difficulty.
Consider again the plight of A's bondholders. To maintain a fraud-
ulent conveyance suit, A's bondholders allege "constructive" fraud by
buyout participants. 2 6 1 Under this approach, transfers of property or
commitments incurred by the debtor are considered constructively
fraudulent if the debtor does not receive "fair consideration" or "rea-
sonably equivalent value" and the debtor is "insolvent" or rendered in-
solvent by the transfer or is engaged in business and as a result of the
conveyance has "unreasonably small capital" to continue in business.
Initially it appears that A's bondholders cannot satisfy the "fair con-
sideration" or "reasonably equivalent value" test for fraudulent trans-
fers. For example, in the buyout of A, A's assets were indirectly
encumbered to secure loan proceeds which were paid to A's former
shareholders rather than to the target firm itself. The third-party nature
of the leveraged acquisition may thus prevent the LBO from satisfying
the "adequacy of consideration" standard necessary for the debtor. The
difficulty of successfully avoiding LBO conveyances under these circum-
stances is that the acquisition funds were transferred directly to S, a shell
corporation, and not the target firm. Under this scenario, S pledged the
A stock which was purchased with the loan proceeds as security for the
funding. Structuring the buyout in this manner may, therefore, avoid a
fraudulent conveyance claim.
As a practical matter, however, third-party financing is detrimental
to the lender who, as a result, has no direct action against target assets.
260. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) (1988).
261. Due to the difficulty of proving "intentional" fraud, most claimants will attack
leveraged transactions on the basis of constructive fraud.
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If, therefore, the acquisition under attack is a leveraged recapitalization
by A's management which was financed by funding provided directly to
A corporation, A's bondholders may maintain a fraudulent conveyance
claim. On the other hand, pursuit of an LBO by a third-party via a shell
corporation prevents avoidance claims by pre-merger bondholders and
insulates the acquiror (and other parties acting in concert with the ac-
quiror) from liability. This result occurs because of the independent
existence of S corporation as the acquiring entity.
As a consequence, it seems that A's bondholders are faced with a
paucity of remedies against LBOs initiated by outsiders. One response
to this dilemma by bondholders is that courts can "collapse" the various
stages of an LBO into a single transaction wherein an acquiror leveraged
target assets to secure buyout funds which passed to former sharehold-
ers rather than the target corporation. The flaw to this approach is that
the acquiror and its lenders are not direct creditors of the target firm;
their interests are tantamount to a claim by an existing shareholder.
Nevertheless, courts have invoked their powers of equity to break down
the discernible steps to a leveraged tender offer notwithstanding the use
of a direct loan structure.
In the landmark decision of United States v. Gleneagles Investment
Co.26 2 the court ruled that mortgages executed in favor of an LBO
lender were fraudulent conveyances voidable under the Pennsylvania
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.2 63 In Gleneagles, the LBO lender
(the transferee) structured the loan arrangement as a two-part process.
The loan proceeds first passed directly to the transferor (the LBO com-
pany). The proceeds were then immediately turned over to a holding
company which used the funds to complete the LBO. In applying the
"fair consideration" element of Pennsylvania's UFCA, the court "col-
lapsed" the two separate loans into one transaction in order to find that
the transferor did not receive the benefits of the loan.26 4 Instead, the
court said that the transferor functioned as a mere conduit through
which the funds passed to the selling shareholders. 265 As a result of
"collapsing" the dual steps to the buyout, the court found the secured
LBO lender liable for constructive fraud.
2 66
The second obstacle to fraudulent transfer claims is the difficulty in
determining if and when insolvency of a target firm occurs. For in-
stance, assume that evidence of constructive fraud scienter is found.
Participants to the LBO may escape avoidance of transfers or obliga-
tions incurred by the debtor by conducting pre-lending reviews of the
262. 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), modified, United States v. Tabor Court Realty
Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) [hereinafter
Gleneagles].
263. Id. at 573-83.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 575.
266. Although Gleneagles is often cited for its broad application of state fraudulent con-
veyance statutes to LBO transactions, the court also found the LBO lender liable for inten-
tional fraud. 565 F. Supp. 556, 586.
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financial status of the target firm or the acquiror (if a "collapse" theory
is being used).26 7 If the product of that review is a good faith belief
concerning the firm's sound financial position, fraudulent conveyance
liability may be precluded. If, on the other hand, undercapitalization or
insolvency of the firm should have been discovered, fraudulent transfer
avoidance likely will attach.
Where courts "collapse" LBO transactions and resulting insolvency
is proven, pre-existing bondholders may seek to avoid cash payments to
former shareholders. Stockholders to LBOs are prime targets for avoid-
ance claims since selling shareholders, arguably, never convey value to
the debtor firm upon the sale of their stock. Likewise, LBO lenders are
susceptible to fraudulent transfer claims under these circumstances be-
cause loan proceeds pass to selling stockholders rather than the subject
corporation. Stockholders and LBO creditors may attack this theory
where the buyout is effected by a third-party acquiror to whom the
buyout proceeds are directly transferred. If a court "collapses" the
leveraged transaction, prior secured lenders, former creditors, and new
subordinated lenders may find their claims avoided or otherwise
subordinated to existing unsecured claims.
2 68
In light of these theories, fraudulent conveyance statutes under
state law provide the most optimistic course of recovery for pre-merger
bondholders. In addition, if bondholders seek relief from fraudulent
transfers under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,26 9 two additional
factors must be considered: (1) that bankruptcy creates a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the debtor-in-possession or trustee with the firm's
creditors, not simply those who suffer the greatest harm, and (2) section
548 sets forth a one year statute of limitations for avoiding fraudulent
transfers and obligations in a bankruptcy proceeding.2 70 Section 544(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code2 7 1 allows unsecured creditors to extend the sec-
tion 548 one-year limitations period by initiating claims of fraudulent
transfers under other "applicable law," in particular, state fraudulent
conveyance statutes. Due in part to the concept of bond aging and the
delayed impact of failed or failing LBOs, section 544(b), as applied to
267. Id.
268. Section 5 10(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the equitable subordination
of claims pursuant to the bankruptcy court's general powers of equity to alter creditor
claim priority in order to rectify a perceived injustice to one or more claimants. 11 U.S.C.
§ 510(c) (1988). Equitable subordination is applied only in those circumstances where
one claimant participated in unfair conduct which resulted in detriment to other creditors.
Claimants most often subject to charges of subordination are corporate insiders. The
leading case on equitable subordination is Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), in which
the Supreme Court upheld the subordination of a claim by a director/sole stockholder in
favor of outsider creditor claims. See also Estes v. N & D Properties, Inc., 799 F.2d 726, 733
(11 th Cir. 1986) (secured interest of insider subordinated to the extent of harm caused to
other creditors). See generally, Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 83 (1961).
269. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
270. Id. Section 548 in particular provides that the trustee may avoid transfers of inter-
ests in the debtor that were incurred on, or within one year before, the date of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition.
271. Id. § 544(b).
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state uniform acts, may provide the most fruitful source of recovery for
unsecured corporate bondholders.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unsecured corporate bondholders in the 1990s face an ultimate
"prisoner's dilemma" as a result of failed or failing LBOs. The dilemma
focuses upon the ineffectiveness of legal remedies and rights for public
debt owners in connection with the de-leveraging phenomenon of major
U.S. corporations. Currently, unsecured corporate bondholders must
decide whether to pursue impairment of investment claims against LBO
management or acquirors in state corporate or federal securities actions.
They must also decide whether to pursue these actions on the grounds
of breach of fiduciary duties or duties of disclosure, or to accept partial
payment in cash or equity securities of the insolvent corporation in out-
of-court workouts or bankruptcy reorganizations or liquidations. Pur-
suit of state and federal remedies alleging breach of duties by directors
or acquirors have been all but universally rejected due to a lack of stand-
ing by bondholders/creditors. State corporate courts are particularly
reluctant to intervene on behalf of debt investors, apparently in recogni-
tion of the irresolvable conflict between the economic interests of equity
and debt investors.
An expanding avenue of relief is the state corporate action which
seeks recovery for consent solicitations undertaken by LBO manage-
ment to retire, replace, or amend outstanding debt securities in connec-
tion with firm restructurings. These state contract claims attack
"coerced" modifications to indenture covenants, especially where fees,
increases in interest rates, or rights to put the securities to the issuer or
acquiror are offered as inducements to those bondholders who consent
to indenture amendments. Consent solicitation actions provide an un-
chartered avenue for creative counsel if requirements of good faith and
fair dealing in contract enforcement are considered co-extensive with
fiduciary duties owed to stockholders. It is suggested, however, that
state contract claims needlessly obfuscate the efficient and predictable
precept of corporate law that directors owe fiduciary obligations to
stockholders and not bondholders.
If bond owners await payment by the debtor during an LBO re-
structuring, their choices include receipt of equity in the newly-organ-
ized entity (which bears the risk of a failed reorganization) or a partial
cash payment. If bondholders holdout for a non-reduced claim, LBO
management likely will pursue liquidation in Chapters 7 or 11. In the
event of a forced disposal of firm assets, unsecured bondholders will
receive less than the face value of their bonds and may be compelled to
compete with thousands of other unsecured claimants for whatever cash
is available to pay claims upon liquidation of the debtor. A possible eq-
uitable argument for bondholders confronting this bankruptcy alterna-
tive is to seek compensation as trade creditors and, therefore, recover
ahead of junk bond owners.
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An increasing possibility of recovery for unsecured bondholders is
to set aside claims of former shareholders, LBO participants, senior
lenders, or LBO management pursuant to state and federal fraudulent
conveyance statutes. Due to the third-party nature of most LBOs, how-
ever, relief may be dependent upon a court's application of equitable
principles which "collapse" the discernible steps to LBOs. In light of
the auction process for corporate control which has resulted from the
de-leveraging process, as well as the insiders who are effecting the un-
supervised transfer of control, courts should exercise the full comple-
ment of their equitable powers to avoid fraudulent claims by insiders
and LBO participants where detriment is visited upon pre-existing cred-
itors. If courts are unwilling to interpret fraudulent transfer statutes in
this manner, the only remaining alternative for unsecured bondholders
is to await an unregulated market correction of the harms currently con-
fronting legitimate unsecured lenders.




This is a paper about legal pedagogy. Although content and meth-
odology are often difficult to separate, what I have to say has more to do
with process than with substance. It is not complicated, but it is in-
tended to be provocative as well as illustrative. The basic premise is that
virtually any subject area can provide fertile ground for teaching the
skills, principles, and theories of responsible law practice from which law
teachers have to choose in designing their courses. The subject of
Shakespeare, for both practical and philosophical reasons, serves here as
the example by which this premise is demonstrated.
In putting this piece together, I was guided by two underlying prin-
ciples. Neither is revolutionary, but together they help explain the con-
clusions I have drawn and the decisions I make about teaching. The first
principle has to do with metaphors and the interrelationships between
ideas. Law can be seen as a metaphor for life, and life, I suppose, can be
seen as a metaphor for the practice of law.' Anything, in fact, can be
seen as a metaphor for anything else. Any process can be analogized to
any other, and in the final analysis, all things are related to all others. It
is simply a matter of seeing the connections. Thus I can say to my stu-
dents, a good brief is like an award-winning Japanese garden; it must be
planned and laid out with excruciating care to insure that the results
achieved appear to be the inevitable and untampered-with design of na-
ture. Or, I might postulate, the attorney at the negotiating table is a
Babel fish;2 the attorney's job is to decode both the client's and the
* The author owes thanks to Susan, Bob, Ann, Nancy, and Elliott, who not only
tolerate their colleagues' experiments in education, but encourage them; to Mary,
Heather, Lori and Michael for all their hard work; and of course to Peter andJamie, whose
brilliant scholarship and stellar courtroom performances were the inspiration.
1. The same idea has been expressed by James De Young, speaking on the subject of
experiential learning in the field of theatre arts:
Since the main goal in theatre practicums is cooperative achievement of the best
production possible and since every step along the way in a production involves a
new problem or new decision, it would appear that we have in place an ideal
model for life training as well as artistic training.
J. De Young, The Practicum Experience, Relic of the Sixties or Hope of the Eighties 3
(1985) (paper prepared for U.S. Department of Education, National Institute of Educa-
tion, Educational Resources Information Center).
2. "The Babel fish," said the Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy quietly,
is small, yellow and leechlike, and probably the oddest thing in the Universe. It
feeds on brainwave energy received not from its own carrier but from those
around it. It absorbs all unconscious mental frequencies from this brainwave en-
ergy to nourish itself with. It then excretes into the mind of its carrier a telepathic
matrix formed by combining the conscious thought frequencies with nerve sig-
nals picked up from the speech centers of the brain which has supplied them. The
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adversary's language and communicate the thoughts of each to the
other. Such analogies, discussed and developed in the classroom, help
bridge the perceived chasm between the world of lay experiences and
the world of law practice. Students are thus able to learn something
about lawyering.
It is no doubt true that not all things are easily related to the prac-
tice of law, nor are all analogies equally appropriate. I would not, for
example, necessarily teach Japanese gardening as a prelude to teaching
about brief writing. Then again, I would not rule out the possibility
either. The point is, I could use Japanese gardening theory to teach
about brief writing, and do it successfully. Sufficient similarities exist in
the two activities to make an extended metaphor or analogy workable in
the classroom. This is true of a great many processes.
The second point I'd like to make is that we do best what we love.
When Bill Moyers asked Joseph Campbell during one of their interviews
on the critically-acclaimed Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth (inter-
views reprinted in J. CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF M=T (1988)), what ad-
vice he would give to one attempting to find meaning in this mythless
and ritualless time, Campbell replied, "follow your bliss." Law, teach-
ing, the teaching of law, and the practice of law may be blissful activities
in and of themselves, but most of us have broader interests. We like to
scale mountains or bake, steep ourselves in political debates or bury
ourselves in classical languages. These interests are important to us and
there is no reason why we have to leave our interests or those interesting
parts of ourselves outside the classroom door. The metaphorical
method is one way of making the things we love best an integral part of
our teaching.
One thing that makes it possible for law teachers to bring outside
interests into the classroom is the fact that the range of things that prac-
ticing lawyers need to know and understand is so vast as to be almost
overwhelming. We have the luxury-or the impossible task-of picking
and choosing among any number of important subject areas and ways of
teaching. This gives us broad latitude in discovering ways to fit into the
curriculum matters of interest to ourselves without straining to find ways
in which these interests are relevant to lawyering.
This is not, however, a call to omit a class on cross-examination in
favor of a class on bird watching. Nor do I mean to suggest that law
teachers should abandon basic instruction in essential areas. I simply
point out that what is "essential" consists of a great many things, and
that the number of ways of prioritizing what should be taught and how is
infinite. It is possible-perhaps even essential-to incorporate what we
practical upshot of all this is that if you stick a Babel fish in your ear you can
instantly understand anything said to you in any form of language. The speech
patterns you actually hear decode the brainwave matrix which has been fed into
your mind by your Babel fish.
D. ADAMS, THE HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 59 (1979). I am indebted to my
friends George LaRoche and Edith Blackwell for introducing me to the Babel fish.
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teachers, as human beings, have learned and loved outside the class-
room into our course syllabi.
There is also, I believe, a sound pedagogical basis for doing this.
Imagine a lawyer sitting back after dinner doing the New York Times
crossword puzzle. She is suddenly struck by the idea that the stories told
by plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses in court that day, cross and fit
together in the same way as the downs and acrosses of the Times' puzzle.
That lawyer has the beginnings of a closing argument. Such is the way
arguments and theories of a case are born. The ability to idly reflect on
processes and things and to make associations with other processes and
things is itself a skill, a skill that can be learned through observation and
practice. When law teachers practice that skill in the classroom, it en-
hances, rather than sacrifices, pedagogical objectives.
3
To demonstrate how these ideas can be put into practice, I have
selected two sample classes from an appellate advocacy seminar in which
the main theme is the writings of Shakespeare. The classes were in-
spired by a debate over the question of the true authorship of Shake-
speare's works. The format of the debate-an argument before an
appellate court-made it easy to see the connections that might be
drawn between Shakespearian scholarship and lawyering, and provided
some familiar means by which the classes could be taught.
Part I of this Article provides basic historical background to the sub-
ject of legal pedagogy, and particularly to the rise of the clinical method.
Part II identifies the existing problems law teachers face in deciding on
course content for skills-related courses and describes a few of the
choices others have made or advocated. Part III discusses my personal
approach to course design. Part IV examines the multiple ways in which
the subject of Shakespeare could be used to accomplish the objectives.
The ultimate choices made and justifications for these objectives are de-
tailed in Part V.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the late 19th century, when the scientific method was enjoying its
heyday, Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced into the law school
curriculum a pedagogical theory which he believed applied principles of
scientific analysis to legal thought.4 The legal system envisioned by
Langdell was one in which the ultimate discovery of a "few fundamental
principles" would inevitably lead to a legal practice governed by these
fundamentals. Legal judgments would be made by applying the few
legal principles written into the common law to facts, and legal judg-
ments accordingly would be dictated by "rationally compelling rea-
son."5 Despite the continuing efforts of legal theorists who have
3. It makes the learning process less painful for the students. "When we our betters
see bearing our woes,/ we scarcely think our miseries our foes." W. SHAKESPEARE, King
Lear, act 3, sc. 6, lines 102-103.
4. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
5. Id. at 8.
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pointed out the many flaws in Langdell's orthodoxy,6 Langdell's theo-
ries retain much of their vitality in today's law schools. The notion that
decisions are made by judges pursuant to some rational ordering of
known constructs still predominates, and the belief that such a process
of analysis can best be understood by examining the cases in which it is
done is still operative through the case book method of teaching law.
7
Even as the law schools clung (and continue to cling) to the scien-
tific method as adapted by Langdell, the legal profession has continu-
ously registered its complaints about the inability of new lawyers to
handle real cases as well as about the failures of the legal education sys-
tem to prepare students to practice law.8 Recent years have seen a vast
increase in the number of skills training programs for lawyers. 9 This
trend must be attributed in part to the profession's concern that lawyers
are not acquiring training in law school which is adequate to meet pro-
fessional practice norms.1 0
Although legal education has been slow to respond to the needs of
the profession, some development along these lines has taken place dur-
ing the last twenty years. Perhaps the most significant development has
been in the area of clinical legal education." 1 Without engaging in, and
certainly without resolving, any debates about what the definition of
6. This includes the futility of achieving anything like the formalistic utopia he pre-
dicted in a system governed by humans preferring to apply their own subjective rules
rather than the ostensibly objective ones of Langdell's ideal world. See, e.g., Bok, A Flawed
System of Lau, Practice and Training, 33J. Legal Educ. 570 (1983); Cramton, Lawyer Competence
and the Law Schools, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock LJ. 1 (1981); Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-
School? 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907 (1933); Gee &Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and
Lawyer Competency, 4 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 695 (1977); Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduc-
tion of Hierarchy, 32J. Legal Educ. 591 (1982); N. Redlich, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE
METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS (1914).
7. GREY, supra note 4, at 50.
8. See e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 A.B.A.J. 274 (1982); Devitt & Roland,
Why Don't Law Schools Teach Law Students How to Try Lawsuits? 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 445
(1987). Macauley, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II: Some Notes on Two Recent
Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32J. LEGAL EDUC. 506 (1982); Martineau, Appellate Litigation Skills
Training: The Role of the Law Schools, 54 CINN. L. REV. 129 (1985); McEachern, The Trial
Process, 40 THE ADVOCATE 217 (1982).
9. In addition to the training opportunities offered by private firms, state and local
bar associations and such organizations as the National Institute for Trial Advocacy, law-
yers in some states are now required to participate in some form of practice-oriented con-
tinuing legal education. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 602, app. A (Supp. 1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 1-B (Supp. 1991); S.D. COD. LAws §§ 16-8-2 (1987).
10. The American Bar Association's standards on accreditation of law schools have
thus far not been interpreted to require law schools to make lawyering skills courses
mandatory for their students. See Standardsfor Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302 (1987).
Despite increasing pressure from bench and bar, such courses are still offered primarily as
electives; indeed, practical skills courses constitute a small percentage of the total number
of courses offered at most law schools. See Devitt & Roland, supra note 8, at 459. Devitt
and Roland point out that studies commissioned by federal judges and by the ABA have
identified significant advocacy deficiencies, which they attribute in part to the interpreta-
tion of Standard 302. Supra note 8 at 445, 459.
11. This development is tracked in Meltsner & Shrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1976). See also Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagno-
sis, 26J. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974); Meltsner & Shrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1978).
[Vol. 68:3
1991] SHAKESPEARE COMES TO THE CLASSROOM 391
"clinical legal education" is12 or what the purposes of clinical education
are,13 I think it is safe to say that clinical education is, in part, a response
to the perceived failures of the educational system. Clinical teachers are
engaged in a search for ways to prepare students for the responsibilities
and realities of law practice.14
Thus, in clinical circles, the underlying assumption of Langdell or-
thodoxy-that we need to teach students to think like lawyers-has been
undermined by identification of a need for students to learn how to act
like lawyers. 15 Dissatisfaction with the Langdell method and greater
emphasis on what lawyers do has led to experimentation and develop-
ment of new methods and theories. 16
12. One definition of clinical legal education that has been proposed is "a curriculum-
based learning experience, requiring students in role ... to take responsibility for the
resolution of a potentially dynamic problem." Boon, A Working Model for Clinical Legal Edu-
cation: Testing the Definition Against a Range of Examples, 21 L. Tchr. 172 (1987). Boon goes
on to describe five categories of clinical course design: work experience; applications of
new (computer) technology; observation exercises; simulation exercises; and gaming. Id.
13. It has been asserted that clinical legal education had a "specific political origin" in
the late 1960's and was intended to promote two experiential goals: the exposure of mid-
dle class professional students to the life of the poor and the exposure of those same
students to the hypocrisy of the bar. Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the
Law School Curriculum, 14 SEroN HALL L. REv. 1, 6 (1983). Another educator has argued
that clinical methodology differs from the Langdellian appellate casebook method only
insofar as clinical instructors collect directly experienced examples involving third parties
as their core teaching materials rather than vicariously or indirectly experienced two-di-
mensional examples from casebooks. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its
Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 67 (1979). Barnhizer then suggests that a
"unique" potential of clinical programs is in the area of teaching professional responsibil-
ity. Id. at 68.
The uncertainty about, or lack of consensus on, what the purposes of clinical educa-
tion are can be gleaned further from articles describing clinical program development at
various schools. E.g., Haydock, Clinical Legal Education: The Histoy and Development of a Law
Clinic, 9 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 101 (1984) (focusing on clinical education as a "learn-by-
doing" method); Oppenheimer, Boalt Hall's Employment Discrimination Clinic: A Model for
Law School/Government Cooperation in Integrating Substance and Practice, 7 INtws. REL. L. REv.
245 (1985); see also Adams, Tulane Students Must Undertake Pro Bono Work Before Graduation, 10
NAT'L L.J. 4 (1988) (illustrative of the view that community service is a primary goal of
student practice).
14. It is no small problem that clinical legal education, however it is defined and
whatever its purposes are purported to be, is still regarded by many as peripheral to law
school education. Among other things, the continued marginality of clinical education has
been attributed to its associations with feminine (in theJungian sense) concerns with peo-
ple, unstructured situations and feelings. Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground:
A Critical Perspective on the Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 272 (1984).
Tushnet argues that clinicians have themselves contributed to this marginality by taking a
defensive posture when clinical education's overall value and cost-effectiveness are
brought into question rather than taking the offensive and attacking traditional legal edu-
cation's methods and values. It is well beyond the scope of this article to examine the
reasons for whatever continuing resistance there is to the inclusion of clinical programs in
the law schools, but in defense of clinical educators, I think it should be pointed out that
many are, and have been, engaged in the process of refining definitions, analyzing pro-
grams and making recommendations for development, and are not simply expending ef-
forts justifying the existence of clinical programs. See, e.g., infra note 34 and accompanying
text.
15. See, e.g., Motley, A Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 NovA L.J. 723 (1986).
Motley critiques the law school examination tradition, and goes on to make recommenda-
tions for change based on experiential learning concepts.
16. See Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education -a 21st Century Perspective, 34J. LEGAL EDUC.
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II. CURRICULAR NEEDS AND OPTIONS FOR LAW TEACHERS
As educators have moved from the rationalistic orientation of Lang-
dell orthodoxy to a more practice-focused orientation, considerable at-
tention has been paid to the tasks of lawyering. In this regard, much
effort has been expended on teaching students, particularly in clinical
programs, how to "do" such tasks.' 7 Implicit in this approach to clinical
teaching are some underlying assumptions about what lawyers do.
From the available literature, it may be widely assumed that what law-
yers do is interview and counsel clients, negotiate, develop case theo-
ries, engage in case planning, conduct direct and cross examinations of
witnesses, write pleadings and do discovery. No doubt many lawyers do
engage in these activities, but they engage in many other activities as
well. Even these identified tasks can be broken down further or rear-
ranged to create different categories of tasks for teaching purposes. The
fairly typical focus of clinical curricula on such skills as interviewing and
negotiation is by no means necessarily dictated by the needs of the legal
profession or the goals of clinical educators.18
Moreover, dissatisfaction with Langdellian orthodoxy has not led to
wholesale agreement or immediate satisfaction with the programs cre-
ated in part as alternatives. Interestingly enough, although the initial
creation of skills programs may be intimately related to a growing dissat-
isfaction with Langdellian orthodoxy, internal program development
has suffered from many of the very same problems as those which have
consistently plagued the legal education profession and which contrib-
uted to the creation of clinical skills programs in the first place. This,
perhaps, should come as no surprise. The more clinicians inquire into
their own as well as traditionalist pedagogical assumptions, the clearer it
612 (1984); Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn
from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284 (1981).
17. A quick inventory of some of the best known texts in clinical legal education dem-
onstrates the high priority given to the "how to's" of lawyering. See, e.g., A. AMSTERDAM,
TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (1978); G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON,
THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); P.
BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY (1982); D.BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUN-
SELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977); R. FISHER & W. URY, GETrING TO YES
(1981); K. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS (1978); T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF
TRIAL TECHNIQUES (1980); J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS (1983).
The underlying theory, expressed in another context, is that
Play acting like child's play is a ritualized form of exploration of the world that is
both enjoyable and challenging while being structured to move towards a satisfy-
ing learning conclusion. Seeing is better than hearing and doing is better than
seeing. Or as an old Chinese proverb has it:
I hear, I forget.
I see; I remember.
I do; I understand.
J. De Young, supra note 1, at 5.
18. See Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 277
(1982). Indeed, clinical law teachers have recognized that the structure and focus of their
courses may well be the result of historical accident or the demands of funding needs
rather than the consequence of planning in response to well thought out pedagogical
objectives.
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becomes that the number of things that lawyers do, and therefore must
learn, is mind boggling.
For example, law can be perceived of as a helping profession. Since
lawyers work with people, they must talk with them, understand their
needs, and work with them to solve problems. 19 This requires the abil-
ity to communicate, and communication requires an understanding of
values and language and of the interplay between the two. 20 This, in
turn, may require an understanding of political, socio-economic, and
historical contexts. 2 1 To provide a client with adequate information
19. "The beginning and end of a lawyer's professional life is talking with a client
about what is to be done." Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 231 (1979); "The skills of the successful lawyer lay in mastery of the human interac-
tion and in subtle awareness of the emotions, concerns and anxieties of others as well as in
the knowledge of how to utilize that awareness to advance the attorney's professional aims
in the interaction." Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Interviewing and Counseling, 27
J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1975). "This is a practice,/ As full of labour as a wise man's art." W.
SHAKESPEARE, Twelfth Night, act 3, sc. 1, lines 64-65. The way in which attorney-client dis-
cussions are to be carried out has been a subject of some interest. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977); M.
SCHOENFIELD & B. SCHOENFIELD, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1982); T. SHAF-
FER & R. REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1980); A. WATSON, THE LAW-
YER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976).
There is a considerable amount of non-legal literature dealing with the process of
communication in professional or quasi-professional settings that is of use to law teachers
as well. The work of Carl Rogers has been of particular interest to clinical law teachers.
E.g., C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961) excerpted in INTERPERSONAL DYNANMICS
287 (Bennis et al eds. 1968). Other articles of note in this volume include Davis, The Cab
Driver and His Fare: Facets of a Fleeting Relationship, at 556 and Gibb, Defensive Communication,
at 606. See also A. BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEW (2d ed. 1974); BERNSTEIN & BERN-
STEIN, INTERVIEWING: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONAL (1976); J. CHILDRESS, WHO
SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE (1982).
20. Jerome Bruner, in his work on the importance of language to the development of
what he terms the "transactional self" (a self that is both "personal" and part of a culture),
addresses this idea in depth. See, e.g., J.S. Bruner, Development of a Transactional Self
(Apr. 29-30, 1983) (paper presented at the conference of the Erikson Institute, Chicago,
Ill.) See also A.M. Quinton, Contemporary British Philosophy reprinted in WrrrGENSTEIN, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 8-21 (G. Pitcher ed. 1966.) One attempt to deal with the
problems of interpersonal communications has been made by developing an attorney-cli-
ent communications model which takes into account the varied sensory-based ways in
which people experience the world. Barkai, A New Model for Legal Communications: Sensory
Experience and Representational Systems, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 575 (1980). See also W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, The Tempest, act II, scene 1 ("You cram these words into mine ears against the
stomach of my sense."). Another approach is suggested by Clark Cunningham, who en-
courages attorneys to translate client language into jury language. For further under-
standing of the philosophical bases of the interplay between language and values, see
Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potentialfor Transforma-
tive Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988).
21. Many would see this as a need for political action, not just as a need for recogni-
tion or understanding. "We must not make a scarecrow of the law,/ Setting it up to fear
the birds of prey,/ And let it keep one shape till custom make it/ Their perch, and not their
terror." W. SHAKESPEARE, Measure For Aeasure, act 2, sc. 1, lines 1-6; Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity, A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C. R.- C. L. L.
REV. 295 (1988) (taking the view that law is ideology); Pellar, The Metaphysics of American
Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985) (asserting that legal discourse is political or mythical).
See also Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process,
1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 39 (1985) (examining the impact of the increased presence of
women in the legal profession on the practice of the law). The title of Menkel-Meadow's
article is, of course, derived from the character Portia in W. SHAKESPEARE, Merchant of eln-
ice; Folsom & Roberts, The Warwick Story: Being Led Down the Contextual Path of the Law, 30J.
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to make decisions, a lawyer may need to know basic psychiatry, be profi-
cient in math, or understand the inner workings of large
bureaucracies.
22
Another view of the law focuses on the nature of the legal system. If
the system is primarily perceived as an adversarial one, particular atten-
tion must be paid to its philosophical underpinnings, especially insofar
as they have been adopted or institutionalized by the profession.2 3 As
advocates in an adversarial system, lawyers take on a certain role. An
understanding of that role and its implications is necessary to competent
performance in that role.24 Adequate performance in this role may also
entail competency in dramatic arts, public speaking skills, the ability to
strategize and compete, and persuasive writing.
The trend toward specialization in law practice suggests another ap-
proach to teaching. To the extent that students enter law school or the
profession with the expectation of practicing in a particularized area,
there is a tendency to gravitate toward courses and clinics which relate
LEGAL EDUC. 166 (1979). These contexts affect the lawyer as much as the law and legal
problems. SeeJ. KATz, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982); A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974). See generally
C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS (1973).
22. This need has been identified by supporters of the Langdellian scientific ortho-
doxy. R. Clark, The Return ofLangdell, 8 HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 299 (1985). Clark asserts
that first year students require some grounding in statistics, model building and cognitive
psychology to enable them as lawyers to ferret out errors in legal reasoning. Id. at 307. See
also T. C. SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (mathematical principles applied to
negotiation); Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counseling and Advocacy - Especially in Commer-
cial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (1946) (identifying a need to understand "opera-
tional" systems); Monahan & Walker, Teaching Social Science in Law: An Alternative to "Law
and Society," 35J. LEGAL EDUC. 478 (1985).
There is no lack of material intended to acquaint lawyers with the basic precepts of
other disciplines relevant to law practice. E.g. W. CURTIS, MICROECONOMIC CONCErs FOR
ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1984); D. HERWITZ, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR
LAWYERS (1980); M. HOOTS, LAWYERS GUIDE TO MEDICAL PROOF (1966); A. MOENssEs, F.
INBAU &J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (3rd ed. 1986);J. RUBIN, Eco-
NOMICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW (1978); T. SANNrro & P. McGOVERN, COURTROOM
PSYCHOLOGY FOR TRIAL LAWYERS (1985); A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1978).
23. The norms of the profession are perhaps best gleaned from the ABA Standards
relating to professional conduct: "Toward the client the lawyer is a counselor and an advo-
cate; toward the prosecutor the lawyer is a professional adversary; toward the court the
lawyer is both advocate for the client and counselor to the court." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-8 (1980). Because "[a]dvocacy is not for the timid, the meek, or the
retiring," and because "[o]ur system of justice is inherently contentious . . . it demands
that the lawyer be inclined toward vigorous advocacy." Id. Voices have been raised against
too-strict adherence to these principles. See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
justice and Professional Ethics, I Wis. L. REV. 30 (1978)(discussing the implications of wide-
spread unquestioning acceptance of certain professional norms, including the belief in the
legitimacy of the system). See also Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1 (1975) (raising questions about whether "it is a good thing for lawyers to be
so professional-for them to embrace so completely this role-differentiated way of ap-
proaching matters"). Id. at 8.
24. There are many writings from the lawyer's perspective on their professional role
and its implications. A number of them have been collected in DVORKIN, HIMMELSTEIN &
LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER (1981), and can be also found in BELLOW & MOULTON, THE
LAWYERING PROCESS (1978). Some interesting implications of role assumption are also ad-
dressed in Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 87, 89-93 (1982); and Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64
VA. L. REV. 735 (1978).
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to those particular substantive interests. In-depth knowledge of sub-
stantive areas of law is considered both desirable and necessary by many
law teachers as well as students. Because clinics in most instances serve
a disempowered minority or class, there may be an increased danger
that clients will be exploited in the name of education and will be dis-
served by student representatives lacking basic understanding of the law
in the field in which they are operating. Thus intense inculcation in sub-
stantive law is considered a necessary prerequisite to the rendering of
services by students.
Process as well as substantive law can be viewed as essential content
to clinical law courses. Whereas traditional law courses stress analytical
thinking and demonstrable inferential logic as necessary components to
the process of "thinking like a lawyer," clinical courses may concentrate
more on creative problem solving and intuition as critical to legal
thought processes. 25 In addition, process as content can take the form
of deliberate observation, reflection, and self-analysis. 2 6 This suggests a
process-oriented and experientially-based approach to teaching, or per-
haps more accurately, to developing ethical standards.
27
The acme of the process orientation may be the theory that the real
25. "Clinical legal education, while attending to cognitive changes, has emphasized
learning in the affective and active dimensions." Harbaugh, Simulation and Gaming: A Teach-
ing/Learning Strategy for Clinical Legal Education, REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOoLs-A.B.A. COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 191, 198
(1980). It may be that the exposure to the real world of practice is what leads to this
approach to developing thought processes. As Emily Calhoun notes, "The genius of a trial
lawyer lies in knowing when to appeal to logic and when to appeal to values or unprovable
intuition." Calhoun, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 507, 512 (1984). Good
litigators, in other words, can sometimes ". . . see that most noble and most sovereign
reason, Like sweet bells jangled, out of tune and harsh." W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet act 3,
sc. 1, lines 157-158.
26. See SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACIIONER (1988) for a full development of this no-
tion. Of a student successfully taught by such a method, it might be said: "He is a great
observer, and he looks/ Quite through the deeds of men." W. SHAKESPEARE,Julius Caesar
act 1, sc. 2, lines 202-203. Clinical law teachers normally incorporate constructive critique
methods, including self-critique methods, into their supervisory sessions and thus tend to
be conscious of the process. Motley, supra note 15, at 749-50. In doing so, they certainly
can emphasize the same analytical skills that are central to Langdell's orthodoxy, especially
in the classroom. Some, perhaps many, clinical teachers are prone to utilize teaching meth-
odologies such as the Socratic method generally associated with more traditional law
courses. There is a belief that the clinical methodology merely adds a new dimension to or
is only marginally different from more conventional methodologies, Bloch, The Andragogi-
cal Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321 (1982); Barnhizer, supra note 13,
and that it is in danger of becoming even more like the system from which it rebelled.
Kennedy, supra, note 13, at 7. See also Tushnet, supra note 14 (suggesting that the leanings
toward acceptance or integration of traditional methods should be resisted).
27. Thus, it has been advocated that professional conduct in the mental health pro-
vider field be taught, tested and modified through "active experimentation and concrete
experience," even if the risk is that, by working through the decision making process them-
selves, students will reject professional codes of conduct. Pelsma & Borgers, Experience-
Based Ethics: A Developmental Model of Learning Ethical Reasoning, 64 J. COUNSELING & DEY.
311, 313 (1986). Although the teaching of ethics has long been a concern of clinical law
teachers, see COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THIRD
BIENIAL REPORT, 1973-1974 (1974), there has been some resistance to entrusting this task
to clinical education. See Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 392-93 (1980).
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goal of the educational system, or at least that part designated as
"clinical," ought to be one of empowering students to teach themselves.
The thrust of most self-directed learning proposals is that teachers
should facilitate a process by which students are ultimately transformed
into their teachers' equals.28 Among the advantages cited for adopting
a self-directed learning approach are: (1) such learning coincides with
normal psychological development toward a more independent and ma-
ture self,29 and (2) learners can be expected to continue to assimilate
ever-increasing amounts of needed new knowledge over time.3 0
Regardless of what substantive approach to legal education is fa-
vored, law teachers cannot teach everything.3 1 The choices with respect
to content are difficult and frustrating. If students are plied with sub-
stantive law, how will they learn what to do with it? If they are not, do
the clients suffer? Is it reasonable to expect that students will grapple
with professional responsibility issues in their ethics classes and will
have been provided adequate foundations in research and writing skills
in their first year legal methods classes? Are clinical law teachers quali-
fied to teach about matters having psychological components?
Even the goal of teaching students to teach themselves, however
valid, is rife with complications. For one thing, students raised in educa-
tional environments notable for using external reinforcements such as
grades as learning incentives may resist or have difficulty adjusting to
the demands of self-education. The learning quotient in such situations
may decrease in the short term.3 2 This has obvious implications for
clinical programs in which clients are dependent on the students' ability
to assimilate a significant amount of information quickly and which, be-
cause of their intensity and the time demands made on students, are
likely to suffer from student frustration and attendant decreased motiva-
28. M. KNOWLES, SELF DIRECTED LEARNING 14, 29 (1975). Knowles' theories are ap-
plied to the clinical legal education context in Bloch, supra note 26. Actually, Shakespeare
may have forecasted this trend when he wrote, "[b]e governed by your knowledge and
proceed/ I' the sway of your own will." W. SHAKESPEARE, King Lear, act 4, sc. 7, lines 19-
20.
29. KNOWLES, supra note 28, at 14. It has been asserted that with self-directed learn-
ing, "the self-actualized person experiences an integration of self and an integration of
experience into a meaningful whole" during which the person "feels more whole, more
alive, more at one with the world, more self-sufficient." M. Kersh, Integrative Curriculum
for Gifted Learners 2 (April, 1987) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Education Research Association, Wash., D.C., April 20-24, 1987).
30. KNOWLES, supra note 28, at 16; P. Beare, The Contract-An Individualized Ap-
proach to Competency-Based Learning and Evaluation 1 (Oct., 1986) (paper presented at
15th annual conference of Internat'l Soc. for Individualized Instruction, Atlanta, Ga., Oct.
9-11, 1986). Other possible advantages may be reduction of stress, which has been attrib-
uted in part to the one-exam system, see Archer & Peters, Law Student Stress, 23 NAT'L A.
STUDENT PERSONNEL ADINS.J. 48 (1986), and the greater development of talent. A. Astin,
Assessment, Value-Added and Educational Excellence, 15 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 89
(1987).
31. As it is, "[m]ore to know/ Did never meddle with my thoughts." W. SHAKESPEARE,
The Tempest, act I, sc. 2, lines 22-23.
32. K. Duckworth, Intelligence, Motivation, and Academic Work: An Operations Per-
spective (March 25, 1983) (paper commissioned by the National Commission on Excel-
lence in Education, Mar. 25, 1983).
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tion. In addition, the recognition of different styles and paces of learn-
ing makes the task of teaching self-directed learning a particularly
difficult one.
3 3
Given that every legal educator cannot teach everything, choices
about what to teach have to be made. One way of looking at the choices
is to see them as mutually exclusive. In deciding what to teach and how
to go about it, it is certainly possible to restrict one's self to a very lim-
ited number of topics and methodologies. For example, one could de-
cide to focus exclusively on interpersonal skills taught through lecture
and discussion, or one could choose to teach substantive bankruptcy law
by means of role playing. It is, however, also possible to avoid the con-
clusion of mutual exclusivity and recognize both the importance of all
the learning areas and the individual teacher's inability to teach every-
thing there is to know in all these important areas. The choices can be
seen as providing a wide range of interesting and relevant topics and
methods from which individual educators and institutions can select in
ways that best serve their purposes.3 4 This calls for selective incorpora-
tion of learning areas and methodologies.
3 5
III. ONE APPROACH TO COURSE DESIGN
There are, no doubt, as many ways to design a syllabus as there are
law teachers to do it. In this section, I describe only one of the ways of
conceptualizing a clinical seminar, that being my own. It is an illustra-
tion of how a selective incorporation approach to course design can
work when non-legal subject areas are included in the learning areas to
be incorporated.
I should point out that in putting together my class syllabus, I am
guided by several principles. First, I believe that students do learn in
different ways and that it is important to attend to their different needs
33. Much work has been done in the development of learning models from a number
of different perspectives. Chief among the various theories seem to be those which identify
stages of development. See, e.g., A. CHICKERING, EDUCATION AND IDENTIrF (1969);
Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 347-480 (1969); Kolb & Fry, Toward an
Applied Theory of Experiential Learning, in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES (G. Cooper, ed.
1975); the "whole brain" theories developed by Abraham Maslow among others, see, e.g.,
A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1969); K. Bruch, Bridging Curriculum with
Creative Development, 30 GIFTED CHILD Q. No. 4 (Fall 1986); and studies collected in IN-
TEGRATIVE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN THOUGHT (H. Morgenau, ed. 1972); and those which
concern themselves with the impact of environmental factors and dynamics to explain in-
tellectual growth patterns, e.g., A. ASTIN, ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE (1985);
K.A. Feldman, Some Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Change and Stability of College Students,
42 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 1 (1972); G. STERN, PEOPLE IN CONTEXT: MEASURING PERSON-ENVI-
RONMENT CONGRUENCE IN EDUCATION AND INDUSTRY (1970).
34. This seems almost too obvious to state. A number of law teachers have made
recommendations regarding how to go about identifying priorities and begin the process
of selection. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 26; Hoffman, supra note 18.
35. I have no doubt that most law teachers do engage in a process of selective incor-
poration in designing their courses. If my method of course design differs from my col-
leagues in any notable way, I believe it is more a matter of degree than anything else, and
is based on the belief that the range of learning areas and teaching methodologies from
which it is possible to draw is endless.
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as much as is reasonably possible. I also lean to the view that my job is
to give students the push they need to get started in their chosen profes-
sion, so that they can carry on confidently without my assistance a few
months or years down the road.3 6 Finally, I believe that contributing to
my own growth and maintaining an interest in my work are important
goals that should not be overlooked in deciding what and how to teach.
With those precepts always in mind, I move to designing the class
syllabus. In keeping with the general goal of empowering students to
learn on their own, I attempt to identify subject areas and teaching
methods that can serve as the source for learning something outside and
beyond the classroom. I think of these learning areas in simple (if trite)
metaphorical terms as "seeds." For example, a focal point of a class
nominally dealing with counseling might be the process of decision mak-
ing. Decision making is clearly not an activity that is limited to the con-
text of counseling. In fact it is not limited to lawyering activities at all.
An individual who understands the process of decision making can apply
that understanding to other life decisions. It is, therefore, a skill that
aids in learning and self development. The subject area of decision
making, taught in the context of a counseling class, has the potential to
"blossom" later in other situations and thus helps insure the individual's
continued growth.
3 7
Consistent with the belief that people learn in different ways, I have
found it works best to select seeds from several different categories for
each class or series of classes. These categories include skills, substan-
tive law, values issues, and overlapping interdisciplinary theory. I like-
wise try to utilize several different teaching methods in each class, such
as non-legal role plays, problem solving, simulation, non-legal games,
and lecture with discussion.
As important as it is for the subject matter and learning method to
have intrinsic interest for me, it is equally important that the subject
matter and learning method have some intrinsic interest for the stu-
dents. 38 There are many ways in which student interest can be piqued.
Some measure of familiarity with the subject area may do the trick. For
example, they studied this subject in college or played this game in kin-
dergarten. Non-threatening novelty, especially combined with humor,
can likewise be appealing. Predictably, student interest is affected by the
degree to which it is apparent that what they learn in the classroom has a
direct relationship to what they are doing in their field work or will be
doing in practice. It also helps if students are able to see the relation-
ship of any given class to other classes or to the course as a whole.
36. The students "must be taught, and trained, and bid go forth." The hope is that
they will not thereafter be "barren spirited," feeding on "abjects, orts, and imitations."
W. SHAKESPEARE,JUIUS Caesar, act 4, sc. 1, lines 35-37.
37. "Their understanding/ Begins to swell; and the approaching tide/ will shortly fill
the reasonable shore/ That now lies foul and muddy." W. SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest, act 5,
sc. I, lines 79-82.
38. Motivational theories of particular significance to clinical law teachers are dis-
cussed in Harbaugh, supra note 25, at 199-205.
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Learning cannot take place in an environment in which students are
forever in fear that they will be criticized or embarrassed. Many stu-
dents embark upon their law school experience with intrepidation and
nearly all enter clinical programs intimidated by the responsibility of cli-
ent representation. For most students, it is no easy task to perform for
courts and clients (even simulated ones) in the role of a lawyer. The
need to create a non-threatening environment in which the first fright-
ening steps toward being a professional can take place is of particular
importance in skills-oriented teaching.3 9 It is important to earn the stu-
dents' trust by expressing over and over again, in the first few classes
especially, support and confidence in their abilities. It is equally impor-
tant to reinforce students' support of each other and to impress upon
them both the need to work cooperatively rather than competitively (as
many learned to do in their first semester or two of law school, if not
before) and the responsibility each person bears towards the others in
the learning process. In this way, a foundation can be laid upon which
students individually and as a group can build. The idea is to create a
relatively safe environment in which planted seeds can develop.
The overall methodological strategy for all this is to demystify the
giant of lawyering by breaking it down into recognizable parts that can
be analyzed, mastered, put into a legal context, and finally incorporated
into an increasingly larger whole. Each of my classes has a goal of its
own and provides some measure of closure. At the same time, each
class fits into a series (usually a series of three), with each class relating
to the others in the series and each successive class building on the class
before it. There are recurring themes in many of the classes which help
the students see their work as part of a much bigger picture as well.
IV. THE PROCESS OF INCORPORATING SHAKESPEARE
Shakespeare fits into this teaching framework very well. Fortui-
tously, in 1987 The American University hosted a debate in which the
origins of Shakespeare's works was at issue. The debate, the brainchild
of Shakespeare enthusiast David Lloyd Kreeger,40 took the form of an
appellate argument before three justices of the United States Supreme
Court: Harry Blackmun, William Brennan, andJohn Paul Stevens. Rep-
resenting the appellant in the case, Edward deVere, who claimed to be
the true author of the works historically attributed to Shakespeare, was
PeterJaszi, a professor of law at the American University's Washington
College of Law. Representing William Shakespeare before the Court
was Professor Jaszi's colleague at the Washington College of Law, Pro-
fessor James Boyle.4 1 The debate proved to be a rich source of class
39. I agree with Gary Goodpaster when he says "It is difficult to overemphasize the
need for openness in class atmosphere, in the instructor and in the students." Goodpaster,
supra note 19, at 7.
40. Mr. Kreeger, himself a lawyer among other things, also serves as chairman of the
Board of the Corcoran Gallery of Art and the Washington Opera.
41. A full description of the debate, the briefs of the parties, the opinions of the jus-
tices, and Professors Jaszi's and Boyle's reflective comments on the project are contained
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material for an appellate seminar.
The question of whether to use the debate as a teaching tool was an
easy one; the possibilities seemed endless. The process of deciding how
to use it was more problematical and required some brainstorming on
the possibilities. What follows is an abbreviated and considerably better
organized version of the brainstorming process by which specific poten-
tial subject areas for teaching were identified, considered, and either
adopted or rejected. The choice of substantive content took precedence
over decisions as to methodology. Teaching methodologies such as
moot court-type arguments, edited tape review, and directed class dis-
cussions mentioned here in passing are specifically identified only be-
cause they are methodologies that seemed to jump out given the
appellate argument structure of the Shakespeare debate already in
place. Although decisions regarding methodology could be made in ad-
vance of decisions regarding class topics, here, because the starting
point was a non-legal subject of interest, it seemed to make sense to first
ascertain in what ways that subject matter related to topics associated
with the practice of law before deciding on the specific method for incor-
porating an as yet undetermined topic into the curriculum.4 2 The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of particular methodologies available for
each topic or class do have to be weighed,43 a process which I believe is
most effectively illustrated by the description in Part V of the choices
ultimately made in this instance.
4 4
The first broad subject area considered was written advocacy. At a
very basic writing skills level, students could be given one or both briefs
or portions of the briefs and could be required to write responsive argu-
ments or summaries of arguments. The purpose of such an exercise
would be to get students to work on such elements of their writing as
organization, clarity, emphasis, and accuracy. The same things could be
addressed by having the students critique the briefs written by the par-
ticipants in the debate and compare and contrast the writing styles and
in In Re Shakespeare: The Question of Authorship, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 609 (1988). The debate
before the justices was also filmed and broadcast on public television.
42. This, then, is certainly not to make light of the decision as to methodology. "As
teachers we must first collect, understand, and organize our material. But we must, in the
end, pass on that material to students in a way that insures that meaningful learning oc-
curs." Harbaugh, supra note 25, at 222.
43. Some of these advantages and disadvantages have been analyzed with reference to
particular teaching methodologies. As the title of his report indicates, Dean Harbaugh has
advocated the integration of gaming and simulation methods into clinical law teaching. Id.
Simulation and gaming exercises are two of five clinical methods examined in the article by
Boon, supra note 12 (the others being work experience, computer technology, and obser-
vation exercises). Role playing as an effective teaching methodology is addressed in
Cabral, Role Playing as a Group Intervention, 18 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 470 (1982). A commu-
nication and psychological interaction model specifically geared to law teaching is the sub-
ject of Gary Goodpaster's article, supra note 20. The use of non-legal role plays as an
effective teaching method is discussed in Bergman, Sherr & Burridge, Learning From Experi-
ence: Non Legally-Specific Role Plays, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 535 (1987). Peter Hoffman looks at
five methodologies-role assumption, evaluation, demonstration, expository teaching, and
dialectic teaching, supra note 18.
44. "Though this be madness, yet there is method in 't." W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act
2, sc. 2, lines 203-04.
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techniques used by the authors of the briefs.
4 5
A slightly more sophisticated approach to analyzing writing tech-
niques and styles would be to construct a class around the role of truth
in brief writing and how that "truth" is presented.4 6 Discussions could
also center around questions of perspective or point of view.4 7 A closer
look at specific word choices and language makes for yet a different kind
of class discussion.
4 8
45. Countless books have been written on the subject of legal writing. E.g., M.
FONTHAM, WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY (1985); A. HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY
(1984); R. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE - FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS
(1983); M. MOSKowrrz, WINNING AN APPEAL (1983); E. RE, BRIEF WRITING & ORAL ARGU-
MENT (5th ed. 1983); R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); F. WIE-
NER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS (1967). This list is by no means exhaustive.
46. Discussions about the relationship between the "facts" of a case and "truth" al-
ways seem to pique considerable student interest. The notion that there is an objective
truth to be known is prevalent. It often takes some time for students to realize that lawyers,
also, must grapple with the idea that "[t]he truth or falsity ofstatements is affected by what
they leave out or put in or by their being misleading and so on," and that "'true' and
'false', like 'free' and 'unfree,' do not stand for anything simple at all, but only for a gen-
eral dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in
these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions." J.
AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 143-44 (1962). In litigation, "[b]ecause one
cannot usually return in a time machine to show a trier of fact 'what really happened,'
investigations do not produce 'facts.' They produce evidence from which the trier of fact
will resolve the parties' dispute(s) by deciding the probable facts." D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN,
FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF 6 (1984). The difficulty with ascertaining
truth in the adversary system is effectively demonstrated in Susan Glaspell's play Trifes
(copyright 1920 by Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc., renewed by S. Glaspell, 1948). (The movie
version of Glaspell's play, A Jury of Her Peers, may be familiar to some.)
47. Perspective and point of view are closely aligned to the concept of truth. In weav-
ing a story and bringing characters to life, the narrator necessarily begins somewhere and
makes decisions that will be reflective of a particular point of view. Disciplined writers (and
speakers) are conscious of this approach.
As Professor Jaszi points out, the question of who wrote Shakespeare's works will be
determined to some extent on the basis of how Shakespeare himself is portrayed. Critics,
he notes, have thus described Shakespeare as, inter alia, gardener, lawyer, doctor and
sailor. Jaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote "Shakespeare"?, 37 Am. U.L. REV. 617, 619; See also Jaszi,
Brief of Appellant Edward De Vere, Seventeenth Earl of Oxford, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 645, 673-74.Just
as the sailor may be perceived as less likely to be the author of Hamlet than some other
candidate for authorship of Shakespeare's works, a client, party or witness portrayed as a
poet will be perceived differently from the person identified as a politician or pauper.
48. Language and literary style may be presumed to have limited definitions in the
law.
If it were only teachers who insisted that.. .writers stay close to literary styles of
the past, we might reasonably ignore them. But readers insist on the very same
thing. They want our pages to look very much like pages they have seen before.
Why? It is because they themselves have a tough job to do, and they need all the
help they can get from us .... They have to read, an art so difficult that most
people do not really master it ....
So... our stylistic options as writers are neither numerous nor glamorous,
since our readers are bound to be such imperfect artists.
K. VONNEGUT, PALM SUNDAY 80 (1981). Vonnegut was not speaking about legal writing,
although he could have been.
Notwithstanding the limits within which lawyers operate, much work can be done to
increase awareness of the impact of word choices and phrasing and to alleviate the
problems resulting from what George Orwell called "pretentious diction," "verbal false
limbs," and "meaningless words," see G. Orwell, Politics and the English Language 337 in 4
THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM, AND LETrTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127, 130-32 (S.
Orwell & I. Angus eds. 1968), and to improve the lucidity of what is written. Such efforts
can mean the difference between verbal products consisting primarily of "dead carcasses
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The topic of oral persuasion is at least as obvious a choice as that of
writing skills. Students could themselves do oral arguments based on
the briefs, either in class or in out-of-class taped sessions. The effective-
ness of various techniques could be analyzed by means of in-class criti-
ques, self critiques, or class discussion of edited tapes. As with the
possible writing skills options, here, because the actual arguments are
available on tape, students could review and critique those instead of
engaging in the oral advocacy themselves. Some fairly typical goals of
this critiquing process would be to alert students to the proper and ef-
fective use of humor and sympathy in oral argument, to help them de-
velop ways of simplifying their arguments and making them more
memorable, and to work on the concept of anticipatory rebuttal.
49
On a slightly different plane, the tapes and student presentations
could be used to analyze performance issues, as opposed to content is-
sues. Dramatic techniques involving body language, memory and deliv-
ery, listening, and audience bonding would be appropriate subjects to
develop. 50 Also of particular importance for discussion in the legal con-
text would be questions relating to the effects of role expectations, ego
threats, and other underlying needs or inhibitions. 5
of words," Y. OUOLOGUEM, BOUND TO VIOLENCE 137 (1968), and those constituted of the
kind of words describable as "damned sparks of syllables that set fire to the blood .... C.
FUENTES, THE DEATH OF ARTEMIO CRUZ 41 (1964). For further readings, see D. Allison,
Translator's Introduction toJ. DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA AND OTHER ESSAYS ON Hus-
SERL'S THEORY OF SIGNS (1983); TRUTH AND MEANING: ESSAYS IN SEMANTICS (G. Evans &J.
McDowell eds. 1976).
49. As in the area of legal writing, there is no dearth of material on the skill of oral
advocacy. Indeed, the vast majority of books dealing with the subject of written advocacy
also include chapters on oral advocacy. For a listing of some of these works, see supra note
45.
50. Unlike many others who have tackled the subject of oral advocacy, Bea Moulton
and Gary Bellow devote substantial space to the arts of rhetoric and drama in their book.
Bellow and Moulton, supra note 17, at 914-23, 937-56, 638-45. For additional information,
see B. BATES, THE WAY OF THE ACTOR: A PATH TO KNOWLEDGE & POWER (1987); V. SPOLIN,
IMPROVISATION FOR THE THEATRE (1983);J.L. HANNA, THE PERFORMER-AUDIENCE CONNEC-
TION (1983). Theatrical interpretation-by producers and audiences alike-is a subject of
interest to Shakespeare scholars. As a result, a number of texts deal with the subject of
interpretation specifically in the context of Shakespeare's plays. SeeJaszi, supra note 47, at
620-21, and supra notes 6-8.
51. Motivating and inhibiting factors, frequently discussed in the context of counsel-
ing, deserve attention when attorneys and judges engage in a dialogue, if the advocate
does not wish to be told, "your words/and performance are no kin together." W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, Othello, act 4, sc. 2, lines 185-86. Legal argument must be more than an entertain-
ing performance; it is intended to be persuasive. Similarly, argument that is substantively
persuasive (i.e. good rhetoric) fails if the arguments are not heard or understood by the
audience. This suggests that a focus on the communicative and persuasive aspects of oral
discourse is desirable. Literature dealing with these subjects abounds. E.g., H. ABELSON
AND M. KARLINS, PERSUASION: How OPINIONS AND ATITrUDES ARE CHANGED (1959); K. AN-
DERSON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1971); HOVLAND & JANIS, COMMUNICATION
AND PERSUASION (1972); W. MINNICK, THE ART OF PERSUASION (1957). For some thought-
ful insights on the psychology and ethics of persuasion, see F. Haiman, Democratic Ethics and
The Hidden Persuaders, 44 Q. J. SPEECH 385 (1958) and White, Persuasion and Community in
Sophocles Philoctetes, in HERACLES Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW
(1985).
At another level, an understanding of differences in communication patterns is worth
studying, particularly if attorneys and clients are representative of minority cultures. Per-
spectives on issues of difference that might be worth exploring include the gender-associ-
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Moving from the performance skills orientation to the analytical,
one could use the briefs and oral arguments to focus on the logical con-
nections between factual premises and conclusions. What inferences are
drawn? What authorities are used to support the inferences? What pre-
dictions are made and what role do the predictions play in the choice of
arguments? 52 Students could be asked to work through their ideas in
advance of class or the process could be initiated in class, with a full
development of logical constructs following.
With regard to substantive areas, it would be possible to have the
students review the opinions of the justices on their merits and analyze
the reasons for the decision as they might in any other class. Several
aspects of this case deserve particular attention; for one thing, the par-
ties are dead. In addition, there is no lower court record nor any prece-
dent to guide the court. The absence of these elements could be the
basis for a discussion about their ordinarily presumed importance or ne-
cessity. Thejustices who heard the case, in making their decision, relied
heavily on the fact that deVere bore the burden of persuasion. This
might prompt an inquiry into the standard of review and the deference
to be given lower courts.5 3 In their briefs, the parties examined at
length historical and sociological factors, 54 which might suggest as a
ated view proposed by C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982), the cross-cultural
approach to body language addressed in LaBarre, The Language of Gestures and Emotions,
reprinted in INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 14, at 197, and the call to listen to the
"voices at the bottom" in Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Repara-
tions, 22 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987). See also,Julius Caesar W. SHAKESPEARE, act I,
sc. 2, line 284: "But for my own part, it was Greek to me."
52. Although logical reasoning or deduction may be the heritage of western philo-
sophical thought and the foundation of the Socratic method widely used in American law
schools, it is a method with which many students "being young, till now ripe not to rea-
son," W. SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act 2, sc. 2, line 128, in fact seem to
have little or no familiarity. Were they more familiar with Shakespeare's works, they might
come to a greater appreciation of these skills. See, e.g., W. SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer
Night's Dream, act 2, sc. 2, lines 129-30 "And touching now the point of human skill,/
Reason becomes the marshal to my will."; W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 4, sc. 4, lines 36-39
"He that made us with such large discourse,/Looking before and after, gave us not/That
capability and godlike reason/To fust in us unused."; W. SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest, act 4,
Sc. 1, lines 66-68 "rising senses/Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle/Their
clearer reason." A useful source for a full understanding of the practical applications of
deductive reasoning to law practice is D. BINDER & P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION:
FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF (1984).
53. See Martineau, supra note 8;J. PURVER & L. TAYLOR, HANDLING CRIMINAL APPEALS
(1980); see also Note, Ponduit Corp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Co.: De Novo Review and the
Federal Circuit's Application of the Clearly Erroneous Standard, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 963 (1987);
Case Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): Applicability of the "Clearly Erroneous" Test to
Findings of Fact in All Nonjury Cases, 29 How. LJ. 639 (1986); Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. Indeed, a substantial portion of the Appellant's brief is devoted to untangling the
historical events which led to the conclusion that Shakspeare of Stratford wrote the works
attributed to him and to setting forth historical facts supporting the claim that someone
other than Shakspeare of Stratford (allegedly Edward deVere), was the true author. The
appellee, for his part, argues that the appellant "ignores the historical, social and artistic
context in which the plays were written." Brief of Appellant Edward De Vere, Seventeenth Earl of
Oxford, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 725, 733. Appellee also counters with a few historical facts of his
own, including the fact that deVere was dead before all the plays were published. Id. at
745.
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topic for discussion the appropriate reliance on non-legal authority and
use of "Brandeis briefs."
55
The case against Shakespeare presents special problems of issue de-
velopment. Much relevant information is unknown or unknowable or, if
known, suspect. 56 Although most cases handled by the students do not
suffer from the same extreme dearth of information, there are often
problems of incomplete records, problems which may be exacerbated
when there is access to information (from a client, for example) that will
never be part of the record. Posing a question like "did Shakespeare
write Shakespeare?" provides opportunities for brainstorming, discover-
ing creative theories, and developing ways of testing the strength and
validity of theories. 57 The brainstorming process leads into the process
of classification and organization, which in turn provides fodder for dis-
cussion of how to frame issues.58 Role issues abound in this context as
in any other. Who is the client? How does one relate to an absent cli-
ent?59 What is the importance of the client to the case? Must others'
interests be taken into account? What are the attorneys' obligations to
55. A Brandeis brief, named after the noted jurist Louis Brandeis, is "[a]n appellate
brief in which economic and social studies are included along with legal principles."
WEST'S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY (1985).
56. This is what ProfessorJaszi calls "[tihe informational void surrounding the histor-
ical Shakespeare." Jaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote "Shakespeare"?, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 617, 623
(1988). According to Professor Boyle, "the whole imposing edifice of Shakespearian biog-
raphy rests on a set of facts which one could fit onto-if not a postcard-then at least three
medium sized sheets of paper." Boyle, Brief of Appellee William Shakespeare of Stratford-Upon-
Avon, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 725, 729 (1988).
57. Thus, "imagination bodies forth/the forms of things unknown..." W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act 5, sc. 1, lines 14-15, and "All difficulties are but easy
when they are known." W. SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, act 4, sc. 2, line 172. Creative
problem solving is a not-entirely-new, though perhaps underused, approach to the legal
issues. See, e.g., Hegland, supra note 17, at 180-85. The initial stages of creative thought are
developed inJ. GUILFORD, WAY BEYOND THE IQ 160-80 (1977) and in A. OSBORN, APPLIED
IMAGINATION 125-36 (1963). For an understanding of how creativity can be blocked, read
B. UELAND, IF YOU WANT To WRrrE 28-39 (1987); R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTOR-
CYCLE MAINTENANCE 270-94 (1974). Pirsig also provides a brief, readable description of
theory development. Id. at 62-67, 252-59. The same ideas are explicated somewhat less
colorfully in Osborn, supra, at 86-109. Those wishing to explore concepts of creativity fur-
ther may find it useful to consult S. PARNES, A SOURCE BOOK FOR CREATIVE THINKING
(Parnes & Harding, eds. 1962).
58. A simple checklist for evaluating theories which includes recognizing underlying
assumptions, evaluating authority and understanding problems of language is contained in
the NEw YORK TIMES: GUIDE TO REFERENCE MATERIALS 185-86 (rev. ed. 1985). The pro-
cess of systematizing ideas and of organizing them is clearly explained by Guilford, supra
note 57, at 34-37. The relevance and application of the skill of idea association to the
process of classification is described by Osborn, supra note 57, at 111-21. Lawyers, in de-
veloping case theories and framing issues, of course go through this process, even if not
consciously. One lawyer's attempt to simplify and clarify the process of issue classification
by creating a full taxonomy of cases appears in A. HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY 74-
127 (1984).
59. This is an issue that students in an appellate practice clinic face rather frequently.
Clients are likely to be federal prisoners to whom access is often frequently restricted. The
absent client problem can occur in trial work as well for a number of reasons, including the
fact that some clients simply never communicate with their attorneys before trial. In other
cases, such as class actions, the clients are many and geographically widely distributed, and
some clients, such as very young children or the severely mentally disabled, may be liter-
ally present but incapable of communicating.
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the Court in this case? Does the role of the attorney change depending
on what is at stake and whose interests are involved?
60
Viewing any event, decision, or belief in its historical or political
context is likely to affect perception. Analyzing the question of the au-
thorship of Shakespeare's works in the context of 16th or early 17th cen-
tury societal and political norms as compared to current societal and
political norms is revealing.61 An inquiry into the effects of culture and
class in the Shakespeare case is illuminating as to similar effects in legal
disputes. Recognition of the significance of context raises questions
about how and whether to address value-laden issues in any given case
and what to do when conflicts between values are apparent.6 2 These are
just a few examples of ways in which Shakespearian scholarship, as al-
ready encapsulated in briefs and oral argument, might work its way into
a Clinic classroom. Once Shakespeare became the focal point of a class,
it was more difficult to curtail the ideas for incorporating the theme
than it was to come up with ways in which to make Shakespeare relevant
to the practice of law. In fact, in the end, Shakespeare dominated two
classes.
V. THE ULTIMATE CHOICES
Shakespeare originally made his appearance in the appellate semi-
nar of a year-long clinical course.63 By this time, most students in the
appellate clinic had made an argument before a real court, and all of
them had filed at least one brief of their own composition. Classroom
coverage in the first semester included system analysis, interviewing, fact
writing, and theory development. The beginning of the second semes-
ter introduced the students to counseling and to different aspects of
written and oral persuasion, including logic and rhetoric, dramatic per-
60. These are issues that frequently arise in the cases clinic students handle. A student
may feel very differently about what role to assume in a divorce case in which the issue is
jurisdiction than about what the proper role is in the representation of a guilty murderer
whose speedy trial claim, if successful, will result in the client's release from prison.
61. As Shakespeare wrote, "men may construe things after their fashion,/Clean from
the purpose of the things themselves." W. SHAKESPEARE,JiUS Caesar, act 1, sc. 3, lines 31-
32. Professor Jaszi examines some of the ways in which Shakespeare's works have been
interpreted at different points in history and by different peopleJaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote
"Shakespeare"?, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 617 (1988). In his essay, Professor Boyle looks at "the
strange subtext that lies under the Shakespeare story and [links] it to current philosophical
and literary concerns about the reading of texts." Boyle, supra note 56, at 626. Professor
Boyle analogizes the desire to understand Shakespeare's writings by reference to the
"real" author to the drive to determine the "intent of the framers" in constitutional analy-
sis. Among other things, he concludes that still prevailing 18th Century romantic notions
about authors are what have led critics to reject Shakespeare of Stratford, who does not fit
the romantic conception, as author of Shakespeare's plays.
For additional reading on the subject of the relationship between social, political and
cultural norms and decision making, see R. BENDIX, CLASS, STATUS AND POWER: A READER
IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (R. Bendix & S. M. Lipset eds.
1966).
62. See supra, notes 22, 24, 28.
63. In addition to using these two classes in a clinical setting, I have included varia-
tions of them in a one-semester, non-clinical seminar on appellate advocacy.
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formance, and communication problems. The classes I am about to de-
scribe were docketed as classes on the art of responding.
In the first of these two classes, the primary emphasis is on skills.
The skills I seek to focus on are recognition of crucial points of argu-
ment, fluff elimination, argument reduction, and labeling. The primary
focal points of the second class are interpersonal relations, role assump-
tions and underlying values. In both classes I make use of some inter-
disciplinary theories that have surfaced in prior classes. In addition, an
attempt is made to bring in substantive law on the appropriate use of
reply briefs and practical advice on maximizing the effectiveness of
responses.
Prior to the first class, students are required to read the statement
of facts and summary of argument from Appellant Edward deVere's
brief. They are told to reduce deVere's argument to 50 words or less.
They are then given Appellee William Shakespeare's summary of argu-
ment and instructed to reduce it to 50 words or less.64
In class, samples of the reduced appellant's arguments are distrib-
uted and the discussion is focused on the decisions different people have
made with respect to emphasis, in particular on the process by which
choices were made and the difficulties encountered in trying to reduce a
lengthy argument to bite-size pieces. The goal is to identify the skill of
"argument reduction" and provide some information about the process
and about possible resolutions of problems associated with it. We also
talk about why this skill is important in the context of appellate
advocacy.
The second segment of the class is devoted to a variation on the
children's game of "telephone." Two students are provided with a one-
page essay or argument of some sort. I have used several different
things for this exercise, but my current favorite is a short portrayal of the
life of Shakespeare's imaginary sister by Virginia Woolf.6 5 The two stu-
dents are asked to read the essay and then they are paired up with two
other students. The readers have three minutes - or up to five minutes,
depending on the length and complexity of the essay - to relay to their
partners all the essential information contained in the essay. The two
listeners are then paired up with two other students and instructed to
convey what they have just heard. They have a reduced amount of time
in which to do this, perhaps two or three minutes. The process contin-
ues, with the last two students receiving all essential information in a
period of about thirty seconds. These last two students then relate to
the group as a whole the substance of what they have heard. The results
of the two lines of communication are invariably different.
What follows is a deconstruction of the process. How did the stu-
64. "Brevity is the soul of wit." W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 2, sc. 2, line 90.
65. V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 8-50 (1929). Woolf poses the hypothetical of
William's "sister," Judith, a woman whose literary genius is equal to that of her brother's,
attempting to find an outlet for that genius. Woolf concludes that had such a person lived,
she may well have ended up committing suicide.
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dents choose what to tell? How did they decide what to eliminate? Did
they use any shortcuts-words, labels or themes-that got picked up by
the next listener and passed on? Flowing from this is a discussion about
the problem of time in the court room. Because time is scarce, and be-
cause an opponent's argument can take unexpected turns, it is impor-
tant to be able to sift through a lot of information quickly and eliminate
the non-essential. Of course, what constitutes "essential" information
and what constitutes "fluff" are questions that provoke a fair amount of
debate.
To build on the concept of labeling or themes-and the use of short-
cuts-the students are given a list of quotes from Shakespeare and asked
which they find best describe the Appellant's position, the Appellee's
position, or maybe the class. The following selected quotations are
illustrative:
"Things without all remedy
Should be without regard; what's done is done."
'66
"Good wombs have borne bad sons."
'67
"Thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."
6 8
"Reputation is an idle and most false imposition;
oft got without merit and lost without deserving.
'
"69
"[T]hy head is as full of quarrels as an egg
is full of meat."
70
"Our doubts are traitors.
'7 1
"Have we eaten on the insane root,
That takes the reason prisoner?"
7 2
"I shall the effect of this good lesson keep.""
The students' choices are compared and the question is posed whether
any of the ideas expressed in the quotations could be used as a centraliz-
ing theme for an argument. Ideas about the benefits of themetizing or
labeling get aired and ways of putting such notions into practice are dis-
cussed, often with reference to the students' own cases.
Each of these exercises stresses the importance of identifying the
heart of an argument. The first highlights the desirability of brevity; the
second, the situational necessity for speed; the third, the advantages of
having an easily remembered central theme. The final segment of the
class is devoted to conceptualization of a framework for responding that
can aid in preparation of rebuttal arguments.
It is not uncommon for a student to believe that a rebuttal argu-
ment is primarily a matter of making spontaneous declarations. The last
66. W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, act 3, sc. 2, lines 11-12.
67. W. SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest, act 1, sc. 2, line 22.
68. W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 3, sc. 3, lines 84-85.
69. W. SHAKESPEARE, Othello, act 2, sc. 3, lines 263-65.
70. W. SHAKESPEARE, Romeo and Juliet, act 3, sc. 1, line 22.
71. W. SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, act 1, sc. 4, line 79.
72. W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, act 1, sc. 3, lines 85-86.
73. W. SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, act 1, sc. 3, line 45.
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part of class is thus dedicated to analyzing the accuracy of this proposi-
tion and attempting to demonstrate that spontaneity can spring from a
well-ordered framework-indeed, often works best when that framework
is solidly in place in advance.
At this point, the students look at some of the 50 word reductions of
the Appellee's argument and begin to categorize them. Generally, this
categorization process breaks the possible arguments down to some-
thing like this: (1) The premises are false, incomplete or unsupported;
(2) What the party is trying to achieve (the goal) is undesirable, creates
havoc or is inconsistent with other desirable ends; (3) The points made
lack relevancy or consistency, or the inferential leap between facts and
conclusions is too great; (4) The writer is stupid, insincere, insensitive,
etc.
These four categories all focus on the opponent's position. Other
argument reductions usually fall within a set of categories building on
the strength of the appellee's position, most frequently either: (1) there
is direct support for the Appellee's position, or (2) there is indirect (con-
sistent) authority supporting the appellee's position.
Once the arguments are categorized, it becomes clear that the cate-
gories cover a great many of the arguments that could be made by a
respondent. Mastery of the categories, therefore, makes preparation for
any rebuttal an easier task. Although the strengths and weaknesses of
any given approach still must be balanced, rebuttal need no longer be
viewed as a "gut reaction," but can be seen as a measured response.
The second class brings in the human dimension. Prior to class, the
students engage in non-legal role plays with partners and write-up their
reactions to the experience. The role plays are designed to require the
students to confront persons having some measure of power or author-
ity. So, for example, one situation might involve a street encounter with
a police officer; another will place the student in a tax assessor's office.
Other students might be required to confront the principal at a daugh-
ter's school, or a nurse at a hospital. These role plays become the focus
of a discussion midway through the class.
Class begins with a review of taped excerpts of the appellant's argu-
ment in the Shakespeare case. A brief discussion follows on the differ-
ence between the appellant's written argument and his oral
presentation. The students then put into practice what they learned the
previous week. They discuss what has been identified by the appellant's
counsel as crucial and what points of argument have been eliminated.
The question of whether the argument as presented has a logo or cen-
tral theme is raised, and the students are asked to develop memorable
themes from what they have seen and heard on the tape. The themes
that get developed may run the gamut from the simple "the facts don't
fit" to the accusatory "their's is a classist plot" to the more mystical
"Shakespeare is a figment of the collective imagination." What is im-
portant about this exercise is that students are able to see that they are
[Vol. 68:3
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quite adept at breaking down an argument and reframing it in simple,
memorable terms.
At this point, the students are broken into groups and asked to take
a few minutes to construct a responsive argument. Volunteers from
each group are then asked to stand up and make the responsive argu-
ment before me as judge. Following the first group's presentation, the
class discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the choices made.
Alternative choices might be brought up and the advantages and disad-
vantages of these other options discussed.
The second and third arguments are then heard without any inter-
vening discussion. The second advocate's argument is interrupted by
inappropriate, irrelevant, or confusing questions and comments from
thejudge. The third volunteer faces ajudge who stares without making
any response at all. At the end of the oral presentations, the students
are asked what is different about the last two arguments, and the discus-
sion shifts from a focus on the decisions about content of the arguments
to the effects of the listener's conduct on both the substance of the argu-
ments and the speaker's ability to present arguments.
This is the time at which the role play assignments are brought into
focus. We talk about the difference between perceiving oral argument
as a performance, as many students initially assume it is, and perceiving
it as a confrontation with authority, which is what many really believe.
Students begin to reassess their assumptions about the nature of court-
room presentations and begin to think about how they deal with persons
with apparent power or authority (police officers, car mechanics, and
administrators) and what about their manner of dealing with such
figures is likely to carry over to the courtroom and cause problems.
This discussion is followed by a review of taped segments of the
responsive arguments actually made in the Shakespeare case. The ap-
pellee's choices are compared to and contrasted with the choices made
by the students. Also at this point, questions are raised about different
styles of argument-manipulation versus conciliation, for example-and
how these styles may be influenced by the attorneys' views of the nature
of oral argument and any underlying authority issues. If there is time,
volunteers are permitted to rebut the appellee's arguments and then ex-
cerpts of the rebuttal made by Professor Jaszi before the Justices are
shown.
These two classes are, I believe, rather moderate examples of the
principle that lawyering skills can be taught from any topical base. The
inspiration of Mr. Kreeger to have a debate on the origins of Shake-
speare's works and to have it presented as an appellate argument mini-
mized the amount of imaginative work it took to bring Shakespeare into
the classroom. Perhaps for that reason, it seemed an opportunity not to
be passed up. In some ways, because the groundwork for introducing
Shakespeare into a clinic seminar was already done, the classes built
from that groundwork may not be the best choices for testing or demon-
strating the hypothesis. In another way, I think the debate makes it eas-
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ier to see the association between things non-legal and legal, and thus
makes the point clearer. Even without the good fortune of having the
briefs and arguments at hand, it is possible to draw on Shakespearian
scholarship, or anything else, to make law classes both interesting and
instructive. Obviously, a law teacher could fashion a debate on the ori-
gins of Shakespeare's works without the fanfare attached to Mr.
Kreeger's spectacle and derive from that debate the same lessons as can
be derived from the jazzed-up version.
Despite the fact that the two classes described here are what I view
to be rather moderate extensions of fairly typical seminar classroom
scenes, I feel it advisable to anticipate and respond to criticisms. I hear
voices saying that the attempt to teach lawyering skills by drawing on
outside interests is inefficient, clouds the issues, and trivializes the role
lawyers must assume. There are those who would say that the best way
to learn is to do, and "doing" means doing the thing itself, or the closest
thing to it, and not some facsimile of tortuous relevance.
If the premise of such criticisms is that "person as lawyer" is some-
how fundamentally different from "person as person," then I find myself
in disagreement with the premise. It is only when we see our lawyer
selves as independent of our non-lawyer selves that we see what we do in
one context as separate from what we do in another. This notion of
separate selves has, I think, been resoundingly refuted.74 To the extent
that it still curries favor within the profession, it seems to me to be wise
to make attempts to eradicate its influence. Thus, the role of the lawyer
is trivialized in non-legal contexts only if there is a preconceived notion
of the lawyer's role.
The method is inefficient only if efficiency is defined in terms of
what students learn in the immediate environs of the classroom, what
they can regurgitate outside the classroom, or the amount of prepara-
tion time required of the teacher. It is not inefficient if looked at from
the perspective of learning yielded per class. Admittedly, a lot of prepa-
ration goes into these classes, but the long term benefits go far beyond
producing student lawyers who are capable of not humiliating them-
selves in court.
Similarly, the method clouds the issues only if the "issues" are arti-
ficially limited to well delineated legal issues. In fact, the introduction of
non-legal subjects into the classroom helps identify and clarify impor-
tant issues in the legal realm that might otherwise remain clouded. For
example, when students read and transmit the essential thoughts in Vir-
ginia Woolf's essay about Shakespeare's sister, they learn not only about
the skill of argument reduction, but about historical sexism and how in-
dividual values dictate decisions. It is a little bit like the poetry of Rob-
ert Frost or Emily Dickinson; everyday occurrences and familiar objects
74. "Our tendancy to treat the law as a separate, unique human activity has been
harmful; we need to tie law into the whole social fabric." Bergman, Sherr & Burridge, supra
note 43, at 540 (footnotes omitted). I would add that we need to tie person-as-lawyer into
the concept of the whole person.
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are the means by which the student is safely and uncombattingly
brought into other contexts.7 5 New ideas sink into consciousness with-
out the learner even necessarily realizing that the process is occurring or
knowing to what to attribute changes in thinking patterns and attitudes.
It is learning by osmosis.
CONCLUSION
Experimentation in law teaching methodologies has opened up the
range of options for those engaged in law teaching. The resulting
proliferation of possible subject areas is forcing legal educators to look
closely at their curricular offerings. It is also forcing educators to make
difficult decisions both about what is most essential substantively and
about what is the best and most efficient way to transfer knowledge and
to prepare students to utilize their knowledge, skills, and perceptions in
the practice of law. To the already overbrimming pot of subject matter
covered in the classroom, I propose to add non-legal subject areas.
Rather than flood the classroom with trivial or irrelevant ideas, I believe
the introduction of non-legal subject areas into class helps to bridge the
gap between students' life experiences and their legal careers. The in-
tegration of the non-legal with the legal enables students-and teach-
ers-to see connections between different aspects of their lives,
discloses new perspectives and meanings, clarifies and simplifies the
mysteries of law practice through the device of analogy, and provides a
measure of entertainment that enhances living as well as learning.
75. Like "Lovers and madmen," they "apprehend/More than cool reason ever com-
prehends." W. SHAKESPEARE, A Midsummer Night's Dream, act 4, sc. 1, lines 4-6.
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THE REUSE RIGHT IN COLORADO WATER LAW:
A THEORY OF DOMINION
ALISON MAYNARD*
The Colorado law governing the right to reuse or make successive
use of return flows after a first use of water has been made is relatively
strict compared to that in other western states. In other states, the right
of a first user of tributary water to recapture seepage or return flows of
that water is often permitted; in Colorado, "when the use has been com-
pleted the right of the user terminates." ' The Colorado courts have
taken the view that such return flow or seepage water is also tributary to
the stream, and interception of it thus constitutes an interference with
vested water rights. 2 Therefore, if a Colorado appropriator wishes to
"recapture" tributary water return flows, he or she must make a separate
appropriation for each successive use.3 Each successive appropriation is
thus subject to the test of availability of water and takes its place at the
bottom of the priority system.
There is obviously a strong economic motivation in claiming water
to be "reusable" in a prior appropriation state, therefore, since
reusability circumvents entirely the priority system by which tributary
water is allocated. Reusable water may be "taken off the top," and the
owner does not have to stand in line for it.4 Thus, in Colorado, the right
of reuse is limited to return flows from waters which are not tributary,
and so not initially subject to the priority system: developed,
5 foreign,6
* Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources Section, Water Unit, State of Col-
orado. The author wishes to acknowledge, with thanks, the helpful comments on this arti-
cle provided by Michael Browning, Brad Cameron, Wray Witten, Tony Martinez, and
Peter Fahmy.
1. Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 568, 203 P. 681,688
(1922); Water Supply and Storage Co. v. Curtis, 733 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1987); Ft. Morgan
Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 206 P. 393 (1922); A. TARLOCK, LAW
OF WATER RiGirS AND RESOURCES § 5.05[3][b] (1989). Some cases suggest, however,
there may be a right to recapture escaped surface water (running wastewater) before it has
left the user's control and percolated into the ground, see McKelvey v. North Sterling Irri-
gation Dist., 66 Colo. 11, 179 P. 872 (1919) (explained in McCune, 71 Colo. at 260-61, 206 P.
at 395), and Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 P. 98 (1906). The distinction between
irrigation wastewater and return flow is explained in City of Boulder v. Boulder & Left
Hand Ditch Co., 192 Colo. 219, 557 P.2d 1182 (1976). Wastewater is never deemed
"used" in the first instance. Id. at 220, 557 P.2d at 1185.
2. Comstock v. Ramsay, 55 Colo. 144, 133 P. 1107 (1913); Ft. Morgan Reservoir &
Irrigation Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 206 P. 393 (1922). See also discussion in note 1,
supra.
3. See Curtis, 733 P.2d 680; McCune, 206 P. 393.
4. See, e.g., Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement
Co., 68 Colo. 437, 191 P. 129 (1919) (Garrigues,J., dissenting) and cases cited therein.
5. "Developed water, also described as artificial or salvaged water, is that water
which has been added to the supply of a natural stream and which never would have come
into the stream had it not been for the efforts of the party producing it." Note, A Survey of
Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. LJ. 226, at 356 (1970). See also Southeastern Colo. Water
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and nontributary ground waters7 only8 (henceforth referred to as "de-
veloped water"), and even here there are certain threshold requirements
governing the ability to reuse.
THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF REUSE
The right of a developer to reuse developed water, which "is that
water which has been added to the supply of a natural stream and which
never would have come into the stream had it not been for the efforts of
the party producing it," 9 exists in the common law and is also codified in
different statutes.10 The most particularized of these Colorado statutes
states:
RIGHT TO REUSE OF IMPORTED WATER. (1) Whenever an appro-
priator has lawfully introduced foreign water into a stream sys-
tem from an unconnected stream system, such appropriator
may make a succession of uses of such water by exchange or
otherwise to the extent that its volume can be distinguished
from the volume of the streams into which it is introduced.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or diminish
any water right which has become vested.
(2) To the extent that there exists a right to make a succession
of uses of foreign, nontributary, or other developed water, such
right is personal to the developer or his successors, lessees,
contractees, or assigns. Such water, when released from the
dominion of the user, becomes a part of the natural surface
Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, 187 Colo. 181,529 P.2d 1321 (1974); Pikes Peak Golf
Club Inc. v. Kuiper, 169 Colo. 309, 455 P.2d 882 (1969); and Ripley v. Park Center Land
and Water, 40 Colo. 129, 90 P. 75 (1907).
6. Foreign water is water which is imported into a stream system from an uncon-
nected stream system. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106(1) (1990). See Benson v. Burgess,
192 Colo. 556, 561 P.2d 11 (1977); City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch
Co., 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972); and Martz, Seepage Rights in Foreign Waters, 22
RocKY M-N. L. REV. 407 (1950). The term includes transmountain and transbasin waters.
7. Nontributary ground water is defined in pertinent part as "that ground water...
the withdrawal of which will not, within one hundred years, deplete the flow of a natural
stream ... at an annual rate greater than one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of
withdrawal." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (1990). Because of the negligible hy-
draulic connection with tributary water, nontributary ground water is allocated based upon
ownership of the overlying land, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102(1) (1990), and is conse-
quently private property. The reusability of nontributary water is established or assumed
in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-82-101, -82-106(2), -90-137(9)(b) (1990).
8. See City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 179 Colo. 47, 53,
506 P.2d 144, 147 (1972) and cases cited therein. It has also become common to claim the
right to reuse to extinction consumptive use (CU) water following a change of point of
diversion or type or place of use. The writer knows of no reported decisions holding that
such a right does in fact attach to CU water, however, and regards it as unlikely to with-
stand the scrutiny of the supreme court. Because CU water is still tributary water, it can-
not lawfully, by the mere fact of being once quantified, be immunized from subsequent
requantification in a later change proceeding, nor from a finding ofabandonment. What is
claimed to be "reusable to extinction," therefore, is in fact tributary return flow in which
the appropriator has no property right. See, e.g., Green v. Chaffee Ditch, 150 Colo. 91, 371
P.2d 775 (1962).
9. Fulton Ditch, 179 Colo. at 53, 506 P.2d at 147.




stream where released, subject to water rights on such stream
in the order of their priority, but nothing in this subsection (2)
shall affect the rights of the developer or his successors or as-
signs with respect to such foreign, nontributary, or developed
water, nor shall dominion over such water be lost to the owner
or user thereof by reason of use of a natural watercourse in the
process of carrying such water to the place of its use or succes-
sive use. 1 1
Subsection (1) of section 106 delimits the right to reuse in two re-
spects: first, by allowing reuse of the water only "to the extent that its
volume can be distinguished from the volume of the streams into which
it is introduced"; and second, by requiring that no other vested water
right be impaired or diminished by such reuse.12 The two requirements
of this subsection thus set up an injury analysis which must be satisfied
before the right to reuse is recognized.
Subsection (2) of section 106, added in 1979,13 articulates a third
limitation on the right to reuse: the user must maintain the personal
property right in the water. The impetus for the bill was the "Huston
filings" for 444 c.f.s., whereby Mr. Huston sought to recapture, in-
dependent of the priority system, return flows from nontributary waters
developed by others' deep wells, which had escaped to the South Platte
River. 14 Discussions in both the Colorado Senate and House Commit-
tees, which considered this amendment, emphasized that it was enacted
for the purpose of clarifying by statute what the legislators felt had al-
ways been historically a part of the law. They stated that the bill was
intended neither to expand upon nor diminish the right of a developer
or his assigns to reuse foreign water. Rather, it was to make clear that a
complete stranger to the water, such as Mr. Huston, had no such right.
The difficulty raised by the language in subsection (2), however, is
that the right to reuse is not merely dependent upon a showing of the
personal property right as determined by contractual privity, but is also
coextensive with the prospective reuser's retention of "dominion" over
the water. Whether that mystical term adds or ought to add any new
conditions on reuse which must be satisfied in addition to privity, and in
addition to the injury analysis required in subsection (1), requires
examination.
THE MEANING OF "DOMINION"
No definition of "dominion" is provided in subsection (2)15 or
anywhere in the water statutes, even though it is used at least three
11. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106 (1990).
12. Id. at § 37-82-106(1).
13. S.B. 481, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1979 Colo. Laws 1366 (codified at COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-82-106(2) (1990)).
14. Characterization by Mr. Ward Fischer, during testimony on S.B. 481 before Sen-
ate Agricultural Committee, March 15, 1979, at approximately 1:37 p.m. See also State
Dept. of Natural Resources v. Southwestern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 671 P.2d
1294 (Colo. 1983) ("Huston Ir').
15. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106(2) (1990).
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times. 1 6 Nevertheless, "dominion is a word of distinctive legal mean-
ing,"1 7 and consequently lawyers might feel they instinctively under-
stand it. For example, a definition of "dominion" which has been
frequently used by courts' 8 comports with the general understanding of
the concept. "Dominion" is "[p]erfect control in right of ownership.
The word implies both title and possession and appears to require a
complete retention of control over disposition. Title to an article of
property which arises from the power of disposition and the right of
claiming it." 19
The problem with relying on this definition too much, however, is
that it, and the concept it defines, arose not in the context of water law,
but was probably borrowed from the law of immutable discrete chattels
and fixed real property. The idea of dominion over water, which is mi-
gratory, fluid, and mixable in character, confounds the intuition. Words
like "possession" and "control," easily enough understood when ap-
plied to a chattel, become problematic when applied to water.
Yet the definition is helpful in one respect, which is that of title:
clarifying that dominion is exactly the "right of claiming" the water and
the "right of ownership."'20 Dominion thus is the right to recapture the
water for reuse and is the personal property right. From the outset,
then, it can be easily remarked that the separate statutory requirement
of contractual privity is comprehended within the term "dominion" and
is, therefore, redundant. But it also follows that if there are authorities,
for example, in other states, which have found the satisfaction of certain
external conditions to be prerequisite to retention of the personal prop-
erty right or of the right of claiming the water from others, these condi-
tions also constitute components of "dominion," and could by the use
of that word in the Colorado statute properly be considered incorpo-
rated into Colorado law.
Thus, although the right to recapture and reuse water in other west-
ern states applies often even to appropriative waters, and so is qualita-
tively different from the Colorado law, the guidelines courts have used
in those states in finding or not finding the right to reuse should be
useful. Similarly, those Colorado cases which have denied the right of
reuse of tributary water provide insight into the problem, as whether or
not dominion is retained is a question which can be addressed indepen-
dently from that of the initial character of the water sought to be reused.
As could be expected, then, the cut-off point in these cases (the
point where the personal property right in the water terminates and the
right to reuse is consequently extinguished) often will not be labeled
"loss of dominion" per se. The word "dominion" may never appear at
all. Rather, the right of reuse will be denied due to some other condi-
16. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-82-101(1), -82-106(2), -90-137(9)(b) (1990).
17. Whelan v. Henderson, 137 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
18. Eastex Aviation v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 522 F.2d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir.
1975) (citing Black's Law Dictionary) and cases cited therein.




tion or conditions, which, as will be seen, appear always to be variants of
the following: abandonment, failure to identify, and loss of possession
(or control) of the water.
Specific cases will be discussed where relevant in this article. Before
leaving the task of circumscribing the concept of "dominion" as far as
possible at the outset, however, it is instructive to examine one more
source: the understanding the legislators may have had of the term, as
reflected in the testimony and questions asked of expert witnesses at the
time subsection (2) was added to section 106 in 1979,21 for "[w]ords
and phrases which have acquired a technical or particular meaning,
whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accord-
ingly." 22 For example, the testimony of Mr. Ward Fischer, a Colorado
water lawyer, on the bill during committee hearings in the senate,
equated loss of dominion with abandonment:
[W]hile a person who is a developer of water can use that water
until it is totally consumed, by a succession of uses or reuse or
otherwise, once he abandons that water and it goes back to the
stream, it belongs to the other appropriators on the stream,
and that is the existing law.
2 3
In the course of discussions of the Huston filings during the com-
mittee hearing in the house, Mr. Fischer was also asked, "Would you
differentiate between after the waters get into the South Platte, or just
prior to that? Would there be a difference there?"
His answer to that question revealed a somewhat different aspect of
his understanding of "dominion" as applied to water:
I think the difference is, as long as the developer controls the
developed waters ... he could totally consume them. Once they
have left his control, they became part of the waters of the stream,
because they became part of the groundwaters which are tribu-
tary to that stream . ... As soon as he loses control of them, they're
gone.
24
Mr. Glenn Saunders, another prominent Colorado water lawyer,
testified that the right of reuse was dependent not only on dominion,
but on the ability to identify the water:
We have made it clear now by both statute and judicial decision
that [the] appropriator of [developed] water may make a suc-
cession of uses of that water so long as he maintains it within his
dominion and can identify it quantitatively.
25
Thus, as a first attempt at defining "dominion," the ability to claim
the water from others and subsequently dispose of it, evidenced by
21. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106 (1990).
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-101 (1973) (emphasis added).
23. Testimony on S.B. 481, supra note 13, before Senate Agriculture Committee,
March 15, 1979, at approximately 1:35 p.m.
24. Testimony of Mr. Ward Fischer before House Agriculture, Livestock, and Natural
Resources Committee hearings on S.B. 481, supra note 13, May 7, 1979, at approximately
4:06 p.m. (emphasis added).
25. Senate Agriculture Commitee hearings, supra note 14, at approximately 3:00 p.m.
(emphasis added).
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"nonabandonment" or intent to reuse, identification, 26 and control,
would appear to have been its meaning in the legislators' eyes.
In fact, those three terms which the legislators understood to be the
hallmarks of "dominion" are the same which keep reappearing in the
case law from other states, 27 like beacons in the mist: intent, identifica-
tion, and control. As will be seen, any particular element of these three
may be emphasized with or without the others, in different proportions,
any one assuming paramountcy depending on the aspect of reuse which
is important in the case at hand. It is reasonable, therefore, to regard
these three elements as the primary components of "dominion."
INTENT AS AN ELEMENT OF DOMINION
The intent to reuse is at this point in Colorado law primarily an
implicit, common-law requirement on the prospective reuser, and per-
haps so obvious as to appear simplistic. The user of developed water
must intend to reuse, at the very least, or the statute compels that the
water discharged after first use will belong to the stream.2 8 Intent to
reuse probably can be presumed if the developed water remains always
in the continuous actual possession of the owner, meaning inside a con-
fining structure within the boundaries of his or her property. When the
water either leaves the owner's property or leaves confinement, how-
ever, intent would seem to be critical as the "first cut" to distinguish the
prospective reuser from the abandoner, who discharges water to the
stream merely to get rid of it.
That the legislature thought it necessary to insert express language
permitting the use of a natural watercourse as a conduit to take reusable
water downstream to the place of successive use reinforces this view.2 9
Only if the placing of the water in the watercourse is purposeful (done
with a specific type and place of successive use in mind) does this lan-
guage have effect, as the reason for it is to protect the reuser from the
interpretation of abandonment of the water that would normally attach
to such a practice. As a Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice once
stated, "[Ihf it was put in with the intention of taking it out and using it,
it belongs to the person causing the increase." 3 0
26. Although concededly redundant with the "volumetric distinction" requirement in
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106 (1) (1990) that "identification" is also understood by many
to be comprehended within "dominion" is explored more fully in the "Identification and
the Burden of Proof" section of this article.
27. See also Annotation, Right of Appropriator of Water to Recapture Water which has Escaped
or is Otherwise No Longer Within the Immediate Possession, 89 A.L.R. 210 (1934), for more cases.
28. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106(2) (1990) ("Such water, when released from the
dominion of the user, becomes a part of the natural surface stream where released, subject
to water rights on such stream in the order of their priority .... ).
29. See Annotation, supra note 27, at § 11(a), and Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United States,
269 F. 80 (8th Cir. 1920), affg United States v. Ramshorn Ditch Co., 254 F. 842 (D.C.
1918) (dealing with appropriative water).
30. Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68
Colo. 437, 451, 191 P. 129, 134 (1919) (Garrigues, C.J., dissenting). Although Justice Gar-
rigues was outvoted on his characterization of the water in this case as "developed water,"
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The difficult question to answer is when, if ever, in Colorado intent
must manifest itself to ensure the right of reuse. For example, may the
developer who has been heedlessly discharging return flows from devel-
oped water for many years suddenly form the intent to reuse, change
her or his practice, and begin capturing that water to use over? Section
10631 cannot readily be interpreted as providing an answer to this ques-
tion. The Colorado Supreme Court has also avoided addressing this
issue, the equitable "flip side" of which is reliance on the developed
water return flows by downstream juniors who made their appropria-
tions in the expectation that the waters they saw available at the time
were waters of the state, rather than waters which were privately owned.
The question may perhaps be answered if some confusion in the
labeling is unraveled. In the cases where intent is discussed, it is some-
times characterized as the intent to recapture and reuse,3 2 and some-
times as merely the intent not to abandon.3 3 These are in fact two
distinct problems. As the doctrine of abandonment comes into play
only if there is a delay between the commencement of first use and the
implementation of recapture/reuse plans, "intent not to abandon"
should need to be proved, if at all, not in lieu of intent to reuse, but
rather regarded as an additional hurdle which may need to be overcome
by the nondiligent reuser.
The most positive proof that there exists intent to reuse, other than
the continuous possession/confinement scenario already mentioned,
would be a comprehensive plan for reuse to be implemented concur-
rently with the initial use of the developed water.3 4 This level of proof
thus is similar to that required for the intent to appropriate in the condi-
tional water rights context, constituting a "fixed purpose to pursue... a
certain course of action." a55 Intent to reuse should be regarded as a
question of fact, proved by concrete plans which indicate the place and
type of each successive use to be made of the water, and also logically
requiring evidence of the developer's ability accurately to identify, as
well as to control (if necessary), the water sought to be reused.3 6
the principles he reviewed as governing the right to reuse provide a helpful summary of
the development of the law to that time.
31. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-82-106 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 507 (1924) (the government's intent to
use all the water for project purposes was "stated and restated in various official reports,
... and was well understood by the project officers."); and Rio Grande Reservoir, 68 Colo.
437, 451, 191 P. 129, 134 (Justice Garrigues's dissent discussing cases where intent to
recapture was present).
33. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservation Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715
(Colo. 1984) and City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 179 Colo. 47,
506 P.2d 144 (1972) (both discussing the evidence of no intent to abandon).
34. See Wiel, Mingling of tWaters, 29 HARv. L. REv. 137 (1915) and Fischer, Re-Use of
Foreign Waters, 7 COLO. LAw. 523 (1978) (discussing concepts Wiel developed in his arti-
cle); see also, Martz, Seepage Rights in Foreign Maters, 22 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 407 (1950).
35. Water Supply Storage Co. v. Curtis, 733 P.2d 680, 683-84 (Colo. 1987) (quoting
City and County of Denver v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730, 745
(Colo. 1985)).
36. See, e.g., Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United States, 269 F. 80 (8th Cir. 1920) ("The
existence or nonexistence of an intention to abandon is a question of fact," 269 F. at 84);
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The argument for requiring an equivalent demonstration of intent
in the reuse case to that in the conditional rights context is a sensible
one. While proof of intent to appropriate in the conditional rights con-
text does determine the extent of a property right,3 7 not an issue when
the subject is a quantity of water already privately owned, the type of
proof required that no injury occur to vested water rights from the tak-
ing may be identical. In the conditional rights case, the injury question
must be addressed in determining whether water is available for appro-
priation;38 in the reuse case, the question must be addressed before re-
capture is allowed and the right to reuse recognized.3 9 Proof of how
much water will be taken out, at what locations and at what times, in-
cluding in what quantities depletions will occur to the stream, should be
fundamental to answering the injury question in both cases. Also, own-
ers of vested water rights deserve the opportunity to discover the extent
of a prospective reuser's plans for recapture and reuse in detail, and to
be heard on the injury issue, as much as they do in the tributary condi-
tional rights case.
40
If the most positive proof of the intent to reuse is not present
(meaning the plan for reuse is either not sufficiently detailed or is not
implemented concurrently with initial use), the question of abandon-
ment of the reuse right then could potentially arise. For example, in
Fulton Ditch Co., Denver thought it prudent to make "a good record" at
trial that it never intended to abandon its return flows,4 ' and the City of
Pueblo did likewise in the most recent pronouncement of the supreme
court on the reuse issue.4 2 Proof of intent not to abandon might be
adequately made by a reservation of the right to reuse expressed in the
original decree for the water. Resume notice at the time of application
would also have the salutary effect of putting later appropriators on no-
tice that the enhanced flows they observe are in fact private property
Southeastern Colo. Water Conservation Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715 (Colo.
1984); Curtis, 733 P.2d 680; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (1990); and discussion in
note 37 infra. Also see the "Control" section of this article.
37. A water right is established by an appropriation. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-
103(12) (1990). The definition of "appropriation" states that it means "the application of
a specified portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use.., but no appropriation of
water, either absolute or conditional, shall be held to occur when . . . [t]he purported
appropriator of record does not have a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise
capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses." COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a)(II) (1990) (emphasis added).
38. Cache la Poudre Water Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53, 61,
550 P.2d 288, 294 (1976) ("water is available for appropriation when the diversion thereof
does not injure holders of vested rights").
39. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106(1) (1990) ("Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to impair or diminish any water right which has become vested.").
40. See Bunger v. Uncompahgre Valley Water Users Ass'n, 192 Colo. 159, 557 P.2d
389 (1976).
41. City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch, 179 Colo. 47, 58, 506 P.2d
144, 150 (1972) (The trial court did not, however, pass upon the issue).
42. City of Florence v. Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990). The
supreme court quoted from the trial court's ruling: "Transmountain waters have unique
properties, most importantly, the right to use, reuse, and successively use to extinction,
free from the call of the river, unless those reuse rights are somehow abandoned or otherwise surren-
dered. The evidence showed that such a loss has not in fact occurred " Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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subject to discontinuance at any time.43 Other evidence should also be
admissible to the extent it is in the tributary water rights context.
But as mentioned, whether as a question of law the reuse right may
be abandoned is dubious, and has not been addressed by the Colorado
Supreme Court.44 There is in fact some indication to the contrary in
City of Florence. The supreme court stated there that "importers of for-
eign water are accorded wide latitude as to the use and disposal of the
[imported] water" in finding that the general change of water right crite-
ria did not apply to the imported water.45 It also quoted with approval
the principle set forth in a treatise on Colorado water law that "the ap-
propriator of such waters may reduce or eliminate the amount of foreign
water available to junior appropriators, by changing the time, place or
manner in which these waters are used, even if junior appropriators are
adversely affected." 46 Also, as Colorado law does not permit the reuse
right to attach to tributary water, there is less motivation to apply aban-
donment principles to the reuse right here than there would be, say, in
California. Adding to these statements the fact that there is no statutory
diligence requirement on the right to reuse, unlike the conditional water
right situation, it seems unlikely that the supreme court will find aban-
donment of the right to reuse even after many years of non-reuse. As it
held for Pueblo against downstream juniors who complained of that
city's decision to change the place of use of its imported water after
years of heedless discharge,47 the Court would probably also hold for
the developer who finally formulates and implements a plan for recap-
ture and reuse under the same circumstances. 48 For the part of the
downstream junior, however, let it be also remarked that even if the re-
use right may not be lost through abandonment, it potentially could be
adversely possessed against the nondiligent reuser.
49
43. "[Alppropriators on a stream have no vested right to a continuance of importa-
tion of foreign water which another has brought to the watershed." Brighton Ditch v. City
of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 377, 237 P.2d 116, 122 (1951).
44. Fischer, Re-Use of Foreign Waters, 7 COLO. LAW. 523 (1978), distinguishes the aban-
donment of the "corpus of the water" from the abandonment of the reuse right. Cer-
tainly, physical abandonment of the water itself, as occurs when a gap exists between the
initial use of the water and later implementation of plans for reuse, might serve as an
indicator of intent to abandon the reuse right altogether.
45. Florence, 793 P.2d at 154.
46. Id.
47. Florence, 793 P.2d 148.
48. Nevertheless, a stipulated decree containing an effective diligence requirement
was quoted with approval by the supreme court in Fulton Ditch, although not because of
any equitable balancing of the reuser's versus the downstream users' rights. Rather, the
reuse itself, as required in that decree, was seen as a way of furthering the goal of minimiz-
ing transbasin diversions from the Western slope. City and County of Denver v. Fulton
Irrigation Ditch, 179 Colo. 47, 54-55, 506 P.2d 144, 148 (1972); accord City of Florence v.
Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990). The implication, thus, is that there is a
duty to reuse before more transmountain diversions should be allowed.
49. See, e.g., Lomas v. Webster, 109 Colo. 107, 122 P.2d 248 (1942) (dealing with
adverse possession of nontributary seepage water arising on the lands of another). But see
Martz, supra note 6.
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IDENTIFICATION AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A requirement that the reuser "identify" reusable water in the
course of establishing the right to reuse is separately embodied in the
statutory requirement of volumetric distinction. 50 Requiring that the
reuser is in fact using her or his own water, and not water owned by
others, also furthers the separate statutory requirement of no injury to
vested water rights set forth in the same paragraph.5 1 As the Montana
Supreme Court has succinctly put it, "Whoso asserts that he is entitled
to the exclusive use of water by reason of its development by him must
assure the court by satisfactory proof that he is not intercepting the sup-
ply to which his neighbor is rightly entitled." 52 Other cases agree that
the burden of proof as to identification is on the developer:
The burden of proof rests with the party causing the mixture.
He must show clearly to what portion he is entitled. He can
claim only such portion as is established by decisive proof. The
enforcement of his right must leave the opposite party in the
use of the full quantity to which he was originally entitled.
53
As these quotations reflect a concern with injury, again, by analogy
to the level of proof required to prove no injury in a change of water
rights case it can be said that the reuser makes "satisfactory" 5 4 or "deci-
sive" proof,55 once specific injury to a vested right is asserted, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
5 6
As to the elements of identification, one Colorado water lawyer
writing on the subject has characterized them as follows: "A prospective
reuser must prove that it can maintain "dominion" of the water by quan-
tifying the amount, timing, and location of the return flows in order to establish
that it will be reusing its own water rather than water properly claimed
by senior water rights."' 57 Thus, each of these three elements, amount,
timing, and location, should be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106(l) (1990) ("[S]uch appropriator may make a suc-
cession of uses of such water ... to the extent that its volume can be distinguished from
the volume of the streams into which it is introduced.").
51. Id.
52. Smith v. Duff, 39 Mont. 382, 391, 102 P. 984, 986-87 (1909).
53. Butte Canal & Ditch Co. v. Vaughn, I 1 Cal. 143, 153 (1858). See also, e.g., United
States v. Haga, 276 F. 41, 43-44 (S.D. Id. Cir. 1921) ("Nor is it essential to his control that
the appropriator maintain continuous, actual possession of [water sought to be recap-
tured] .... It zs requisite, of course, that he be able to identify it; but, subject to that limitation, he
may conduct it through natural channels and may even commingle it or suffer it to com-
mingle with other waters.") (emphasis added); Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 201, 225 P.
214, 214-15 (1924); and Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 115, 69 P. 719, 726
(1902) ("The burden.., is upon him who turns water into a natural stream to show that
he has not taken more out of it than belonged to him.").
54. Smith, 39 Mont. at 391, 102 P. at 986.
55. Butte Canal, I1 Cal. at 153.
56. Danielson v.Jones, 698 P.2d 240, 249 (Colo. 1985). See also Hallenbeck v. Granby
Ditch & Reservoir, 160 Colo. 555, 568, 420 P.2d 419, 426-27 (1966); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-25-127(1) (1987).
57. Hallford, Water Reuse and Exchange Plans, 17 COLO. LAw. 1083 (June 1988) (empha-
sis added) (footnote omitted).
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Identification of the return flows contributed by the developer is the
major stumbling block in plans for reuse. The statutory exception that
dominion will not be lost merely by use of a "natural watercourse" to
carry developed water to its place of use or successive use 58 raises the
question of whether a tributary underground aquifer can constitute such
a "natural watercourse." Developed water return flows which have trav-
eled underground and intermingled with other waters of the state, after
irrigation, for instance, if sufficiently identified therefore might be recov-
erable through wells, or even from the surface stream itself at a point
down-gradient.
But in such a case, the problem of identification is considerably
more complicated than it is in the simple surface water situation. For
instance, the early cases involved developed water produced from a
mine and turned into the watercourse via a flume, where it could be
measured. Hence, such water was easily identifiable when taken out
again downstream: there was effectively no time delay, and the water's
physical presence in the stream was observed. The right of recapture
for reuse was later established for wastewater discharges from municipal
systems, where essentially the same circumstances are present.
The most important Colorado case to date dealing with the subject
of reuse is a municipal wastewater case, City and County of Denver v. Fulton
Ditch.5 9 The court did not directly take up the issue of identification,
since that issue was determined on the basis of stipulated facts. But the
supreme court noted with approval that stipulation, which specified that
"[t]he amounts of water put into the potable water distribution system
by Denver, delivered into sanitary sewer systems, and discharged into
the South Platte River are measured to the extent traceable or determined by
calculations, interpolations, interpretations or estimates, based on
measurements. -
60
These sorts of engineering or accounting procedures were impor-
tant again in City of Florence,6 1 which also concerned recapture and reuse
of municipal wastewater discharges. In that case, the supreme court was
content to rely on the trial court's findings of the adequacy of account-
ing methods employed, subject to approval by the division engineer, in
determining the volume of water which could be exchanged while pro-
tecting against injury to other vested rights. The accounting procedures
considered "the ratio of native to transmountain water in [Pueblo's
water delivery and sanitary sewer system]; the infiltration of ground-
water into the Pueblo system; and certain transit and stream losses."
'62
It was remarked by the court in City of Florence that Pueblo's exchange of
foreign water was similar to the plan of Denver's approved in Fulton
58. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106(2) (1990).
59. City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d
144 (1972).
60. Id. at 57, 506 P.2d at 149-50 (emphasis added).
61. City of Florence v. Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990).
62. Id. at 150, note 5.
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Ditch.63 In both, the proportion of developed water was known at all
times: either measured directly, or determined by calculations based on
prior measurement.
Indeed, the right of recapture and reuse in the municipal waste-
water case is well established probably because identification is easy
when the water is always effectively in a pipe (meaning always confined,
as it goes from pipe to dishwasher, bathtub, toilet, or the like, and
thence to a pipe again). It is similar to water produced from a mine,
which, coming from confinement, is also effectively channelized, and so
easily measurable before its discharge to the stream. A much different
situation arises, however, in the irrigation context, when the water
sought to be reused has percolated underground and mingled with
other waters of the state. Whether the contributed water is in fact physi-
cally present at the time and point of recapture, and in the quantities
expected, is an important question which cannot be answered by mere
visual observation. "Accurate differentiation" of the waters is difficult to
make,64 and to date there are no reported Colorado cases which have
authorized reuse of irrigation return flows.
There do exist cases involving irrigation or water conservancy dis-
tricts, where the right to reuse irrigation return flows has been granted,
and recapture of such waters has, at least on paper, been allowed to
occur within the boundaries of the district.65 But as all water rights in
these cases apparently belonged exclusively to the district in question,
the problem of differentiating the reusable developed water from waters
subject to the priority system did not arise.66 The applicability of such
cases to the general situation (where not all waters are owned by the
prospective reuser, who seeks to withdraw groundwater within the
boundaries of her own property) is thus undecided. It seems clear, how-
ever, that dominion over real property should not be confused with do-
minion over return flows of water. Identification of waters sought to be
63. Id. at 154.
64. See Water Supply and Storage Co. v. Curtis, 722 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1987); Ft. Mor-
gan Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 206 P. 393 (1922).
65. See, e.g., Estes Park v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 677 P.2d 320 (Colo.
1984); Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1939); and Concerning the Appli-
cationfor Water Rzghts ofJames L Orr ("the Cottonwood case"), 81CW142, Water Division I
(March 21, 1986) (when appealed to the supreme court, the issue of dominion over the
return flows was not contested). In Curtis, 733 P.2d 680, there was no express requirement
the recapture be done within the district's boundaries. The supreme court remanded the
case to the trial court, however, to make an "accurate differentiation" of the foreign water
from waters of the state. After remand, a settlement was reached; the stipulated decree
then requires the applicant to "install such measuring and recording devices and institute
such accounting practices as are acceptable to and required by the State and Division Engi-
neers." Amendment to Decree in Case No. 82CW289, Water Division 1, April 19, 1988.
Identification was thus required to be made here.
66. See discussion in note 65 supra. It is important to note that the "reuse" reserved
by the District for its irrigation return flows in Estes Park, 677 P.2d 320, in fact appears to
be merely a concession of abandonment of such flows to the stream. There is no indica-
tion that the District's downstream ratepayers could take the return flows independent of
the priority system. It appears, to the contrary, those flows merely augment the supply
available to them, which users take pursuant to their respective decrees or shares.
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recaptured must still be made, in spite of the developer's ownership of
the property.
Yet the problem would appear at this point in the development of
the law to be one of proof, not of principle. Although there is no right
under Colorado law to recapture seepage water, that stricture applies to
tributary waters, not waters which are "paid for" and have been trans-
formed into private property. Thus, if the prospective reuser develops
the technical wherewithal to tag the individual water molecules belong-
ing to him or to measure or otherwise deduce with adequate precision
the proportion of that privately-owned water to other waters of the state,
it may be possible to meet the burden of proof as to identification of
developed water return flows. 67 Logically, however, as a general rule
identification should be easy. Whatever "dominion" over water really
is, it is indisputably present if that water, after first use, is in confine-
ment, and so capable of measurement prior to its commingling with
other waters of the state. The more complex the proof of identification
of the water becomes, however (meaning the further removed from ac-
tual physical measurement of the return flows themselves, and the more
dependent on measurements of other factors or on estimates and math-
ematical proofs in lieu of measurement), the more suspect that the water
is physically present at all, that it may be recaptured without injury, and
thus that it may be reused.
THE REQUIREMENT OF CONTROL
In other legal contexts, where the term "dominion" is apparently
well understood, it is defined as including "control." 6 8 Even though the
terms are often used together in legal parlance ("dominion and con-
trol") as well as in section 137(9),69 a more reasonable interpretation for
this use than that the words have different substantive meanings is the
fondness of lawyers for coupled synonyms (like "cease and desist" and
"null and void").70 Thus, "control" could easily be considered an all-
67. The applicant in case no. 88CW246 in Water Division 1, the Clear Creek Skiing
Corporation, for example, sought the right to recapture and reuse for augmentation for-
eign water applied to the Loveland ski areas as artificial snow, when those flows melted
and returned to the stream the following spring. The initial plan to reuse this water was
denied by the court (decree of Feb. 1, 1990), as the applicant proposed no accurate
method to distinguish its contribution from natural snowmelt. Although on a seasonal
basis, the quantity of reusable water was sufficiently known, the actual timing and location
of the return flows were not.
Pursuant to its statutory right to propose additional terms and conditions to prevent
injury (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1990)), however, the applicant made a new pro-
posal to install a "Snotel" instrument, which would measure natural precipitation as well
as the reduction in snow-water equivalent when melting occurred. As the ratio of appli-
cant's water to the natural snow was known then, as were the times of actual melting and
return to the stream, the court subsequently decreed (January 14, 1991) that the applicant
had met its burden of proof as to no injury resulting from the recapture and reuse. The
legal right to reuse was thus established.
68. See definition of "dominion" in BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra, note 19, and
Fischer, supra, note 24.
69. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(9) (1990).
70. R. MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE 4-5 (1982).
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purpose synonym for dominion; however, for purposes of this discus-
sion it will not be. Rather, as "intent" and "identification" have been
employed as separate elements of dominion, "control" as the missing
included component will also be restricted to a specific meaning which
does not overlap those terms, and so can be analyzed separately. Here,
"control" will mean the ability to regulate the flow of water, an ability
which presupposes physical confinement. Assigning such a meaning to
"control" is useful precisely because it permits identification then to be
analyzed separately, and at least theoretically accomplished without the
necessity for physical confinement.
That the right of reuse, or the concept of dominion, is not com-
pletely described without the added parameter of control is apparent
first by analogy to appropriative water law, where control is fundamen-
tal. Sections 305(9)(a) and (b) 7 1 provide that a decree for absolute and
conditional water rights may be granted only to the extent it is estab-
lished that the waters have been (or can and will be) diverted, stored, or
otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled.72 The separate statutory defini-
tions of "divert" and "store" 73 also comprehend control of the water,
which as a practical matter requires it to be within some confining
structure.
In appropriative water law, the point at which control is no longer
required is generally that point at which the water is applied to beneficial
use. It is readily apparent that water cannot be used for most purposes
if it remains always in the structure used for its diversion or storage.
The requirement of control, then, while a practical as well as a legal
prerequisite to the beneficial use of water, is often antithetical to it. This
irony is much more serious in the reuse situation, as if the right to reuse
is held to depend on continuous control of the water, as in a pipe, the
ability to apply it to first use is severely restricted. The municipal water/
wastewater reuse precedent set by Fulton Ditch may be unique in meeting
the requirement of continuous, or near-continuous, control of the
water.7 4 And, as the municipal example is the only one to date ad-
dressed by the Colorado Supreme Court, it is not known whether "reus-
able water" is by definition restricted to only that which is continuously
controlled.
Yet it seems unduly harsh to require continuous control, in light of
the separate and stringent requirement of identification. If it is deter-
mined that identification of the developed water after first use is ade-
quate, so that recapture can proceed without injury, by analogy to
appropriative water law "control" should become important, if at all,
only in the course of applying the recaptured water to its next use. The
inquiry is thus reduced to whether recapture must in fact be physically
71. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-305(9)(a), (b) (1990).
72. Id.
73. Id. at §§ 37-92-103(7), (10.5).




effected in a particular situation for reuse to proceed without injury, or
whether recapture can be forgone. The answer to that inquiry is that the
level of control required should be entirely determined by an injury
analysis made with reference to the nature of the successive use.
One method of achieving control, the type utilized in the municipal
cases, would be an exchange into storage. City of Florence75 and Fulton
Ditch76 involved exchanges into storage of native water for the foreign
contribution in municipal wastewater. The amount taken in at the reser-
voir in these cases (ignoring losses) was equivalent to the amount of
foreign wastewater released. The rate of entry into storage could also
easily be tied to the rate of discharge. Thus, in any such exchange case
the water which is ultimately "reused" after the exchange is in fact not
the water discharged from the treatment plant, but the water which has
entered into storage upstream. "Recapture" thus actually occurs at the
reservoir, while simultaneous identification occurs at the point of dis-
charge. Control of the discharge is consequently unimportant; and con-
trolled releases of reservoir water can easily be made, so that reuse can
proceed whenever desired. It would seem that wherever the identification
hurdle is overcome, whatever the source of developed water, and an ex-
change allowed to proceed as described (or similarly, when the identi-
fied water itself is directly placed into storage), the prospective reuser is
"home free" on the control issue. The level of control achievable by
releases from storage is sufficient for any successive use.
7 7
In a second scenario, where the water is identified at the actual
point of discharge, thence to be applied directly to the successive use
without the benefit of storage, the ability to regulate the flow of water at
the point of discharge may or may not be important. For instance, if the
purpose of reuse is augmentation, whereby water must be supplied to
seniors by the out-of-priority diverter at the time and place of the se-
niors' need, a high level of control of the augmentation sourcewater
could be required. 78 Although many of these types of plans have been
approved at the trial court level, it would seem that simply relying on a
general, seasonal credit for return flows seeping back to the stream at
their own rate might not suffice as sources for augmentation, as these
flows cannot be turned on and off to satisfy the call. But if the second
use is subirrigation of adjacent lands, or recharge of underground aqui-
fers, control should then be unimportant.
CONCLUSION
The concept of dominion in water law is best regarded as flexible,
assuming almost different forms depending on which aspect of the prob-
75. City of Florence v. Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990).
76. 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972).
77. Exchanges themselves are subject to legal requirements, an examination of which
is beyond the scope of this article. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-101 (1990), and Hallford,
supra note 57.
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(8) (1990). Augmentation plans also require their
own injury analysis.
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
lem of reuse is being examined. It might be useful to think of "reuse"
as a three-stage process. At the first stage, the time of original use, it is
intent which is most important in satisfying the requirement of domin-
ion: the prospective reuser ideally should demonstrate a comprehensive
plan which evidences the physical and legal ability to reuse. At the sec-
ond stage, the time of recapture of return flows, it is identification which
is primarily important: the developer must accurately differentiate the
reusable water from other waters of the state, so that more is not taken
out from the stream than has been contributed. At the third stage, the
time of successive use, control may be particularly important, as the na-
ture of the reuse may or may not require a high degree of control of the
water in order adequately to forestall injury to vested water rights.
The ultimate conclusion arrived at here is that, since in Colorado
the right of reuse can attach in the first instance only to waters not ini-
tially subject to the priority system, the corners of "dominion" are ade-
quately pinned down by an injury analysis. That injury analysis is
consistent with the reuse statute, but is not completely described with-
out addressing all three criteria suggested here: intent, identification,
and control. If the burden of proof as to each of these criteria is met,
and the subsequent user has a statutorily permitted relationship to the
original developer, the right of reuse then should be established.
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ALLSTATE INS. Co. v. TROELSTRup: APPLICATION OF THE
INTENTIONAL ACTS EXCLUSION UNDER
HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICIES TO
ACTS OF CHILD MOLESTATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, and in Colorado, the tragedy of sexual abuse
becomes a reality for children. In 1989, a national study found two mil-
lion reported incidents of child abuse of all types,' of which over
900,000 were confirmed. 2 Colorado recorded 7,224 confirmed reports
of child abuse or neglect in 1989, 3 classifying 1,969 as sexual abuse.4 Of
these, 1,208 were incest and 761 third party sexual abuse.
5
Colorado makes sexual abuse of a child a criminal offense.6 But
1. REPORT OF THE U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
(1990).
2. Id.
3. CONFIRMED REPORTS TO THE CENTRAL REGISTY (sic), (unpublished report) (1990)
(hereinafter REPORT).
4. Sexual abuse of children is defined as "the involvement of dependant, develop-
mentally immature children in sexual activities that they do not fully comprehend and
therefore to which they are unable to give informed consent and/or which violate the
taboos of society." R. HELFER & R. KEMPE, THE BATrERED CHILD 286 (4th ed. 1987).
5. REPORT supra note 3. COLORADO CENTRAL REGISTRY, REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE
TO COLORADO CENTRAL REGISTRY FOR CHILD PROTECTION at 6 (1986). This report defines
incest as "inappropriate sexual activity where the victim to perpetrator relationship was as
natural parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, foster parent, [or] sibling (natural, adoptive or
stepsibling)" and third party sexual abuse as "inappropriate sexual activity with a child
where the perpetrator is unrelated to the victim."
6. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405 (Supp. 1990) Sexual Assault on a Child.
(1) Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual
contact commits sexual assault on a child if the victim is less than fifteen years of
age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.
(2) Sexual assault on a child is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3 felony if:
(a) The actor commits the offense on a victim by means of such force, intimida-
tion, or threat as specified in section 18-3-402 (1) (a), (1) (b), or (1) (c); or
(b) Repealed, L. 90, p. 1033, § 25, effective July 1, 1990.
(c) The actor commits the offense as a part of a pattern of sexual abuse. No
specific date or time must be alleged for the pattern of sexual abuse; except that
the acts constituting the pattern of sexual abuse must have been committed
within ten years of the offense charged in the information or indictment. The
offense charged in the offense or indictment shall constitute one of the incidents
of sexual contact involving a child necessary to form a pattern of sexual abuse as
defined in § 18-3-401 (2.5).
(3) If a defendant is convicted of a class 3 felony of sexual assault on a child
pursuant to paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (2) of this section, the court shall
sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 16-11-309,
C.R.S.
Sexual contact within the meaning of section 18-3-405 is defined as:
the knowing touching of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's
intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact can
reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification,
or abuse.
§ 18-3-401 (4) C.R.S. (1986).
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prosecution and incarceration of the abuser does little to help the vic-
tim, who may suffer psychological effects from the molestation. 7 Often
such effects are long-term and require extensive medical assistance and
psychological therapy.8 Abused children have sought compensation for
these damages through civil suits,9 often recovering from an abuser's
insurance policy. Recently, several jurisdictions have limited recovery
under an intentional act exclusion provision of an abuser's homeowner's
insurance policy. In Allstate Insurance Company v. Troelstrup,10 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court joined this trend.
Section II of this Comment provides background of such suits and
the trend towards limitation of recovery. Section III reviews pre-Troel-
strup Colorado case law concerning the nature of intentional acts within
the meaning of an intentional act exclusion clause of a homeowner's in-
surance policy. Section IV examines the Troelstrup decisions. Section V
reviews the cases from other jurisdictions cited in support by the Troel-
strup court. Finally, section VI discusses the implications of Troelstrup
and reviews alternative sources of recovery for child sexual abuse
victims.
II. BACKGROUND
Victims of child sexual abuse have sought recovery from their abus-
ers for costs of past, present and future counseling, therapy and medical
expenses.'1 They have also pursued damages for pain and suffering,
emotional trauma, diminished childhood, hedonic damages (economic
measurements of reduced enjoyment of life) and punitive damages,
12
often under differing theories of recovery.' 3 Such suits have produced
impressive results. Laurie M. v. Jeffery M. 14 granted an abused step-
daughter $100,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive dam-
ages. 15 Thirteen alter boys who sued a Catholic priest for alleged sexual
abuse settled for $400,000 to $600,000 per child. 16 In Wilson v. Tobias-
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.3 (1986) Sexual assault on a child by one in a
position of trust.
7. See generally C. WALKER, THE PHYSICALLY AND SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD, (1988); R.
HELFER & R. KEMPE, THE BArERED CHILD, (4th. ed. 1987); Comment, Insurance Coverage
for Child Sexual Abuse Under California Law, 18 Sw.U.L. REV. 171 (1988).
8. See Comment supra note 7 at 172; HELFER supra note 7 at 294.
9. Moss, Fighting Child Abuse, A.B.AJ. Oct. 1, 1987 at 36. See Comment, Civil Remedies
for Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 223 (1986) (identifying and sug-
gesting reforms of obstacles barring suit by incest victims against their abusers and outlin-
ing theories of recovery).
10. 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990).
11. For a lengthy discussion of the long term psychological effects of incest and resul-
tant need for therapy, see Jones v. Jones, 242 N.J. Super. 195, 576 A.2d 316 (1990).
12. Pimpinelli, Incest: The Secret Tort; Toward a Civil Cause of Action, NJ.LJ. Jan. 17,
1991, at 12.
13. See Comment, supra note 9, (discussing tort theories including intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, assault and bodily harm).
14. 159 A.D.2d 52, 559 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1990).
15. See id. at 56, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 339, for a discussion of punitive damage awards in
sexual abuse cases. The court reduced the amounts from the $200,000 actual and
$275,000 punitive damages awarded by the trial court.
16. Moss, supra note 9.
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sen, 17 the plaintiff, sexually abused by a Boy Scout leader, was awarded
$4.2 million. Such verdicts only benefit the victim if a source exists to
satisfy thejudgment. Often the most likely source is the abuser's home-
owner's insurance policy.
Most homeowner's policies contain an "intentional acts" exclusion
provision, allowing the insurer to deny coverage for injury or harm that
results from acts intended or expected by the insured. 18 Abuse involves
intentional behavior by the molester that, at first glance, appears to fal
squarely within the exclusion. Plaintiffs have avoided these exclusions
and obtained recovery by alleging that abusers, while intending the act
of molestation, did not have the subjective intent to injure. Although
suggesting that an act of sexual abuse is not intended to harm the victim
seems ludicrous, evidence suggests that in some cases it may be true.19
Defendants have introduced expert testimony, often uncontroverted,
supporting this distinction.2 0 Insurers, however, have sought to deny
coverage in these cases by arguing that courts should decline to make an
act/harm distinction and instead find that molesters intended the resul-
tant psychological injury.2 1 Finding such an intent to injure brings the
acts within the intentional act exclusion provisions and allows insurers
17. On appeal the punitive damages were vacated; the actual damages were affirmed.
97 Or. Ct. App. 536, 777 P.2d 1379 (1989).
18. The policy in the Troelstrup case excluded coverige for "bodily injury or property
damage intentionally caused by an insured person." Troelstrup, 789 P.2d at 417. See gener-
ally Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly
Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R.4th 957 (1990).
19. "Because the sexual victimization of children is so reprehensible, the offender is
perceived to be some sort of depraved monster. [W]e have ... not found this to be the
case. His offense has been more the product of immaturity than malicious intent ...."
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SENTENCING ADVOCACY, THE CHILD MOLESTER: CLINICAL OB-
SERVATIONS (1989).
See also D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY & RESEARCH 33-44 (1984).
Child sexual abuse in many cases is motivated by emotional rather than sexual needs.
Finkelhor summarizes theories about why a molester commits child sexual abuse into four
research models. Some theorists believe that child sexual abusers have an arrested psy-
chological development and thus have a need to relate to "other" children because of their
low sense of self-esteem. Some evidence suggests that molesters actually have a sexual
orientation for children. A third model holds that the abuser is unable to get his or her
sexual and emotional needs met in an adult relationship. This model is often seen in cases
of incest in dysfunctional families. The fourth factor is that some social conditioning, in-
cluding role models set by the abuser's own childhood, may make molestation more ac-
ceptable because some social norms have been altered or never learned. See generally M.
BRASSARD, PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YoUTH, 81-82 (1987); K.
FALLER, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, 89-115 (1988).
20. [Accused molester] Troelstrup presented deposition testimony from several
involved professionals, as well as from the investigating officer, all of whom, in
essence, expressed the opinion that Troelstrup had no subjective intention to
injure or harm the child. He also submitted a psychologist's affidavit in which the
opinion was expressed that Troelstrup had formulated no conscious intent to
harm the child.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 768 P.2d 731, 732 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). See also Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. 618, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
Doe, 788 P.2d 121, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Abbott, 204 Cal. App. 3d
1012, 1016-17, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623-24 (1988).
21. See Grady & McKee, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR SEXUAL .IOLEST4TIOX OF
A MINOR: There should be no coverage for or duty to defend cases involving adnmtted acts of sexual
molestation by an insured, 56 DEF. COUNS. J. 170 (1989). This article reviews the trend of
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to deny any duty to defend the insured or satisfy a judgement assessed
against the insured.
Since 1982, eighteen states have decided, generally in declaratory
judgment actions brought by insurers, that the intent to injure will be
inferred as a matter of law from the intent to commit the molestation,
thus allowing insurers to deny liability under homeowner's insurance
policies. 2 2 In its decision in Troelstrup, the Colorado Supreme Court
joined the jurisdictions accepting this view.
III. COLORADO CASE LAW ON THE MEANING OF AN INTENTIONAL ACT
EXCLUSION OF A HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY PRIOR TO
TROELSTRUP
Butler v. Behaeghe23 established the general approach in Colorado to
defining intentional acts within the meaning of an intentional act exclu-
sion in a homeowner's insurance policy. Behaeghe struck Butler in the
head with a steel pipe, causing serious injury. Behaeghe claimed he in-
tended to strike the plaintiff in the abdomen but not to injure him. After
a favorable jury verdict, Butler sought recovery against the third-party
defendant Safeco, the defendant's homeowner's insurance carrier.
Safeco denied liability, claiming the defendant's actions were intentional
within the meaning of the intentional acts exclusion.
Behaeghe, seeking to secure coverage, argued that for the exclusion
to apply, Safeco must show not only that he intended to strike the plain-
tiff but also intended to cause the specific resulting injury.24 The court
of appeals held that, within the meaning of an intentional act exclusion,
coverage is excluded if the insured acted with the intent to cause any
bodily injury, even if the resultant injury differed in character or magni-
tude from that expected. 2 5 The court found that in general such an ex-
decisional law in the area and concludes by noting the trend "favors insurers. We applaud
that trend." Id. at 178.
22. The first supreme court case to infer intent as a matter of law in a sexual assault
on a minor was Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982). Hill is
widely cited as precedent, however, the Hill court did not create a new rule inferring intent
in all situations. Instead the court found the defendant had received actual notice as to the
harmful effects of his actions by prior warnings of the state health department and inferred
intent. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Okla. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698
F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Doe, 163 Ariz. 388, 788 P.2d 121
(Ct. App. 1989); CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 666 S.W.2d 689 (1984); J.C.
Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 804 P.2d 689 (1991); Landis v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 546 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1989); Roe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 259 Ga. 42, 376
S.E.2d 876 (1989); Altena v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1988); Harpy
v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 Md. App. 474, 545 A.2d 718 (1988); Worchester Ins.
v. Fells Acres Day School, 408 Mass. 393, 558 N.E.2d 958 (1990); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v.
Gardipey, 173 Mich. App. 711,434 N.W.2d 220 (1988); Lehmann v. Metzger, 355 N.W.2d
425 (Minn. 1984); MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 124 N.H. 456, 471 A.2d 1166 (1984);
Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986) (en banc); N.N. v. Moraine
Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 84, 450 N.W.2d 445 (1990); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber,
376 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1988).
23. 37 Colo. App. 282, 548 P.2d 934 (1976).
24. Id. at 286, 548 P.2d at 938.
25. Id. at 287-88, 548 P.2d at 938-39 (emphasis added).
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clusion would apply unless the insured acted "without any intent or any
expectation of causing any injury, however slight."
26
The Colorado Supreme Court extended the scope of an exclusion-
ary provision in Chacon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company. 27 In
Chacon, an insured sought recovery from his own insurance company for
damages he paid after his son vandalized a public school. The policy
provided coverage for the named insured and other residents of the in-
sured's household, and excluded coverage for acts intended by any in-
sured.28 The insurer denied coverage, arguing that this language
excluded coverage to all those insured for property damage which was
intended or expected by any individual insured. 29 The insured brought
the instant suit for breach of contract. The supreme court affirmed a
decision for the insurer.
Such an exclusion was held not to apply in American Family Mutual
Insurance Company v. Johnson,3 0 which involved a mistaken assault on an
innocent party. Johnson, after a domestic dispute, kicked a person
whom he thought was his wife but turned out to be Brown, an
uninvolved third party; Brown was subsequently successful in a personal
injury action. American, the plaintiff, from whom Johnson held a home-
owner's insurance policy, brought a declaratory judgment action alleg-
ing thatJohnson's actions were within the scope of the provision.5 1 The
court held that an act intended to accomplish a certain result which ac-
complishes a result not expected or intended does not fall within an in-
tentional acts exclusion. 3 2 SinceJohnson neither intended nor expected
to kick Brown, the exclusion did not apply.33 In Mangus v. Western Casu-
alty Surety Company,3 4 Miller was tried for assault to commit murder after
shooting Mangus, and found not guilty by reason of insanity. In a sub-
sequent settlement, Miller assigned all rights under his homeowner's
policy to Mangus. Western Casualty brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion alleging that Miller's acts were intentional and it was thus not liable
for coverage under the intentional acts exclusion clause.3 5 The court
held that as the insured was insane at the time of the assault, the in-
sured's insanity, as a matter of law, precluded application of the
exclusion.
3 6
Thus, prior to the Troelstrup decision, an intentional act exclusion in
a homeowner's insurance policy had been held to apply where any in-
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. 788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1990).
28. Id. at 750. The policy defined the insured as "you and your relatives if residents
of your household." The intentional act exclusion provided that coverage would not apply
for injury "expected or intended by any insured."
29. Id.
30. 796 P.2d 43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
31. Id. at 44. The provision excluded coverage for "bodily injury... which is ex-
pected or intended by any insured."
32. Id. at 45.
33. Id.
34. 41 Colo. App. 217, 585 P.2d 304 (1978).
35. Id. at 218, 585 P.2d at 305.
36. Id. at 219-20, 585 P.2d at 306.
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sured intended or expected to cause property damage or injury. Cover-
age was not excluded where the insured simply had no intent to injure,
injured the wrong person by mistake or was legally insane at the time of
the act and could not form the requisite intent.
IV. THE TROELSTRUP SERIES OF DECISIONS
A. Troelstrup v. District Court
3 7
In December 1983, W.M.L., a minor, filed a suit by and through his
mother in Denver district court against the defendant, Glenn Troel-
strup, alleging sexual assault and seeking money damages for negli-
gence and outrageous, willful and wanton conduct.a8 Troelstrup
tendered his defense to Allstate, his homeowner's insurance carrier.
Allstate accepted under reservation of rights and sought a declaratory
judgment that Troelstrup's actions fell within the intentional act exclu-
sion in his homeowner's policy.3 9 The district court refused Troel-
strup's request to delay the action and allowed the declaratory action to
proceed before the underlying civil trial. Troelstrup sought review of
the denial of his request to delay through a petition of prohibition and
mandamus. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, additionally noting
its belief that Allstate had a reasonable likelihood of success in the de-
claratory judgment action.40 Justice Erickson, joined by Justice Neigh-
bors, specially concurred in the result but stated that he believed the
court had "unnecessarily" stated that Allstate had a reasonable likeli-
hood of success. 41 On remand, the district court entered summary
judgment for Allstate.
37. 712 P.2d 1010 (Colo. 1986).
38. Id. at 1010. W.M.L. was a 12 year old patient at Fort Logan Mental Health
Center, a state mental health facility. Troelstrup, age 53, was a volunteer member of the
Mental Health Advisory Committee of the center. The alleged molestation occurred at the
facility. W.M.L. alleged that Troelstrup had committed homosexual acts, committed the
crime of sexual assault on a child, slept nude with W.M.L. and had photographed and
developed nude and erotic photographs of W.M.L.
39. Id. at 1010. The homeowner's insurance policy had an exclusionary clause that
provided: "We do not cover bodily injury or property damage intentionally caused by the
insured person."
40. Id. at 1012-13. "Hence... the nature and character of the alleged facts giving rise
to W.M.L.'s personal injury case establish a reasonable likelihood that the tortious conduct
of Troelstrup is excluded from coverage under his homeowner's policy." The court went
on to cite three other cases, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W, 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1984); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 355 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1984);
Slate Farm Fre & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 355 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1984). All three cases in-
volved sexual assault, the first two on a minor and the last on a physically disabled adult.
The court found that all three supported the idea that "an intentional injury exclusion
clause may be invoked to negate the insurer's duty to defend where the nature and charac-
ter of the act is such that the intent to inflict injury may be inferred as a matter of law."
41. Troelstrup, at 1014. "[In so deciding], the majority virtually decides the merits of
Allstate's summary judgment claim, stating that Troelstrup's conduct is likely not covered
by the Allstate policy. Such a factual determination is properly made by the trial court."
(Erickson, J., concurring).
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B. Allstate Insurance Company v. Troelstrup4 2
The court of appeals reversed in Allstate Insurance Company v. Troel-
strup. The court initially determined that the sole issue before it was
whether, as a matter of law, Allstate would be excused from satisfying
any judgment W.M.L. might obtain against Troelstrup.4 3 The determi-
nation of that issue rested on whether Troelstrup had the subjective in-
tent to harm W.M.L.
4 4
Allstate argued that Troelstrup's previous nolo contendere plea4 5 and
his deposition admissions in the civil suit were sufficient, as a matter of
law, to bring his actions within the intentional act exclusion.4 6 Troel-
strup argued that, although he admitted the acts, he had provided un-
controverted deposition testimony from psychologists and the arresting
officer expressing opinions that he had no subjective intent to harm
W.M.L.4 7 Troelstrup claimed this constituted a genuine controversy as
to his intent to injure, raising a sufficient factual issue to preclude sum-
mary judgment.
4 8
The court of appeals found Butler v. Behaeghe4 9 to be controlling
precedent. The court also cited Allstate Insurance Company v. Steinemer50
for the "majority rule" that an exclusion did not apply to a policyholder
not intending that his act cause bodily injury, even given that harm was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act.5 ' The court held that
Troelstrup's subjective intent to harm was thus integral to the applica-
tion of the exclusion, and the determination of that intent was a factual
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
52
C. Allstate Insurance Company v. Troelstrup
5 3
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed in Allstate Insurance Company
v. Troelstrup. After reviewing Butler, the court noted that other jurisdic-
tions, while accepting this rule, had declined to apply it in cases of child
42. 768 P.2d 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. In a criminal trial held before the civil case was brought, Troelstrup pled nolo
contendere to a charge of felony sexual assault upon a child under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-
405 (1986) and received a three year prison sentence.
46. Id. at 732.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 37 Colo. App. 282, 548 P.2d 934 (1976). Fora discussion of Butler see supra notes
23-26 and accompanying text.
50. 723 F.2d 873 (1 th Cir. 1984).
51. 768 P.2d at 732. Steinemer involved an injury suffered when a minor injured his
friend by shooting him with a BB gun. The Eleventh Circuit followed what it termed the
"majority rule" which, within the meaning of an intentional act exclusion, separated an
intent to do an act from the intent to injure or cause harm by doing the act.
"Under the majority rule ... an 'intentional injury' exclusion will not apply if the
insured intentionally does an act, but has no intent to commit harm, even if the act involves
the foreseeable consequences of great harm or even amounts to gross or culpable negli-
gence." Id. (quoting Steinemer, 723 F.2d at 875) (emphasis in Allstate).
52. Allstate, 768 P.2d at 732.
53. 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990).
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molestation. 54 The other courts expressed several theories in support
of such holdings. Some used an objective test.55 This test permitted an
inference of intent, since a reasonable person would expect injury to
result from molestation. This approach, however, had been criticized as
being overly broad.56 Moreover, most jurisdictions that had considered
the issue had decided to infer an intent to injure as a matter of law.
57
The court found that jurisdictions which inferred intent as a matter
of law had taken judicial notice that sexual assault on a child will inevita-
bly produce some harm.58 The court quoted from Allstate Insurance Com-
pany v. Kim W, 59 declaring that injury is inherent in acts of child
molestation. 60 It also noted that both the Colorado legislature 61 and
court of appeals 62 had found harm present in cases of molestation. The
court also found the criminal statutes concerning child abuse implicitly
contained the idea that harm is present in and flows from the forbidden
behavior.
6 3
In its decision, the court held that an intent to injure would be in-
ferred as a matter of law from an intentional act of child molestation.
64
As a result, the subjective intent of the insured would not be relevant in
the determination of whether an intentional injury exclusion precluded
coverage.6 5 The court rejected Troelstrup's claim that the rule should
54. Id. at 418.
55. Such a test "considers what a 'plain ordinary person would expect and intend to
result [from the offender's sexual misconduct].'" Id. at 419 (quoting CNA Ins. Co. v.
McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 94, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (1984)).
56. "[Tlhe policy specifically states that the insured must expect or intend harm ....
[I]f an objective standard is used, virtually no intentional act would ever be covered."
Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 385, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (1986).
57. 789 P.2d at 419.
58. Id.
59. 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 334, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613 (1984).
60. [I]mplicit in the determination that children must be protected from such acts
is a determination that at least some harm is inherent in and inevitably results
from those acts .... "The harm may be manifested in many different mental,
emotional and physical ways, leaving a child with possible lasting and debilitating
fears."
Id. (quoting People v. Austin, 111 Cal. App. 3d 110, 114-115, 168 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407
(1980)).
61. The legislature has declared that "the sexual exploitation of children constitutes a
wrongful invasion of the child's right of privacy and results in social, developmental and
emotional injury to the child ...." (quoting CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-6-403 8B (1986)).
This section refers to sexual exploitation of a child, a different offense than Troelstrup was
charged with. The quoted language appears in section one of the statute and is a state-
ment of legislative intent only. The court has held that social, developmental and emo-
tional injury to the child is specifically not an element of this crime. Id. People v. Enea, 665
P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1983).
62. Kim W, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 334, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613. Child molestation "is
indeed a heinous crime that causes devastating results whenever it is committed, particu-
larly when the perpetrator is in a position of trust." (quoting People v. Garciadealba, 736
P.2d 1240, 1243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986)).
63. Id.
64. Id. Troelstrup had admitted the intentional nature of the acts. Troelstrup had
pled nolo contendere to the charge of sexual assault on a minor and the trial judge had deter-
mined that Troelstrup's actions were taken "to satisfy his own gratification." Id. at 417.
The court cited as support the cases discussed infra in section V.
65. Kim W, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The court said this deci-
sion does not "completely reject the [insured's] subjective intent; rather [it] overrule[s] the
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not preclude coverage for his actions as they were not "extreme," citing
Horace Mann Insurance Company v. LeeberA6 which found that the majority
rule inferring intent was not limited to cases involving "violence," "pen-
etration" or an abuse over a "lengthy period of time."6 7
Troelstrup did not contend that the count of negligence in the com-
plaint was relevant to the resolution of the issue.68 The court men-
tioned in a footnote that a Michigan court of appeals case had denied
coverage for a "negligent" molestation claim, calling it a "transparent
attempt to trigger insurance coverage" by recharacterizing intentional
child molestation as negligence.69 Finally, Troelstrup's claims that All-
state had not zealously pursued his defense in the civil case during the
pendency of the declaratory judgment were rejected, the court noting
that because Allstate had accepted under reservation of rights, its only
obligation was to prevent a default judgment or other prejudicial
action.7 0
V. DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS CITED AS SUPPORT IN
TROELSTRuP
Troelstrup cited decisions from California, Iowa, Minnesota and
Washington in support of the holding.7 1 Fire Insurance Exchange v. Ab-
bott 72 was a consolidated action involving two separate defendants ac-
cused of unrelated acts of sexual misconduct with a minor. Both
defendants admitted their acts but denied subjective intent to injure.
73
The court decided the question of intent in light of a statute excluding
coverage for "wilful" acts of an insured. 74 The statute is construed as a
part of all policies written in California; Colorado has no analogous stat-
utory language. Abbott adopted the holding of a previous California
case 75 inferring intent to injure as a matter of law from an intentional act
of molestation within the meaning of the "wilful" statute.7 6 Unlike
Troelstrup, Abbott did not involve an underlying criminal prosecution.
7 7
insured's actual intent in limited circumstances." (quoting Rodriguez v. Williams, 107
Wash. 2d 381, 385, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (1986)).
Of note is Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989). The Landis
court excluded coverage based on the insured's intentional act of molestation itself, not
reaching the question of specific intent. "[Wle believe that specific intent to commit harm
is not required by the intentional acts exclusion. Rather, all intentional acts are properly
excluded by the express language of the homeowner's policy."
66. 376 S.E.2d 581, 585-86 (W. Va. 1988).
67. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d at 420.
68. Id. at 418.
69. Id. at 418 n.7 (citing Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App. 750, 757, 376 N.W.2d
400, 406 (1985)).
70. Id. at 420.
71. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d at 419.
72. 204 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1988).
73. Id. at 1016, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
74. "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured ......
CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West Ann. 1990).
75. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984).
76. InJ.C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991), the
California Supreme Court upheld the holdings in both these cases.
77. The result in Abbott was upheld inJ.C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689,
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Altena v. United Fire and Casulty Company 78 involved an adult victim of
sexual abuse by a relative. The Altena court, although noting that the
victim was an adult potentially distinguished the case from others involv-
ing abuse of a minor, adopted the holding in State Farm Fire and Casulty
Company v. Williams 79 which refused to make that distinction. 80 Thus,
Troelstrup's reliance on Altena for support may indicate that Colorado
would extend the rule to cases involving sexual assault on an adult, de-
spite the court's express limitation of its holding to situations involving
minors. 8 1 Altena, like Abbott, did not involve an underlying criminal
prosecution.
In Lehman v. Metzger,82 an uncle was alleged to have sexually abused
his minor niece. It is not clear from the reported decision if Metzger
admitted his acts. The Lehman court, in a perhaps overly broad holding,
inferred intent to injure as a matter of law where the underlying claim
was that the insured intentionally sexually assaulted a victim (not limited
to an adult).83 The court provided no analysis, merely citing previous
state decisions.
8 4
In Rodriguez v. Williams,85 after Williams was convicted of commit-
ting incest with his minor stepdaughter, the stepdaughter filed a civil
suit.86 In the declaratory judgment action brought by his insurer, Wil-
liams in deposition admitted the incest but denied the subjective intent
to injure.87 He introduced an affidavit from his psychologist in sup-
port.88 The Washington Supreme Court rejected the reasonable person
standard applied by the court of appeals, finding the exclusion must be
interpreted from the insured's standpoint. 89 Nonetheless, the court
concluded that in cases involving incest it would infer intent to injure as
a matter of law and thus declined to allow coverage. 90
278 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991). The California Supreme Court also decided the issue in light of
section 533 of the California Insurance Code. Of note is that the court found the language
of the statute sufficient to infer intent: "Because we agree ... that child molestation is
wilful as a matter of law under section 553, we do not base our decision on the insured's
admissions of wrongdoing. Neither an admission nora criminal conviction is necessary to give rise
to the exclusion under section 533." Id. at 840 P.2d at 698 n.13, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 73
(emphasis added). Thus the California line of cases in this area, based on a state statute,
provides questionable support for Colorado's common law decision.
78. 422 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1988).
79. 355 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1984).
80. Altena, at 422 N.W.2d at 489.
81. "We conclude that an intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law where child
molestation is involved." Troestrup, 789 P.2d 415, 419 (emphasis added).
82. 355 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1984).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 426.
85. 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986).
86. Id. at 382, 729 P.2d at 628.




90. Id. at 388, 729 P.2d at 630. The court cited Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App.
750, 376 N.W.2d 400 (1985) and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 355 N.W.2d 421
(Minn. 1984), both reaching similar results in sexual abuse cases.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF TROELSTRUP FOR VICTIMS OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
It is not yet clear what effect the Troelstrup decision will have in Col-
orado. No commentators have yet analyzed the implications in those
jurisdictions which preceded Colorado in finding intent as a matter of
law in abuse cases. One California justice has offered a cautionary dis-
sent on the effects of a similar decision in that state. J.C. Penney Casulty
Insurance Company v. M.K.,91 settling a split in California appellate
courts, 92 reached the same holding as the Troelstrup court. Writing in
dissent, Justice Broussard identified two areas of concern with the ma-
jority opinion. Justice Broussard accused the majority of "practicing
psychiatry without a license and doing a terrible job of it."'9 s He pointed
out that all the expert testimony in the case showed that the abuser had
no subjective intent to harm the victim, even though the majority held
the testimony "irrelevant" and quoted from other cases to the effect that
such testimony "flies in the face of all reason, common sense and experi-
ence." 94 In strong language, Justice Broussard rebuked the majority for
discarding the expert testimony.9 5 He also noted that liability insurance
serves a two-fold function in society. Such insurance provides not only
funds for the wrongdoer to use to pay his debts but is a source of com-
pensation, often the only source, for victims. 96
Of note is that Troelstrup does not give guidance to what result the
court would have reached had the defendant denied the allegations in
the civil suit. Of the cases cited as support, the alleged molesters in
Abbott, Altena and Rodriguez admitted their actions. In Lehman the act was
established at a trial on coverage with no reference to an admission. In a
similar declaratory judgment action brought in Colorado by an insurer
subsequent to Troelstrup, a plaintiff's lawyer has successfully avoided the
application of the Troelstrup decision where the defendant in that case
denied committing the alleged acts.
97
The court in Troelstrup found it unnecessary to address the effect of
the nolo contendere plea, finding that the admissions in the deposition pro-
vided sufficient basis for its holding. 98 Even if it had reached that issue,
91. 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 804 P.2d 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991).
92. The difference centered on inferring intent to injure as a matter of law in child
molestation cases within the meaning of § 533 of the California Insurance Code, applying
a "wilful acts" exclusion to all policies in the state.
93. 804 P.2d at 701, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 704, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
95. There is nothing in our record to justify this shocking attack on the science of
psychiatry. Neither the majority opinion nor the cited authorities provide any
empirical evidence for such an attack, and the experience involved is that of child
molesters and those who work with child molesters, notjudges. In the absence of
experience, judges should not undertake to practice psychiatry. Id
96. "Often the wrongdoer's insurance is the only way the innocent victims of crime,
including child molestation, may recover compensation for medical expenses, their disa-
bilities and their injuries." Id. at 703, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
97. Conversation with Tim Devereux, Esq. (Feb. 18, 1991).
98. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 417 n.6.
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a nolo contendere plea has been held not relevant to prove intent.9 9 Thus,
if Troelstrup had denied the charges in the civil action, the court would
have had nothing on which to base its newly created mandatory infer-
ence of intent. Additionally, the court has long held that a guilty verdict
may be introduced only as prima facie evidence in a civil case.1 00 Had
Troelstrup been convicted in the criminal case and denied the charge in
the civil suit, the verdict could have been introduced only as prima facie
evidence. Trial courts are now apparently in the position of either up-
setting precedent and inferring intent as a matter of law from the previ-
ously prima facie evidence of a conviction, or not granting summary
judgment to an insurer and charging it with the duty to defend the suit.
Of the cases cited as support in Troelstrup, only Rodriguez v. Williams 10 1
involved a criminal prosecution. Williams was convicted of incest and
subsequently admitted his acts in deposition in the declaratory judg-
ment action. 10 2 As in Troelstrup, the Rodriguez court accepted the deposi-
tion testimony, not considering (or even discussing) the criminal
conviction. 10 3 Other states which have considered the use of criminal
convictions in similar declaratory judgment actions have reached differ-
ing results. 1
0 4
Also unresolved is the potential extent of the decision's application.
Given the plain language of the holding,10 5 it is unclear if the decision
covers any case in which child molestation is initially alleged, even if de-
nied by the defendant. Lehman v. Metzger, cited as support, appears to
exclude coverage where the claim alleges sexual assault. 106 If the doc-
trine does so extend, it is not obvious what occurs after an insurer is
released from any obligation to defend in a pre-trial declaratory judg-
ment action over the denials of the insured and ajury subsequently finds
that indeed no molestation occurred, or that the claim itself was spuri-
ous. It is possible that an insured may then seek reimbursement for his
costs. Also, as noted above, the Troelstrup holding is specifically limited
to cases involving child molestation,1 0 7 yet it cites Altena, involving an
adult victim, for support. As the case does not define what it considers
child molestation, nor limit any such definition by reference to the stat-
ute, it is possible that the age of the molester is not determinative.1
0 8
99. See People v. Goodwin, 197 Colo. 47, 593 P.2d 326 (1979).
100. Approximately Fifty-Nine Gambling Devices v. People, 110 Colo. 82, 130 P.2d
920 (1942).
101. 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1986).
102. Id. at 383, 729 P.2d at 628.
103. Id. at 388, 729 P.2d at 631.
104. See Annotation, Criminal Conviction as Rendering Conduct for Insured Convicted Within
Promsion of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Coverage for Damage or Injury Intended or
Expected by Insured, 35 A.L.R.4th 1063 (1990). This annotation discusses the use of convic-
tions on either a jury verdict or a guilty plea. There are no cases concerning use of a plea
of no/o contendere.
105. "We conclude that an intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law where
child molestation is involved." Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 419 (emphasis added).
106. 355 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1984), see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
107. 789 P.2d at 419.
108. Colorado makes sexual assault on a child a crime only where "the victim is less
than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim." CoLo.
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Troelstrup may thus apply to alleged molesters who are themselves mi-
nors. The ruling could in theory apply to a molester less than ten years
old, even though such a defendant can not be criminally charged. 10 9
Troelstrup should not affect a victim's initial ability to receive com-
pensation, if needed, for therapy and medical expenses. Funds are usu-
ally available from the local county Victim's Assistance program. 1 10
Recognizing the importance of such programs, a Presidential panel has
recommended an increase in funding for state and local programs that
assist minor victims of abuse, including sexual abuse. 1 11 If a criminal
case is successfully prosecuted, the court may order restitution from the
defendant in addition to other penalties. 112 There remains, however,
the difference between an order for, and payment of, restitution.' 
1 3
Troelstrup's effects will primarily be felt by the victim seeking recov-
ery for long-term or late-discovered psychological injuries 1 4 or for
non-economic damages. Where will this compensation come from after
Troelsirup? A victim may search for an alternate insurance policy provid-
ing coverage.' 15 A plaintiff may always seek recovery from a defend-
REv. STAT. § 18-3-405 (1986) (emphasis added). It is unclear if Troelstrup applies to a mo-
lester who can not be criminally charged.
Two decisions provide conflicting guidance in this matter. Compare Illinois Farmers Ins.
Co. v. Judith G., 379 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding no coverage for a minor
who was between the ages of 13 and 16 when he sexually assaulted two minors) with Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Jack S., 709 F. Supp. 963 (D. Nev. 1989) (refusing to infer intent and thus al-
lowing coverage for a 14 year old alleged abuser).
109. A person under ten years old can not be found guilty of a criminal offense in
Colorado. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-1-801 (1986).
110. Victim's Assistance offices are divisions of the District Attorney's offices in the
Denver metro area. Compensation is usually subject to approval by a review board before
disbursement.
Compensation varies in the Denver metro area: Adams County pays for a maximum
of ten therapy sessions at a maximum of $60 per session and will pay some medical ex-
penses if the victim has no primary insurance. Arapahoe County has no set maximum
dollar amount or number of visits. It seeks a treatment plan from a therapist and will
generally follow the recommendations in that plan. Arapahoe also pays reasonable medical
expenses.
Denver provides a maximum of $2,500 for therapy plus will pay for hospitalization
and miscellaneous medical expenses. Jefferson County will pay for one therapy session
per week at a maximum of $60 per session for a reasonable number of sessions. It will also
pay medical expenses, with a total maximum therapy and medical expenditure of$10,000
per victim.
11. PRESIDENT'S CHILD SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, FINAL REPORT 128-35 (1987). The
panel urged states to reduce or eliminate factors which may prevent minors from receiving
compensation from assistance programs offered by state and local governments, such as
the victim's age, the nature of the crime and the victim's unique reactions. It also sug-
gested that state and local governments develop "alternative funding mechanisms," such
as surcharges on wedding licenses or birth certificates, asset forfeiture of individuals con-
victed of child exploitation and mandatory fines or penalties in addition to existing crimi-
nal sanctions, to generate revenue to fund such compensation programs.
112. Such restitution is usually ordered paid as reimbursement to a Victim's Assistance
program if the victim has received such aid.
113. See infra note 117.
114. See Comment, Civil Remedies for Victims of Childhood S6=al Abuse, 13 OHIo N.U.L.
REV. 223, 229 (1986).
115. See Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392,442 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425
N.E.2d 810 (1981) (holding that, under a professional liability policy covering liability for
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ant's personal assets. In Doe v. Uhler,116 the plaintiff attached the
defendant's real property to avoid possible liquidation intended to avoid
a writ of execution. Obviously if the abuser is not of sufficient means to
satisfy the order or is judgment proof, any victory will be hollow. 1
7
One commentator suggests that incest victims may be able to re-
cover under a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress,' 18 a
tort recognized in Colorado 119 but not yet interpreted in this procedural
setting. Although the underlying complaint in Troelstrup contained a
count of negligence, the court did not address it as Troelstrup did not
argue the issue. Nonetheless, given the court's approving reference to a
Michigan case characterizing a negligence count as a "transparent at-
tempt" to avoid the effect of inferring intent,' 20 it seems reasonable to
expect an insurer may prevail in a declaratory judgment action against
such a count.
12 1
A victim may also seek recovery by filing suit against others who
may have been negligent in allowing the abuse to occur. 12 2 The parent
who did not commit the incest but knew or should have known that the
incest was being committed and negligently failed to intervene may be
reached through his or her homeowner's insurance policy. This ap-
proach may fail if the policy contains language similar to that in
injury resulting from "assault" or "undue familiarity," the insurance company had a duty
to defend dentist who had allegedly sexually assaulted an adult female patient).
116. 220 N.J. Super. 522, 532 A.2d 1133 (1987).
117. "Particularly as to child molesters, the wrongdoers are likely to be incarcerated
* and there is little likelihood that a judgment recovered against the wrongdoer can be
collected out of the wrongdoer's earnings. The wrongdoer will ordinarily be faced with
substantial legal expenses depleting whatever assets he may have had." J.C. Penney, 804
P.2d at 703, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
118. Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV., 609, 627-
28 (1983).
119. See Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978). In Towns, a minor
brought suit against a plumbing company after he witnessed an explosion which injured
his sister. He alleged the defendant had negligently exposed him to an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm. In finding the plaintiff had stated a cause of action, the court adopted the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 436(2) which provided: "If the actor's conduct is
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another... the fact
that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional dis-
turbance does not protect the actor from liability."
The court also cited with approval the definition of bodily harm from the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment C: "long continued nausea or headaches may
amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long continued mental distur-
bance, as for example in the case of repeated hysterical attacks, or mental aberration...."
In subsequent cases, Colorado has limited third party claims of fear for another's
safety where the third party was outside the "zone of danger." See Hale v. Morris, 725
P.2d 26 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
120. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 418 n.7 (quoting Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich. App. 750,
757, 376 N.W.2d 400, 406 (1985)).
121. But see State Farm v. Nycum, - F.2d -, 1991 WL 164632 (9th Cir. 1991), distin-
guishingj. C Penny and finding coverage when the jury found liability on a general verdict
which could have been premised on a finding of either intentional molestation or negli-
gent touching. The court rejected an automatic application of theJ.C. Penny doctrine in
any case involving an allegation of molestation.
122. Parents of a three year old boy who was molested by an employee of a McDonald's
restaurant sued the company alleging negligent hiring. The plaintiff sought $3.7 million
in damages. Denver Post, Mar. 1, 1991 sec. B, at 2 col. 1.
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Chacon 123 as discussed in section III. As Chacon involved a married
couple, it may be distinguishable if the abuser lives with but is not mar-
ried to the parent and thus not a relative within the meaning of the
policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Troelstrup, the Colorado Supreme Court, joining
a developing national trend, has foreclosed a major avenue of compen-
sation for victims of child molestation. Yet it is unclear if the Troelstrup
court was responding to social needs or insurer pressures. As abhorrent
as the reality of sexual abuse of a child is, there is no clear reason for this
exception to the Butler rule. Reference to Colorado's criminal statutes is
unpersuasive as the offense is sexual contact with a minor which can
"reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal,
gratification or abuse."' 24 This incorporates the reasonable person re-
view of the act specifically rejected in Troelstrup as overbroad. Addition-
ally, as discussed above, a guilty verdict is admissible only as prima facie
evidence.
Also troubling is the rejection of expert testimony as irrelevant.
Where the determinative issue is the intent of the insured to cause harm,
as set forth in Butler, it seems that expert evidence on this very point is
crucial. Yet the court declared such testimony as irrelevant. Insurers
argue that this trend represents sound public policy,' 25 yet it seems to
represent a fundamental shift in twentieth century tort law theory.' 26
The argument that an abuser will be less likely to commit acts of abuse if
he realizes that his homeowners insurer will not be available to defend
him or satisfy a judgment is spurious.' 27
123. Chacon v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1990).
124. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-405 (1986). See supra note 6 for the full text of the
statute.
125. See Grady & McKee, supra note 21, at 177-78.
126. In the late nineteenth century, liability insurance was viewed strictly as a contract
between the insured and the insurer. The insured was generally an employer, and an
injured employee had no direct recourse against the insurer. This changed in the early
part of the twentieth century. Insurance began to be regarded as a source of compensa-
tion for injured persons. This switch in viewpoints was driven by a larger change in the
perceived purpose of tort law. Tort law had been a means to punish the blameworthy for
their misdeeds, so that losses would "lie where they fell" unless the plaintiff could find a
culpable defendant. Twentieth century tort theorists began to view tort law as an efficient
way to spread the costs of injury throughout society. G. WHriE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA,
146-153 (1980). The trend adopted by Troestrup is a swing backwards, focussing on the
bad acts of the defendant and ignoring the compensation needs of the victim. See generally,
R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw, 1983; G. CALABRESI, IDEAS, BELIEFS, ATrrrUDES,
AND THE LAw (1985).
127. The availability of insurance coverage for child sexual abuse will affect the
perpetrator's choice to commit the act only if financial responsibility is one of his
concerns. Moreover, child sexual abuse is criminal conduct. A perpetrator cov-
ered by a homeowner's policy would not be more likely to sexually abuse a child
because he had a homeowners policy as he would still be subject to criminal liabil-
ity. If financial responsibility is a concern, the perpetrator has knowledge that his
action will harm the child. The very fact that a perpetrator knows he will become
financially responsible for the injuries sustained.., indicates that he is substan-
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Rather than carving a wholesale exception to the Butler doctrine, the
court could have created a rebuttable presumption, placing the burden
on the alleged molester to show through credible evidence, including
expert testimony, that he did not have the intent to injure. Or the court
simply could have required insurers to specifically exempt coverage in
the language of their policies. The fact that this unique situation re-
quired an exception to Butler dispels a "parade of horribles" argument
of a twenty page policy of which eighteen pages are enumerated excep-
tions to coverage.
Ultimately, the boundaries and implications of this new area of tort
law remain to be determined by the courts in Colorado and other juris-
dictions which have chosen to follow this trend in the law. 128 The needs
of the victims, however, have not changed. With this major avenue of
recovery now blocked, needed and deserved compensation may become
unavailable in many cases, thus increasing the suffering of the victims.
Daniel K. Frey
tially certain that the child will be injured by his conduct [thus establishing the
requisite intent to injure and triggering the policy exception].
Comment, supra note 7, at 175-76 (1988).
128. The California legislature recently passed a bill reversing the decision in J.C.
Penny. See 1991 Ca. S.B. 1147. The bill provides that in a civil action for damages for
injury resulting from an act of child molestation, the defendant's intent may not be implied
absent an evidentiary hearing on the matter and an insurer is not exonerated unless the
trier of fact specifically finds that the insured harbored a preconceived notion to intention-
ally harm. See also DebraJ. Saunders, California's Child Molesters'Relief Act, WALL ST.J., Oct.
3, 1991, at A18.
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